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ABSTRACT 
Throughout his career as moral philosopher Hare has insisted that there is 
a rational way of arriving at substantive moral jUdgements . Hare develops 
this view - first presented in ' The language of morals' (1952) and 
' Universalizability' (1955) - into the claim that rational agents are 
required to adopt utilitarian solu tions to moral disputes. In ' Freedom and 
reason ' (1963) this claim is defended with reference to the view that the 
formal features of moral language (universalizability and prescriptivity) 
commit moral agents to a certain method of reasoni ng, and that this method 
of reasoning, when conjoined with facts about people's desires and 
preferences, leads us to accept substantive moral judgements consistent 
with those required by a form of utilitarianism . This view features 
throughout Hare ' s subsequent work, but the argument for it undergoes 
change. This means change in the defence of the claim that the meta-theory 
Universal Prescriptivism is consistent with a form of normative util itar ian 
theory, as this claim is argued for in 'Ethical theory and utilitarianism' 
(1976) and 'Moral Thinking' (1981) . 
I shall endeavour to trace the chronological development of Hare's 
thinking, and will concentrate on developments in the argument for a theory 
of act-utilitarianism. I shall argue that the argument for utilitarianism 
gives rise to two major problems which arise from a specific feature of the 
argument, namely, the attempt to run the resolution of bi-lateral and 
multi-lateral cases of conflict along lines analogous to the resolution of 
conflict in the single-person case. Hare's argument requires that a 
decision-maker must identify the person with whom he reverses roles as 
himself, and that he must be prepared to concede that the things his 
( iii) 
recipient has good reasons for wanting are also reasons for him to want the 
same things . I argue that it is not possible to make coherent sense of the 
identity of the person in the reversed-role situation and that the 
motivational states a decision -maker is expected to deem 'his own' are not 
properly states of himself. If I am right, the 'identity'-question sits at 
the root of a motivational gap in Hare's theory. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the problem 
Hare believes that a proper account of the nature of moral reasoning will 
lead one to accept substantive moral principles; and in particular it will 
lead one to accept a form of utilitarianism . The object of this thesis is 
to trace Hare 's argument for this claim and to evaluate it. 
I will argue that Hare's analysis of the nature of moral reasoning does not 
entitle him to this claim. I will do this by outlining the development of 
Hare 's moral philosophy, and will co ncentrate on 
(1) the article 'Universalizability' (1955) 
(2) 'The language of morals' (1952 - revised 1961) 
(3) 'Freedom and reason' (1963) 
(4) the article 'Ethical theory and utilitarianism' (19 76) 
(5) 'Mora l thinking' (1981) 
Throughout Hare's writing there is an insistence that one must understand 
the logic of moral language if one is properly to understand the nature and 
limits of moral argument; and if one wants to adequately defend substantive 
moral judgements. Hare believes that an understanding of the logic of moral 
language commits one to a theory he calls 'universal prescriptivism ', and 
that this theory is the most adequate theory of moral discourse. Hare also 
believes that the method of reasoning which universal prescriptivism 
generates, taken in conjunction with other things he sees as necessary 
features of moral argument (facts, imagination, inclinations, desires, 
preferences), leads to rationa l acceptance of a form of utilitarianism -
preference act-utilitarianism in particular. 
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A skeleton outline of Hare's theory of moral reasoning includes the 
following kinds of claim: 
(a) Singular moral judgements are universalizable i.e. they entail 
identical judgements about identical situations. 
(b) Moral judgements are prescriptive in the sense that one's acceptance 
that x ought to be done entails the prescription 'Let x be done'. 
These are what Hare calls the basic logical properties of moral language. 
However, the method of reasoning which this analysis generates will not -
by itself - commit one to the acceptance of any substantive moral 
principles. We need , in addition, knowledge claims about 
(c) one's own and other people ' s inclination/ desires/ preferences , and 
(d) a certain power of imagination. 
We begin our moral deliberation by reflecting on what we are committed to 
in virtue of our understanding of the logical properties of mora l 
discourse. Any prescription we wish to offer must rest on a knowledge of 
the relevant facts of the situation we are judging. These facts include an 
awareness of the possibl e consequences of acting on the prescription, i.e . 
an awareness of how we and other people would be affected. The prescription 
must also be universal, i.e . it must be the one we are willing to act on 
were we the affected persons, i.e. were we in their positions with all and 
only the relevant universal features of their persons and circumstances. To 
arrive at a moral conclusion we must desire/ prefer - on balance - that a 
certain thing be done or not be done in all relevant ly similar situations, 
which include hypothetical situations in which we perform the role of each 
affected party in some random sequence . 
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If Hare is right, we are morally obliged to accept that line of action 
which we would accept if we were to be the persons in these situations. 
Hare claims that this line of action will maximally satisfy the 
desires/preferences of all concerned parties , i.e. it will be the course of 
action which a utilitarian would endorse. 
There is a recognisable sense in which all of the ingredients mentioned 
above and the picture just sketched feature throughout the development of 
Hare's theory. But these things undergo changes of statement and 
elaboration, changing defences and changes in emphasis . This means that the 
attempt to marry universal prescriptivism to utilitarianism undergoes 
various changes. The most dramatic of these changes occurs in Moral 
Thinking (1981). Hare introduces a new thesis, which I call simply the 
Knowledge Requirement, and which Hare defends as a conceptual truth. 
According to this thesis our knowledge of other people's preferences 
entails our having the same preferences. As I judge, the introduction of 
this thesis marks a departure from a claim Hare advances in Freedom and 
reason and Ethical theory and utilitarianism to the effect that all the 
moves he needs to make to defend utilitarianism derives from a 
consideration of the logical features of only the moral concepts. In 
discussing Hare's work, I will attempt to show how his thinking develops 
and changes over time. I will also attempt to show how Hare defends his 
methodological assumptions and what necessitates changes in his thinking. 
My argument throughout will be that Hare fails to bring about the desired 
marriage between universal prescriptivism and utilitarianism. 
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CHAPTER 1 
The initial theory of moral reasoning as presented in 'The l anguage of 
morals' (LM) and ' Universalizability ' (U) 
Introduction 
Hare insists that a crucial condition for developing an adequate theory of 
moral reasoning is a proper understanding of what he calls the logical 
features of moral language. These are universalizability and 
prescriptivity. They are the formal properties of moral language on which 
a theory of moral reasoning can be founded. 
My object in this chapter is to explore Hare's initial understanding and 
defence of these features of moral language and to see how they work in his 
initial theory of moral reasoning . I shall concentrate on examining a 
central claim in this initial theory, which is that moral judgements are a 
class of universalizable prescriptive jUdgements. There are two premises 
which jointly support this claim: 
(1) If some agent, A, accepts the moral judgement that x ought to be done 
in S, he is thereby committed to the view that anyone else in 
circumstances relevantly similar to S ought also to do X.l 
(2) 'X ought to be done', if used evaluatively, entails 'Let x be done' . 
If an agent assents to the moral judgement 'X ought to be done', he 
logi cally cannot dissent from the prescription 'Let x be done,.2 
The plan of this chapter is briefly as follows: I examine Hare's defence 
of universalizability and prescriptivity in sections 1 and 2 respectively. 
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My main contention will be that the so-called u-type requirements of 
universalizability demand more than mere applications of the principle of 
consistency, and that Hare's defence of universalizability, which proceeds 
via his account of supervenience, does not show what supports these 
requirements . In section 3 I examine the place of universalizability and 
prescriptivity in Hare's critical theory of moral reasoning . I concentrate 
on the notion of a decision of principle and argue that Hare's initial 
theory admits a form of subjectivism. 
Section 1. Universalizability 
It is, according to Hare 's argument in U, a feature of the logic of 
evaluative judgements that they require justification. Their justification 
always involves, as major premiss, a moral principle to which appeal is 
made .3 Moral principles , however, are of a pecu l iar nature. They must be 
formulable without using terms which function as individual constants and 
so their most distinctive feature is t hat they make no reference to 
particular individuals . Moral judgements , because they are moral, are ' u-
type valuations' , i.e. th ey are applications of 
a rule wholl y de void of personal references, a rule containing 
only predicates (descriptions) and logical terms,. 4 
Being supportable thus i s what Hare means by saying that they are 
universaiizable. 5 Expressed in the form of a principle, Hare makes the 
following claim: 
(UP) If A accepts the moral judgement that x ought to be done in S, this 
implies that he accepts that x ought to be done in all circumstances 
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relevantly similar to S indifferently of who is actually who in these 
circumstances. 
Suppose C is A's reason for holding that x ought to be done in S. Stated in 
terms of reasons for moral judgements, (UP) reads like this: 
C is a reason why x ought to be done in S if and only if A accepts that it 
is also a reason for anyone else in relevantly similar circumstances to 
do x. 
Hare's thesis is not that C id a reason for anyone el se in re l evantly 
similar circumstances, but rather that A is committed to this view. 6 In U, 
Hare ' s defence of (UP) rests on the claim - I call it Q - that moral 
judgements are u-type valuations. Another way of stating this is to say 
that whenever moral reasons are offered from some choice or action, they 
invoke or apply u-type principles. According to Hare, Q is necessarily 
true, i.e. true in virtue of the meaning of the word 'moral,.7 This implies 
that moral reasons necessarily invoke or apply u-type principles. So, a 
moral reason just is a reason which makes no reference to particular 
individuals. It follows, Q being analytic, that to deny the truth of (UP), 
is to misunderstand the meaning of the word 'moral', and to contradict 
oneself. 
Hare attempts to develop his thesis that moral judgements are u-type 
valuations into a distinction between the sorts of reasons that can be 
given for moral and other value judgements. This involves his distinction 
between e-type and u-type reasons. In U Hare is careful to point out that 
nothing in his thesis turns on the meaning of the word ' reason'. Hare 
allows that whenever a reason is given for some ought-judgement, the reason 
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may be of type -e, i.e. it may refer to a particular individual and stil l 
qualify as a reason. s It is analytically true that giving a reason involves 
reference to a rule or principle, but this rule or principle need not be of 
type-u. In giving a reason one says something about an action or a state of 
affairs, and this 'something' may involve a reference to a particular 
individual. 
I use one of Hare's examples to illustrate this pOint. 9 'It [the 
chancellor's squeeze] resulted in an improvement in Great Britain's balance 
of payments', is a reason of type-e, if offered by someone who thinks that 
it is a reason only if the squeeze improves Great Britain ' s balance of 
payments, and not if the same action in another country in qualitatively 
similar circumstances, improves that country 's balance of payments. As 
Hare makes clear, to say that anyone in the chancellor's position ought to 
do x, if x improves Great Britain's balance of payments, is not 
universalizable in the sense required by (UP), since the reason refers to a 
particular individual, Great Britain. If the reason is a I'eason for anyone 
who is situated like Great Britain's chancellor in the re l evant respects, 
i.e. if it is a reason for anyone who is Great Britain's chancellor, it 
cannot be of type-u. 
Now, Hare argues that the reference to Great Britain is eliminable and that 
the reason may therefore be extended to relevantly similar situations (with 
the necessary adaptation) . Hare al lows that there is no logical barrier 
which prevents this. In this regard Hare argues, against Gellner, that e-
type valuations are, in principle at least, translatable into u-type 
valuations. lo To use Hare's 'balance of payments' example again, the claim 
is this: if the chancellor of some other country stands to Great Britain's 
chancellor in a similar relation vis-a-vis the balance of payments in their 
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respective countries, i.e. if his position in his country is like the 
position of Great Britain's chancellor in Great Britain in the relevant 
respects, then the principle that in circumstances of the kind in question, 
the squeeze is right if it improves the balance of payments, is properly 
universal, which means that any reference to particulars in the reason for 
the squeeze is, in principle at least, eliminable. 
Hare recognizes that the suggested elimination is problematic. 11 One 
problem is to find or coin suitable universal terms as substitutes for the 
use of the expression ' like x', where 'x' is an individual constant. 
Another problem concerns designing precise descriptions of the similarity 
(where he means similarity only in the relevant respects) implied by the 
use of the word 'like'. In this regard Hare refers to a confusion in 
common uses of the words ' general ' and ' universal' .12 He holds that 
' universal ' is opposed to 'singular' or ' particular' (though the latter is 
ambiguous), and that 'general' is opposed to 'specific'. He suggests that 
generality and specificity are matters of degree (we can be as specific or 
as general as we like), but that universality and its opposites are not. 
He argues that moral principles may be highly specific and admit of 
exceptions or qualifications (in what respe~ts and to what degree we 
specify this is a matter of choice), while remaining universal in the 
required sense. 
In brief Hare is suggesting this: if anyone says that C is a reason why 
Great Britain's chancellor ought to do x in S, but he thinks that C is a 
reason only if it refers to some particular individual, Great Britain, then 
his use of the word 'ought' is not a moral use. There cannot be a sense of 
universal in which it is legitimate for Great Britain's chancellor to claim 
that C is a reason why anyone who is situated like him in the relevant 
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respects, ought to apply the squeeze, if the reference to Great Britain is 
included in the specification of the relevant respects. The relevant sense 
of the word 'un iversal ' i s simply this: a reason is universal if and only 
if there is no reference to individual constants in the predicate part of 
the reason. In this sense a reason for a moral judgement is simply the 
universalized form of the judgement, or the universal principle which the 
reason invokes. This, howe ver, does not mean that my reasons are reasons 
for you. If C is my reason why I ought to do x in S, I am committed to the 
view that C is also a reason for you, were you in relevantly similar 
circumstances. It does not follow, and Hare does not claim, that you have 
the same reason to do x in S. 
Now, I think (UP) may be interpreted as demanding consist~ncy in applying 
moral judgements. 13 According to (UP), if features a, b, c ground the 
judgement that x is good, or that x is obligatory, then any ot he r y, which 
also has features a, b, c (and no other relevant features) is also good or 
obligatory. But, (UP) does not demand consistency and nothing more, i.e. 
mere consistency in applying moral judgements employing the words 'good' 
and 'ought' is not sufficient evidence that their uses are moral uses. It 
seems that though consistency in applying moral judgements is a requirement 
of (UP), the demand for consistency does not arise as a consequence of 
Hare's definition of moral judgements as u-type valuations. The demand 
arises rather from the notion that moral and other value judgements are the 
sorts of judgement for which reasons can be given. I shall now restate 
(UP) for both 'good' and 'ought' in an attempt to lift out the requirement 
of consistency.14 
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(1) If A judges x to be good, t hen he is committed t o the view that 
anything like x is also good, where 'like x' is similarity i n respect 
of the non-moral but moral ly relevant properties of x. 
(2) If A judges that x ought to be done in S, then he is committed to the 
view that x ought to be done in all situations like S, where 'like S' 
is similar i ty in respect of the non-moral but morally relevant 
properties of S. 
(1 ) and (2) invoke the requirement of con si stency and make explicit Hare ' s 
view that there are always reasons for moral judgements, which reasons 
mention the relevant properties or feature s of the thing or situation about 
which the judgement is made. ls But, by itself the claim that moral 
judgements are made for reasons does no t imply that the relevant properties 
are only thos e which can be stated in universal terms . If (1) and (2) are 
interpreted as asserting only that there i s something logically amiss or 
contradi ctory about making different moral judgements about relevantly 
similar situations, then they assert no more than the principle of 
consistency. 
One sense in which the principle of universalizability may be understood 
might be expressed by saying that the principles which support moral 
' ought'-judgements apply without exception to anyone who falls within their 
scope. Thus , if A says that another person B ought to keep his promises, 
but denies that he is committed to the view that he himself ought to keep 
his promises, if and when he promises, then, un l ess he can show grounds to 
distinguish his case from B's , his denial i s evidence that he does not know 
the meaning of the word ' ought ' in its moral uses. The point is that u-type 
principles, if they apply, make no exception of particular individuals. 
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But I see no reason to accept that all u-type principles which are offered 
as reasons for ought-judgements are moral principles. For example, the 
principle 'One ought always to plant Erica's in acid soil' is u-type, but 
it is not a moral principle . What really is the criterion which 
distinguishes moral uses of 'ought' from non-moral ones? One mig ht ask: 
What supplies the sufficient condition for an 'ought'-judgement to be a 
mora l judgement? 
I have so far attempted to clarify the sense in which moral judgements are 
u-type valuations. If my exposition of Hare 's views in U is correct, then 
his the s is that moral reasons i nvoke u-type principles (for both 'good' and 
' ought') rests on two claims . . These are: 
(a) If x is good, this must be because of some thing about x, which implies 
that it is appropriate to ask for a reason why x is good; 
(b) The reason why x is good can refer to a particular individual , i.e . it 
can be of type-e. But if this is so, then the judgement is not a 
moral judgement. The judgement is a moral judgement if and only if it 
is a u- type valuation. This is because of the meaning of the word 
'moral', i.e. the claim that moral judgements invoke u-type 
principles, is analytic. 
Now, I think Hare's attempt to develop his distinction between the sorts of 
reasons that can be given for moral and other value-judgements, relies in 
part on his account of supervenience. The link between (UP) and 
supervenience touches on a claim alluded to above: if it is true that 
there are always reasons for moral and other value-judgements, this must be 
because of some feature of the thing or situation about which the judgement 
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is made. For Hare's account of supervenience I turn to LM. Hare's notion 
of supervenience is this: 
(Spl): Two things cannot differ only in their value. 16 
I shall use Hare's 'painting'-example in LM to illustrate what (SP) 
entails . ll Suppose that we are invited to judge whether two paintings, P and 
PI are good works of art. Suppose also that either P is a replica of PI' or 
that PI is a replica of P, but that we do not know which is which. Now, in 
judging whether or not P and PI are both good works of art, there is one 
thing we cannot maintain, viz, that P and PI are exactly similar in all 
respects except that P is a good work of art and PI not. There is nothing 
logically amiss with saying that P and PI differ in this respect that P is 
signed and PI not, though they are exact ly similar in all other respects. 
So, as Hare observes, why can we not say that P is good and PI not, t hough 
they are exactly similar in all other respects? Hare 's answer is that there 
is a difference in the logic of 'good' and 's igned ' . In the case of 'good ' 
and other 'value'-words we account for different judgements about things 
with reference to differences of another kind. This concerns the so-called 
supervenient character of 'good' and other 'value'-words . 
Suppose P is a good painting because P is C, where C is the conjunction of 
all the descriptive properties of P. Let G be the supervening property 
' goodness'. In LM Hare maintains the following view: 
(SP2) If P and PI are exactly similar with respect to C, it follows 
necessarily that they are exactly similar in all respects 
pertaining to their value. IS 
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The characteristic of ' good ' which Hare calls its supervenience comes to 
this: P and PI cannot differ in any respect pertaining to G unless they 
also differ in some respect pertaining to C, i.e. differences with respect 
to G cannot vary independently of some difference with respect to C. 19 
Before I examine Hare's defence of (SP), I wish to note two features of 
this notion. (SP) implies that there is a relation of dependence of the 
property 'G' on the set or conjunction of properties 'C'. To say that P 
and P1 are both good because they have certain specified features is to say 
that , if they have those features, they must be good . One might say that a 
judgement to the effect that they are good paintings depends on their 
having the specified features. Put more generally, Hare's point is that for 
any singular evaluative or moral judgement it is never logically amiss to 
ask in virtue of what something is good (bad, obligatory, right, wrong), 
i.e. it is necessarily true that if something is good, it is good because 
it has some specified set of descriptive properties. How does Hare account 
for this dependence-relation? One might ask: What explains the 
supervenient character of 'good'? This is to ask, in effect, how the 
'because'-clause above is to be understood. 
(SP) invokes the requirement of consistency . By (SP), it is inconsistent 
for anyone to say that P is good but PI not while acknowledging that there 
is no other difference to account for this. But there is nothing logically 
amiss in maintaining that P and PI are both bad, while acknowledging that 
they are exactly similar in all other respects. This is to say, if (SP) is 
true, then P and PI are either both good or both bad, depending on what 
standard of goodness one accepts. 20 Now, in so far as (SP) requires 
consistency, there is a link with (UP) as stated above in (1) and (2). To 
see this, suppose that P and PI are both good paintings of some school and 
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that it is generally accepted that good paintings of this school have the 
'good-making' characteristics a, b, c. Suppose also that P and PI differ 
in some respects, for instance, as regards size and shape. It is obvious 
that if P and Pl differed only in the latter respects, they could not 
differ in those respects relevant to their being good, at least no less 
than what two other good paintings of this schoo l , which share all their 
descriptive properties, could differ in those respects relevant to their 
being good. There is no reason to suppose that P and Pl must share all 
their descriptive properties to be good paintings of this school. (SP) 
requires some notion of relevant similarity.2l So (SP) can be reformulated 
thus: 
(SP3) If P is good, then anything else like P is also good, where 'like 
P' is similarity in respect of the relevant descriptive or non-
moral properties of p.22 
(SP3) makes explicit Hare's view that whenever a moral or value judgement 
is offered, it is always logically appropriate to ask for a reason. To say 
that 'goodness' is a supervenient property is to say that moral and other 
value-judgements employing the word 'good' are made for reasons which 
mention the re l evant non-moral or descriptive properties of whatever is 
being judged. But, by itself, (SP3) does not say what kinds of-properties 
the relevant properties must be for the reason to be a reason for a moral 
or value-judgement. (SP3) excludes only the view that the property 
'goodness' itself can be a reason for a moral or value-judgement. 23 But, one 
might ask: What kinds of properties are appropriate instantions of a, b, 
c? 
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In U Hare maintains that only properties stateable in universal terms can 
be morally relevant properties. Hare, of course, carries this point by 
definition of the word 'moral'. This suggests that he is defending the 
supervenient character of 'value'-words like 'good' and 'ought', as regards 
their moral uses, with reference to the meaning of the word 'moral' . But 
what about non-moral uses of 'good' and 'ought'? In U Hare seems to be in 
doubt about whether e-type judgements can properly be called 'valuations', 
though he suggests that there are no grounds in common language to support 
the claim that a reason qualifies as a reason only if it invokes au-type 
principle. 24 Hare seems to be adhering to a position adopted in LM that any 
account of the supervenient character of 'value'-words like 'good' and 
'ought' must involve an account of how moral and other value-judgements 
employing these words can have reasons . For in U Hare is suggesting that 
e-type judgements invoke principles and that these principles can be 
reasons for ordinary value-judgements , though not, of course, for moral 
judgements. I think Hare's attempt to distinguish between u-type and 
e-type judgements is unsuccessful because there is no reason to suppose 
that ordinary value-judgements cannot be universal in the sense Hare wishes 
to reserve for moral jUdgements. So, we may ask again : what reason do we 
have to suppose that the kinds of properties which can be morally relevant 
are only those stateable in universal terms? Does the notion of 
supervenience help to account for this? 
In LM Hare defends his account of supervenience with reference to the view 
that evaluative and moral language are used to guide choices and decisions. 
If Hare is right, the supervenient character of 'value'-words like 'good' 
and 'ought' is readily accounted for by the commendatory or prescriptive 
function which they perform in their ordinary uses. Other attempts to 
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explain their supervenient character either misconstrue this function or do 
not account for it at all. 25 
How does Hare's talk of the use of moral and evaluative language help him 
to explain the supervenient character of 'good'? I shall first simply 
state Hare's position. 26 Suppose that it is generally accepted that P is a 
good painting of its school because P exhibits the conjunction of 
properties C. The position Hare argues for is this: There is a necessary 
connection between the statement that P is C and the judgement that P is 
good, if we grant the further premiss that anyone who says that P is good 
because P is C also accepts the universal principle that all paintings of 
this school which conform to the given description are good, where his 
acceptance implies that he treats the principle as a prescription which has 
the force of a universal imperative . This is to say, a necessary 
connection obtains if his acceptance is an instance of the evaluative use 
of 'good' in the universalized form of his judgement. It is the necessary 
condition of the supervenience of 'good' in this context that there be 
something about paintings of this school which are the subjects of the 
judgements that they are good . It is the sufficient condition that the 
principle be accepted and asserted in the above sense . This is what makes 
it possible for the statement that P is C to be someone's reason why P is 
good, and hence a reason for him to commend paintings which conform to the 
given description. 
This position rests on Hare's distinction between evaluative and 
descriptive meaning, and on the reasons he offers for the primacy of the 
former. 27 I begin with the notion of descriptive meaning and the role it 
plays in Hare's account of supervenience. If one were to teach the 
criteria for applying the word 'good' to P, one would in effect be teaching 
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that some set of describable characteristics of P is what makes it a good 
painting of its school. The task of teaching these criteria could not be 
successfully done unless one were consistentl y to call good all paintings 
of this school which have the required set of 'good-making' 
characteristics. This is a matter of being consistent about what standard 
applies whenever one says that a particular painting is a good painting of 
thi s school . 28 
Now, this feature of 'good ' that it can be used purely to convey 
information about what characteristics of P make it a good member of its 
school, i s what Hare call s the descriptive meaning of ' good ' .29 It seems 
that to teach the criteria for applying the word ' good ' to P is, in effect, 
to teach the descriptive meaning of the expression 'A good P', and that 
within the class of all good paintings of this school the descriptive 
meaning of thi s express ion is determined by the standard which makes 
certain features of these paintings the ' good-making ' characteristics of 
this school. Hence, to know what the descriptive meaning of this 
expression is, is to know what standard is applied in this context. 3D If the 
standard i s well-known or generally accepted, the descriptive meaning of 
the expression ' A good P' will be fixed to · the extent that the standard is 
known or accepted. One might in this context speak of a standard meaning 
of the expression' A good P', but only i n the sense that the word ' good' 
can be used purely to convey information about a generally accepted 
standard .31 
How does this help Hare to explain the supervenient character of 'good'? 
The suggestion seems to be that it is a characteristic of 'good' that its 
use in some judgement to convey information about 'good-making' 
characteristics, or about a standard of goodness, makes it possible that a 
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reason can be given for the judgement. I think Hare uses the informative 
function of 'good' as evidence for the claim that relevant similarity is 
always similarity ~ some set of descriptive properties, and hence that 
the property ' goodness ' itself can never be a reason why P and another 
relevantly similar Pl can both be good. One might say that the possibility 
that the judgement 'This is a good P' can have descriptive meaning 
establishes the possibility that it can have a reason. But this way of 
putting the matter needs to be qualified . The possibility that there can 
be a reason for the judgement is logically tied to this characteristic of 
'good' that its use on a particular occasion has descriptive meaning, if 
the relevant principle is asserted or affirmed on that occasion in Hare ' s 
evaluative sense. 32 
It needs now to be explained how Hare defends this notion of 'evaluative' 
meaning and what role the pr imacy of thi s meaning plays in Hare ' s account 
of supervenience. Hare develops two lines of argument, first to show that 
value-judgements resemble ordinary imperatives and hence that value-
judgements are not reducible to mere statements of fact, and secondly to 
show that logical rules apply to imperatives and hence that it is possible 
to construct argument forms which contain universal imperative sentences 
al ong the l ines of the syllogism. D 
On the first line of argument Hare establi shes that imperative sentences 
and value - judgements have a common function. This is that anyone in using 
them intends someone else to do something. By contrast, indicative 
sentences are used merely for telling someone that some state of affairs 
obtains . The basic theme is that in their ordinary uses value-judgements 
have the force of imperatives and hence that it is possible to distinguish 
an evaluative or attitudinal element which is not reducible to mere 
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description. Hare formulates the resemblance between value-judgement and 
imperatives in terms of a common criterion of assent . Put briefly, to 
assent to either an imperative sentence or to a value-judgement is to be 
committed to accepting a prescription for some actual or conceivab l e choice 
or decision. It is, according to Hare, a necessary condition of assent to 
a value-judgement that if one assents to it, one is thereby committed to 
doing what the judgement prescr i bes. For instance, if one assents to the 
judgement that P is a good painting of its school to study, one is not 
merely affirming that a standard of goodness has been accepted; one is 
also primarily ' instructing' oneself to decide or choose on the basis of a 
universal principle which mentions those characteristics of P which make it 
good for the intended purpose. One might say that the point of applying a 
standard, besides one's intention of informing someone or making known to 
him the criteria for applying the word 'good' to P, is primarily to guide 
or direct his choice within the given class of comparison. 35 It will become 
apparent below that Hare treats the notion of subscribing to the universa l 
principle under which the judgement is to be subsumed, as analogous to 
obeying a command. 
On the second line of argument referred to above, Hare establishes that a 
singular imperative conclusion can be validly drawn from a set of premises 
which contain a universal imperative sentence as major premiss and an 
indicative sentence as minor premiss. 36 The possibility of deductive 
inference rests on the rule that no imperative conclusion can be validly 
drawn from a set of premises which do not contain at least one imperative . 
Hare maintains that if inferences based on this form of reasoning were not 
possible, the word 'all ' would have no meaning in the logic of imperatives. 
The assumption underlying Hare's attempt to construct a logic of 
imperatives and hence of value-judgements is clearly his conviction that 
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purely 'factual' or 'descriptive' principles could not be 'action-guiding' 
and hence could not perform their function of regulating our conduct. 
If I understand Hare correctly, he is suggesting that the supervenient 
character of ' good' is to be accounted for with reference to his notion of 
'evaluative' meaning. Hare's reasons might be made clear by bringing out a 
contrast between the following three statements: 3? 
(a) P is a good painting of its school to study, but PI' though similar in 
all other respects, is not a good painting of this school to study. 
(b) P is an example of the 'blue'-period in Picasso's development, but PI' 
though similar in all other respects, is not an example of the 'bl ue '-
period in Picasso ' s development . 
(c) P is rectangular, but PI' though similar in all other respects, is not 
rectangular. 
It is self-contradictory to asse rt (a), but not self-contradictory to 
assert (b) or (c). It would be self-contradictory to assert (c), if 
'bo unded by four right-angles' is included in the specification of what 
counts as 's imilar in all other respects ' . But, there is an important 
difference between (a) and the reinterpreted (c) which concerns the reasons 
why it is self-contradictory to assert either. One could give a complete 
description of P and say that P is good, and, one could give the same 
description of P and say that P is not good, which is (1) to contradict 
oneself, though (2) each judgement by itself is internally consistent . But 
one could not give a complete description of P and say that P is 
rectangular, and, give the same description and say that P is not 
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rectangular, without al l owing that at least one of these statements is 
internally inconsistent. That this must be so follows from the mean ing of 
the word ' rectangular'. 
Now, Hare thinks that 'good' logically behaves like the expression "'blue-
period' in Picasso's development" as regards (2), but not as regards (1), 
and that ' good ' logically behaves like 'rectangular' as regards (1), but 
not as regards (2) . As I understand Hare's point, this is to be explained 
with reference to his view that the descriptive meaning of 'good' does not 
exhaust its meaning. One might make the same point by saying that the 
characteri stic " ' blue-period ' in Picasso ' s development" can be a reason why 
P is a good painting of its school to study for anyone who accepts (in 
Hare's evaluative sense) this characteristic as a standard of goodness. 
But there is no necessary relation, in the l ogical sense of necessary , 
between the statement "P is an example of the ' blue ' -peri od in Pi casso's 
development" and the judgement ' P is a good painting of this school to 
study' such that the former by itself necessarily entails the latter, 
whereas there is as necessary relation between 'P is bounded by four right-
angles' and ' P is rectangular ' which holds solely in virtue of the meaning 
of the word ' rectangul ar' . 
Hare makes it clear that if one assents to the value-judgement that P is a 
good painting of its school to study, it must be the case that one 
subscribes to a principle. The reason is that teaching or learning involves 
principles: one does not teach or learn an individual act but rather a 
particular kind of act in a particular kind of situation .38 That one must 
subscribe to a principle of the sort just mentioned seems to be a matter of 
necessity. But what kind of necessity does Hare have in mind? On the 
second line of argument referred to above, the judgement that P is good for 
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the intended purpose follows necessarily, in the logical sense of 
necessary, from the joint assertion of the princip l e and a statement of the 
'good-making' characteristics of P. The suggestion is that if one assents 
to the value-judgement, it must logically be the case that one also 
subscribes to a principle of the suggested form. This implies that Hare 
has logical necessity in mind. 39 Hare's explanation implicit in LM, is that 
supervenience is a logical property of Qnly 'value'-words. Purel y 
descriptive words are not supervenient. The claim that the word 'good' has 
a supervenient character is partly the claim that it is not a purely 
descriptive word. Hare's explanation suggests that he is justifying the 
necessity of appealing to a major universal imperative premiss whenever one 
calls something good with reference to the logic of value-language. 4o As I 
see it, the necessity of subscribing to a principle of this nature in the 
suggested form of reasoning rests on Hare's claim that evaluative meaning 
is logically primary, and that the supervenience of 'value ' -words is to be 
accounted for with reference to this primacy . How does Hare account for 
this? 
Hare justifies his view that the word ' good' is irreducibly evaluative by 
arguing that it has two kinds of meaning. It is possible to distinguish 
between the criteria for applying the word 'good' to various cl asses of 
things, and the commendatory function which is common to all value-
ascriptions involving the word ' good,. 41 For instance, it is possible to 
know what the criteria are for applying 'good' to P, without one knowing 
that to call P a good painting to study is to guide or direct a choice 
within the given class of comparison. Conversely, it is possible to know 
this without one knowing what makes P good for the intended purpose. 42 Hare 
offers two reasons for the primacy of evaluative meaning. 43 The commendatory 
or 'action-guiding' force of 'good' remains constant whereas the criteria 
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for its application to various classes of things are all different. The 
commendatory force of 'good' can be used to change generally accepted 
standards of goodness . The change is effected by changing the descriptive 
meaning of 'good' as it is standardly employed within a given class of 
comparison. This is to change accepted notions of what makes a thing of 
its kind good and hence which members of its class are to be called good. 
In effect, this is to propose that future decisions about the value of 
things of this kind be made on the basis of a new principle which mentions 
the new set of 'good-making' characteristics. This implies that what 
descriptive meaning the word 'good' can carry in a given context is always 
subject to what principle is asserted in this context. 
For Hare acceptance of the principle and its subsequent assertion on a 
particular occasion, are always instances of the evaluative or 'action-
guiding' use of 'good' in the judgement which the principle subsumes. But, 
the principle itself cannot be interpreted as stating or expressing a 
necessary truth. 44 It has descriptive content some of which it shares with 
the minor factual premiss of the syllogism . There is, however, a necessary 
connection between the statement that P has the 'good-making' 
characteristic C, and the judgement that P is a good painting to study, 
which is explained with reference to the notion of subscribing to a 
principle. To say that P is good because P is C, is to say that it being C 
is necessarily related to it being good, where the 'because' indicates that 
C is a necessary condition of the goodness of P, and a necessary condition 
of C being a reason for the judgement that P is good. But, for C to be a 
reason for this judgement, a sufficient condition must also be met, and 
this is that the principle must be asserted in Hare's evaluative sense. 
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If this is correct, it follows that to ask for a reason why P is a good 
painting to study, is to ask for the principle under which the judgement 
that P is good, is to be subsumed. This, in effect, is to ask for the 
major imperative or evaluative premiss. Since the principle con tains an 
imperative component, it is possible to derive from it, together with a 
statement of the 'good-making' characteristics of P, a reason for choosing 
P. One might say that the reason consists in the principle under which the 
judgement that P is good is to be subsumed, and that the judgement guides 
cho ices or decisions by drawing attention to the principle and hence to a 
reason for choosing P on all occasions on which the principle is asserted 
or affirmed. For Hare there can be no connection between saying that P has 
the ' good-making ' characteristic C, and saying that C is a reason for 
choosing P, if the principle is not asserted in his evaluative sense. The 
peculiarity of Hare's position might be summed up by saying that a reason 
for a value-judgement is a reason fo r action. 
It follows from what is involved in Hare's notion of subscribing to a 
principle that anyone who accepts that all P's which are C are good 
paintings to study, contradicts himself if he says that P is good but 
another relevantly similar Pj is not good, since this is to affirm and deny 
that he asserts the princip le in this context. 45 But no contradiction arises 
if different persons assert different principles in this same context . The 
descriptive meaning of the judgement 'This is a good P to study ' will be 
fixed by whoever accepts and asserts this principle, but this same 
judgement cannot carry different descriptive content, i.e. it is not 
possible to exhibit its descriptive meaning as a disjunction of different 
sets of descriptive properties . The obvious point is that for Hare 
acceptance of a principle determines relevant similarity. 
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Hare's account of supervenience implies a particular view of what 
disagreement about the value of a thing consists in. Since the statement 
that P is C does not, by itself, entail the judgement that P is a good 
painting to study, it is possible for two people to agree that P is C, yet 
disagree without logical or linguistic error about the value of P. One 
might say they disagree about which paintings of this school are the good 
ones to study, or about what make s a painting of this school a good one for 
the intended purpose, and that the disagreement is to be explained with 
reference to different standards. One might say that the property 
'goodness' supervenes on whatever set of 'good-making' characteristics is 
the reason for a judgement that some paintings of this school are good ones 
to study. Put differently, depending on what principle is asserted, P and 
another relevantly similar Pl are either both good, or both bad. One does 
not offend against any logical rule governing the use of 'good' in this 
context, should one fail to commend them. 46 
The reasons for Hare's rejection of alternative accounts of superven ience 
should by now be obvious. The basic th eme is that alternative accounts do 
not show what is peculiar about value-language. 47 Naturalists accept that 
the relation between the property ' goodness' and the descriptive properties 
of P on which it supervenes is a necessary relation which holds in virtue 
of the meaning of the word ' good '. To say that P is good because P is C is 
to say that it being C is a necessary and sufficient condition of the 
goodness of P. It follows that any P which has the defining characteristic 
C must of necessity be good, and that be ing a good P necessarily implies 
that it has this defining characteristic. If the supervenience relation is 
understood as a relation of entailment due to equivalence of meaning, it is 
contradictory to claim that P and another relevantly similar Pl can differ 
only in being good . For the claim that they differ in the latter respect 
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implies that they differ in other respects too, viz. in being C. On this 
account it is a conceptual truth that value-judgements have reasons. But 
this account reduces the supervening property 'goodness' to a mere 
descriptive property, which is to say that evaluation or commendation 
simply is description. Hence naturalists fail to account for the 
commendatory or 'action-guiding' force of 'good' .48 In LM Hare makes this 
point by noting that if 'A good P' means the same as 'A P which is C', then 
it would be impossible to use the sentence 'A P which is C is good' to 
commend P's which are C. For this sentence would be analytic and 
equivalent to be sentence 'A P which is C is C,.g 
The relation of dependence of the property 'goodness' on other kinds of 
properties is brought out by saying, as Hare does, that whenever something 
is called good, there must be something about it which is good. Hare 
accepts that this dependence relation provides an explanation of why there 
can be reasons for the goodness of things . What is puzzling or peculiar 
about saying that the goodness of P depends on P having the property Cis, 
as I have understood Hare's account, a matter of explaining that P is 
called good by appeal to the relevant standard or principle, and hence for 
the reason that P is C. In other words, it is· a matter of explaining why 
value-judgements employing the word 'good' have reasons and how their 
having them is to be understood. 
What is the relation between (SP) and (UP)? I have tried to show above 
that on Hare's account of supervenience 
(a) the property 'goodness' itself can never be a reason why P is called 
good; 
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(b) some set of descriptive properties of P is necessarily relevant to the 
goodness of P; 
(c) a principle always determines relevant similarity (for all cases which 
may be subsumed under the principle). 
There is a logically necessary connection between 'P is C' and 'P is good' 
which holds if one subscribes to the principle that all P's which are Care 
good paintings to study. C may be a reason for the goodness of P for 
anyone who subscribes to this principle. If I understand Hare correctly, 
there are logical limits to what reasons may be advanced for the goodness 
of P which are set by the three points just outlined, but which principle 
one subscribes to within the given class of comparison is a matter of 
choice or decision. P being C is always a necessary condition, but never 
by itself also a sufficient condition for the goodness of P. The 
sufficient condition is supplied by Hare ' s notion of subscription to the 
relevant principle. It follows that it is logically possible for any set 
or conjunction of properties to ground the claim that P is good (for the 
intended purpose). This is just to say that by itself (SP) does not 
determine what kinds of properties of a th~hg or a~t are relevant. P may 
not be good for anyone who subscribes to a different principle. 
How does (SP) help Hare to establish (UP)? If (UP) requires mere 
consistency, then the three points outlined above establish that (UP) and 
(SP) are equivalent, i.e. (SP) entails (UP) and (UP) entails (SP). But this 
does not explain the assumption of a universal principle which serves as 
major imperative premiss in Hare's account of the supervenience of 'ought' 
and 'good'. There is nothing in (SP) itself to suggest that the morally 
relevant properties of some thing or act are only those which can be stated 
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in universal terms. To what extent, then, does (SP) lend support to Hare's 
claim that moral judgements depend on proper universal principles? 
In defending his account of the supervenient character of ' good' and 
'ought', Hare relies on the notion of subscribing to a principle. The 
significant point which follows from his account of what is involved in 
subscribing to a principle is that the subscriber has a reason to act as 
his principle enjoins him to act. But, there is no reason to suppose that 
he contradicts himself if he allows that anyone else in relevantly similar 
circumstances ought not to act as he does. It seems that (SP) can be 
distinguished from (UP) in that a reason for doing something which 
satisfies the constraints of (SP) can refer to a particular individual. It 
seems that Hare needs to find some justification for limiting what kinds of 
properties of a thing or act can be morally relevant properties. I think 
naturalism sets this limit by making it a necessary and sufficient 
condition of the goodness of a thing or act that it must have a certain set 
of descriptive properties. 50 It is not difficult to see that this supplies 
one possible foundation for universalizability, though Hare rejects this on 
the grounds that it makes the universalizability of moral judgements 
trivially true, i.e . they are univer salizable only in the sense in which 
descriptive statements are universalizable. 5l 
Hare writes as if it is just a feature of the logic of 'ought ' that its use 
in some moral judgement presupposes a reference to a universal principle, 
and as if this requirement of moral uses of 'ought' is supportable by (SP). 
I find this difficult to harmonize with the view that ordinary value-
judgements need not be universalizable in the sense required by (UP), and 
with the view that assent to an ordinary value-judgement commits one to a 
principle of action which has the force of a universal imperative, but 
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which is not universal in scope, as a moral principle (on his view) clearly 
is . If (SP) is equivalent to (UP), all value-judgements, not just moral 
ones, must be universalizable . But, if this is so, Hare cannot consistently 
maintain that the difference between a moral and a value judgement just is 
a difference in the scope of a universal imperative and a universal 
'ought'-judgement . 52 
I think I am right in claiming that Hare does not succeed in defending his 
distinction between the kinds of reasons which it is logically appropriate 
to offer for moral and value -judgements. The problem just is that (SP) is 
not sufficient to support the claim that moral judgements must be supported 
by u-type principles. Hare has not shown why it is logically inappropriate 
to offer an e-type reason for a moral judgement. I sum up what I take to be 
Hare ' s probl em thus : the problem of relevant si milarity in the moral case 
just is the problem of what kinds of properties are morally relevant . This 
requires some justification for limiting what kinds of propertiesare to 
count as morally relevant, but Hare's defence of (SP) supplies no direct 
support for a distinc t ion which he operates within LM and U. I think Hare 
needs to make explicit a criterion of relevant similarity consistent with 
the u- t ype requirement s of (UP). 
In Freedom and reason Hare accepts the view that all ' ought ' -judgements are 
universalizable in the sense that u-type reasons can be given for them. 
Hare retains the claim that moral judgements must be supported by u-type 
principles, but abandons the view that the claim is analytic i.e. true in 
virtue of the meaning of the word ' moral', particularly as he attempts to 
phrase it in terms of values and not in terms of the word 'moral' . In 
Chapter 2 I shall examine the alternative justification for this claim in 
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order to establish whether Hare succeeds in advancing an alternative basis 
for the distinction between e-type and u-type reasons . 
Section 2. Prescriptivity 
The prescriptivity thesis might be stated thus: 
(P) 'X ought to be done', if used evaluatively, entails 'Let x be done' . 
If an agent assents to the moral judgement 'x ought to be done', he 
logically cannot dissent from acting on the prescription ' Let x be 
done ' (if now is the time to act, and if it is within his power, 
physically and psychologically, to do what the prescription enjoins 
him to do) 53. 
In LM Hare 's defence of (P) rests on the claim that moral and other 
evaluative language, including imperatives, are species of the genus 
'prescriptive language' and so distinguishable from statements of fact . 
Hare presents the difference between statements and commands in terms of 
different criteria of sincere assent,54 and develops an analogy between 
value-judgements and commands which suggest the following parallel. 
Sincere assent to a command implies that the commanded is sincere in his 
assent if he does or resolves to do what the speaker commands him to do. 
Analogously, sincere assent to a value-judgement implies that the addressee 
is sincere in his assent if he does or resolves to do what the speaker 
tells him to do. Hare says: 
'It is a tautology to say that we cannot sincerely assent to a second-
person command addressed to ourselves, and at the same time not 
perform it, if now is the occasion for performing it and it is in our 
(physical and psychological) power to do so. ,55 
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Hare makes it a necessary condition of sincere assent to a value-judgement 
that if one assents, one thereby commits oneself to the prescribed course 
of action. The analogy suggests that value-judgements resemble imperatives 
in as much as they require, as a necessary condition of their satisfaction, 
that if one sincerely assents, one must do what the judgement says one 
should dO. 56 
But the analogy is to some extent misleading. Hare's thesis is not that 
value-judgements are reducible to imperatives, but rather that they 
'entail' prescriptions for action, if they are used evaluatively . Hare 
carries this point by definition of the word 'evaluative' .57 Hare says : 
'J propose to say that the test, whether someone is using the 
judgement "J ought to do x" as a va lue-judgement or not is , "Does he 
or does he not recognize that if he assents to the judgement, he must 
also assent to the command 'Let me do x"'?'~ 
Hare recognizes that hi s definition does not, as he puts it, prove anything 
substantial about how we use language, g which is to say that he assumes 
rather than shows that there are criteria which distinguish the genuine 
value -judgement from statements of soc i ological and psychologica l fact, 
i.e . statements like 
(1) "'X is required in order to conform to the standard which people 
generally accept" (statement of sociological fact) ; . 
(2) "J have a feeling that J ought to do x" (statement of 
psychological fact) .,6o 
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The crucial point is that statements like these may be construed as having 
' action-guiding ' force , though they are merely ' de scr iptive ' . This, as Hare 
notes, is a consequence of the fact that standards may become so thoroughly 
accepted that they have the force of intuition, and hence are treated as 
matters of fact. 61 So, the question arises: How might we tell when we are to 
cou nt a judgement as a genuine value-judgement? It is this difficulty which 
Hare proposes to overcome by means of definition. I do not wish to dispute 
Hare's definition of the word 'evaluative '. I wish merely to note that if 
this definition be granted, the prescriptivity thesis becomes analytic. It 
becomes analytically true to say that the moral judgement 'I ought to do x' 
entails the imperative 'Do x', and that we cannot assent to the former and 
dissent from the latter unles s we have, as Hare puts it, ' mi sunderstood the 
meani ng of one or the other. ,62 
Hare also recognizes that his definition, comb ined with the crite ria of 
sincere assent to a moral judgement, produces an odd result . It becomes 
analytic to say 
that everyone always does what he thinks he ought to (in the 
evaluative sense). '~ 
This, as Hare recognizes, is not how we use the word 'th ink '. The criteria 
for saying 'He thinks he ought' are 'exceeding ly elastic' .64 If omitting to 
do something we think we ought to do is accompanied by feelings of guilt, 
we say that we have not acted as we think we ought to. Hare therefore 
proposes to qualify his criteria of sincere assent by allowing that there 
are 'degrees of sincere assent' ,65 not all of which involve actually obeying 
the command 'Do x' . 
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I noted above that it is a necessary condition of sincere assent to a moral 
judgement that if one assents, one is thereby logically committed to a 
particular course of action. Hare recognizes that there is a psychological 
phenomenon called 'weakness of will' .66 But, barring cases of this 
phenomenon, Hare's position implies that it is contradictory to say that on 
some particular occasion one did not act as one sincerely believes one 
ought to have acted . One way of explaining why one may on occasion act 
'contrary' to a principle touches on the question of what shall count as a 
relevant description of what one did on the occasion where one i s said to 
be acting contrary to principle. 67 This is a matter of recognizing whether 
or not a given description fit s the act, and hence whether or not it is 
subsumable under the principle. One might then say post eventum that one 
acted contrary to principle, though at the time one sincerely believed that 
one were acting as one ought to. 
Another possible explanation touches on the problem of deciding in cases of 
conflict, which of one's princ i ples one is willing to override and which 
one is not. A situation might be such that a person is faced with a 
conflict between two principles, each of which is designed to cope with 
circumstances of a particular kind, but which come into conflict because of 
the peculiarities of a particular kind of case. 68 For instance, do we say 
that the doctor, who decides to let a terminally ill patient die rather 
than to keep him alive at great cost in pain to the patient, has acted 
'contrary' to his principle to save lives? Do we say, if he takes the 
opposite line and tries to keep the pat ient alive for as long as possible, 
that he acts 'con trary ' to his principle to prevent pain? I think this is 
the kind of case in which a person might discover that his principles are 
inadequately qualified, i.e. he has not yet settled the prior question of 
which principle he is willing to qualify or which one he is willing to 
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treat as overriding, and what the justification for this could be. One 
might then say, not that he is insincere in holding to either principle, 
but rather that he is in doubt about what he ought to do in this parti cu lar 
kind of case. 
I do not think Hare is likely to quarrel with the idea that considerations 
of one's being in error about the facts of a case or of one's being in 
doubt about the rightness of a particular line of action in a particular 
kind of case, do not define cases of insincere assent . A question about 
one's sincerity in holding to a principle is raised, if one recognizes that 
in some cases one is acting contrary to principle and hence that there is 
something one needs to account for ,69 though this is not always simply a 
matter of actual insincere assent. There is considerable tension between 
Hare's definition of a value-judgement as entailing at least one imperative 
and the criterion of s incere assent. The worry i ng point about the 
definition is that it seems to be stipulative. It helps to tidy up things 
in an area where dispute is likely to arise about when a person can be said 
to be si ncere or insincere in his ass ent . IO 
Section 3. Decisions of principle 
One conclusion that can be drawn from what I said in section 1 about the 
necessity of subscribing to a universal principle in the form of reasoning 
Hare defends, is that he pushes the question of how it i s possible for 
moral judgements to have reasons back to the question of how the adoption 
of a universal principle is to be justified. l ! The position Hare defends 
implies that the principle which supports a mo ral 'ought'-judgement cannot 
be justified by appeal to fact (as the naturalists thought) , or by appeal 
to self-evidently true propositions. How, according to Hare, do we justify 
a decision of principle? What principle one accepts for a particular kind 
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of case is a matter of individual decision, but one cannot be said 
coherently to be making a decision about what one ought to do in a 
particular kind of situation without one knowing what it is one should be 
doing, if one decided to do one or other of the things one could be doing 
in that kind of situation. The suggestion is that one's decision, to be 
right, must ultimately rest on a consideration of the consequences of 
adopting a particular line of action and hence that the justification of 
the principle ultimately rests on a decision to accept one set of envisaged 
consequences rather than another set. Hare says: 
'The truth is that, if asked to justify as completely as possible any 
decision, we have to bring in both effects - to give content to the 
decision - and principles, and the effects in general of observing 
those principles, and so on, until we have satisfied our inquirer. 
Thus a complete justification of a decision would consist of a 
complete account of its effects, together with a complete account of 
the principles which it observed, and the effects of observing those 
principles - for ... it is the effects (what obeyi ng them in fact 
consists in) which give content to the principles too. Thus, if 
pressed to justify a decision completely, we have"to give a complete 
specification of the way of life of wh ich it is a part' .7 2 
If I understand Hare correctly, he is suggesting that we adopt the 
following principle as a guideline for determining the rightness of an 
action: 
(PC): An act is right if the (probable) consequences of its performance in 
situations of a given kind are as good or not worse than the 
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(probable) consequences of performing an alternative act in 
situations of the given kind. 
Two features of (PC) are worth noting. The first is that (PC) leaves open 
the possibility that an act may not be right, since the determination of 
its rightness depends on two things: (1) the extent of one's knowledge of 
the available facts of a situation, which must include an account of the 
(likely) effects of the performance of the possible alternative acts on the 
situation; (2) the reliability of one's expectations that a preferred 
outcome is likely to obtain, which is relative to the knowledge one has of 
the consequences of adopting a particular line of action at the t ime one 
makes one's decision . I think it can be said that a decision-maker does 
wrong in a given situation if and only if he knows, at the time he makes 
his decision, that he ought to do otherwise. But it does not follow that 
he is blameworthy should he discover that he chose wrongly, for (PC) allows 
that there is a sense in which what is right at the time he decides, may 
turn out to be wrong retrospectively. 
The second feature of (PC) worth noting is that it defines a 
consequentialist perspective. Hare is not merely saying that consequences 
are morally relevant, but rather that on ly consequences and nothing el se 
are relevant to a consideration of the moral rightness of an act. It seems 
that the rightness of an act rests on the utility of its consequences, 
though Hare does not explicitly say so. I take this to be the major import 
of (PC), though Hare advances no explicit argument which shows how (PC) may 
be linked with the principle of utility. The second feature raises two 
questions. What commits one to a consideration of only consequences in 
determining the rightness of an act? On what basis does one decide that a 
particular set of consequences is preferable to another? Hare provides no 
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explicit answer to the first question. Regarding the second question, the 
suggestion seems to be that one chooses that set of consequences which is 
best overall for everyone who may be affected by one's decision. This, it 
seems, is a direct consequence of the thesis of universalizability when 
combined with the prescriptivity thesis. In virtue of univer salizabil ity, 
one cannot be said intelligibly to judge that one ought to do a certain 
thing on a particular occasion while refusing to commit oneself to the view 
that anyone else in relevantly similar circumstances ought to do the same 
thing. An individual's decision, if it is to have moral import, must be 
universalizable in this sense. In virtue of prescriptivity, it cannot be 
said that one sincerely subscribes to a principle unless one acts in 
accordance with it, if now is the time to act on it, and if i t is within 
one's power to do so. 
Now, what does this entail for moral reasoning? One might say that anyone 
who accepts a principle for a particular kind of situation is committed to 
the view that anyone else who decides and acts differently in a relevantly 
similar situation, must be wrong. For, in subscribing to a principle, one 
defines a commitment to what is right in- all cases which may be subsumed 
under the principle. For instance, the doctor who decides to let a 
terminally ill patient die rather than to keep him alive a little longer at 
great cost in pain to the patient, must hold that his colleague is wrong in 
taking the opposite line. In universalizing the reason for his decision, he 
implies that the reasons for deciding one way or the other are not of equal 
weight, i.e. the alternative courses of action cannot all be right. 
Hare allows for the play of an element of choice, which implies that a 
moral principle may have whatever content a prescriber chooses to give it , 
and that criteria of value are open to choice. There is, however, an 
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independent check on what one may choose to prescribe universally . This 
is, to put it · bluntly, that one has to live with the consequences of one's 
decisions. Hare says that the decision-maker 
has to decide whether to accept that way of life or not ; if he 
accepts it, then we can proceed to justify the decisions that are 
based upon it; if he does not accept it, then let him accept some 
other , and try to live by it. The sting is in the last clause' .73 
It seems fair enough to say that in LM Hare is advancing the thesis that 
his notion of subscribing to a principle is the essential notion in 
morals. 74 But it is not clear where this is supposed to lead to . There is a 
suggestion that what is right in circumstances of a given kind is, all 
other things being equal, what particular agents decide to do, which 
implies that decisions about the moral rightness of acts of particular 
kinds are always relative to agents. I think there is a case for saying 
that in LM Hare is primarily concerned with individual welfare functions 
rather than with developing a method of reasoning which shows how a 
transition is to be made to social welfare functions . 
But, if what I said in Section 1 is in order, it is not difficult to see 
that ultimate decisions of the kind suggested here admit a form of 
subjectivism. 7S If I am right, anyone who says that anyone else who decides 
and acts differently in a relevantly similar situation does wrong, cannot 
rest his case on an appeal to the requirement of consistency. (UP) requires 
some notion of relevant similarity consistent with the u-type requirements 
which Hare lays down for the justification of moral 'ought'-judgements. If 
I am right a question arises on what grounds one might justify one's 
ascription of wrongness to the alternative decision or act. 
39 
Conclusion 
I conclude this chapter with a brief indication of the direction in which 
Hare develops his views in Freedom and reason. Hare attempts to place his 
defence of (UP) on a different footing, though he holds to the view that 
moral 'ought'-judgements require u-type principles for their justification . 
He develops the notion of a universal descriptive meaning-rule in an effort 
to provide an alternative foundation for universalizability. I shall 
examine this view in Chapter 2 in order to establish whether it is 
sufficient to sustain the claim that moral judgements are u-type 
valuations. Two important issues in Freedom and reason concern the 
development of a method of reasoning which Hare claims is dictated by the 
logic of moral language, universalizability and prescriptivity, i .e. the 
establishment of a theory of moral reasoning which he calls universal 
presc riptivism, and the claim that his method of reasoning commits us to 
accepting substantive moral judgements which are consistent with a form of 
utilitarianism . The argument for this centres on the reversibility test and 
a set of rationality constraints, and consists essentially in the claim 
that a form of utilitarianism may be derived from universalizability and 
prescriptivity taken together with these things. 
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1. In U Hare does not offer an explicit formulation of t he principle of universal izability. My 
formulation follows Don locke's in terpretation of Hare's intention. As locke interprets Hare, in 
accepting a mora l 'ought '-judgement. we are 'legislating for everyone ' , and are committed t o t he 
view that 'anyone who decides differently has decided wrongly'. See locke (1968): The 
trivializability of universalizability. The philosophical review , vol. LXXVII. p. 30. 
2. The clause 'if used evaluatively' is crucial. Hare says: 'I do not wish to claim that all 'aught'-
sentences entail imperatives, but on ly that they do so when they are being used evaluatively.' See 
Hare (1952): The language of morals (reprinted 1982) p. 164. Oxford University Press. All 
subsequent references to LM are to the 1982 reprinted edition . 
3. Hare says that 'giv ing a ~ for any act ion involves reference (explicit or implicit) to a 
ru le, maxim or principle. This appears to me to analyt ically true'. See Hare (1955): 
Universalizability, reprinted in Essa ys on the mora l concepts (1973) University of Cali fornia 
press. p. 15. All subsequent references to U are to the reprinted version of 1973. Hare expresses 
a similar view in lM. He says: '. it would be logica l ly illeg iti mate to give a type C 
prescription [i. e. one i nvolving the use of the word 'ought'] while denying that there was any 
principle on which it depended. ' See Hare (1982) p. 157. 
4. Hare is quoting Gellner. See Hare (l973) p. 13. The terms 'E - type' and 'U-type' are Gell ner' s. The 
thes i s that moral 'ought'-judgements are 'U-type' valuations i s true 'in virtue of the meani ng of 
the word "mora l"'. See Hare (l973) p. 16. 
5. This way of putting the matter is due to C.E. Caton. See Caton (1963): In what sense and why 
'ought '-judgements are universalizable. The ph ilosoohical quarter ly, vo l. 13, p. 49. 
6. Here aga in I follow Locke. See Locke (1968) p. 32. In U Hare says: ' ... a reason cannot be a 
reason on just this occasion, and not on other simi lar occasions unless, of course, there are 
relevant differences between the cases. See Hare (l973) p. 15. I take it that Hare means that the 
reason 'cannot be a reason on just this occasion' for A. 
7. Hare (1973) p . 16. 
8. Hare (1973) p. 15 . 
9. Hare (1973) p. 15. 
10. Hare (1973) p. 18. Hare says: ' Universa l ity , in the sense in wh ich U-type maxims are universal , is 
not a matter of degree; to suppose that it is, is to con fuse the term "universal " (as opposed to 
"singular" ) with the term "genera l" (as opposed to "specific").' 
11. Hare (1973) p. 23-24. 
12. Hare (1973) p. 27. 
13. In LM Hare maintains that to ca ll some x good and another exact ly or relevantly similar y not 
good. is inconsi stent (i.e. contrad ictory). because' ... to do so wou ld be to attempt to teach or 
advocate t wo mutually incons istent pr inciples in the sa.-me breath. '·See Hare (1982) p. 159. I think 
Hare understands (UP) as requ iring consistency . Hare says: ' . if I have said , "That is a good 
motor-car" and someone asks "Why? What is good about it?" and I reply "Its high speed combined 
with its stability on the road", I indicate that I call it good in virtue of it s having these 
properties or virtues. Now to do this is eo i pso to say something about other moto r-cars wh ich 
have these properties. If any motor-car whatever had these properties. I should have, if I were 
not to be inconSistent , to agree that it was, pro facto, a good motor-car 
14 . These formulations are suggested by Andrew Oldenquist. See Oldenquist (1968) Universalizability 
and the advantages of nondescr iptivism. The journal of ph ilosophy, vol. lXV. p. 58-59 . 
15. In LM Hare says: '\oJhenever we corrrnend, we have in mind something about the object conmended which 
is the reason for our corrrnendat ion. It therefore a lways makes sense, after someone has said "That 
is a good motor-car", to ask "Wha t is good about it?" or "Why do you ca 11 it good? " or "What 
features of it are you cornnending?'" See Hare (1982) p. 130. 
16. This formulation is suggested by Oldenquist. See Oldenquist (1968) p. 57. 
17. Hare (1982 ) p . 80- 85. 
18 . This formulat ion is suggested by Oldenqu ist. See Oldenquist (1968) p. 58. 
19 . Hare says: ' ... there is some one characteristic or group of characteristics of the two pictures 
on which the characteristic "good" is logically dependent. so that , of course, one canno t be good 
and the other not. un less these characteristics vary too.' See Hare (1982) p. 81. 
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20. Jaegwon Kim argues that Hare's concept of supervenience has the force of 'weak supervenience'. Kim 
says: .... weak superven ience ... only requires that any two things having the same natural 
properties must be either both good or both not good.' He says further: 'Under weak supervenience 
there would be an inconsistency in one's commending an object (saying that it i s good) but failing 
to commend another that is, or believed to be, exactly like it in all descriptive deta i ls; 
however, there is nothing incons is tent, or incoherent. in fai ling to commend either while 
acknowledging the same descriptive properties of the two objects. Weak supervenience, therefore. 
gives us the much discussed Pr inciple of Universa1izabi1ity of ethical judgements understood as a 
consistency requirement.' See Kim (1984) Concepts of supervenience. Philosophy and 
phenomenological research, vol. XLV, p. 161. 
21. Hare says: ' ... the implicat ion of the judgement "Tha t i s a good motor-car" does not extend merely 
to motor-cars exactly like that one. If this were so, the implication would be for practical 
purposes useless; fo r nothing is exactly li ke anything else. It extends to every motor-car that is 
like that one in the relevant particulars; and the relevant particu la rs are it s virtues - those of 
its characteristics for which I was commending i t, or which I was ca l ling good about it. ' See Hare 
(1982) p. 129-130. 
22. Th is formula tion is suggested by Oldenquist . See Oldenquist (1968) p . 59. 
23 . Hare says: . . s ince, as we have already remarked, "good" is a "superven ient" or "consequent ial" 
epithet, one may always legitimate ly be asked when one has called something a good something, 
"Yhat is good about it?". Now to answer this quest ion is to give the properties in virtue of wh ich 
we call it good . Thus , if I have said, "That is a good motor-car" and someone asks "Yhy? Yhat i s 
good about it?" and I reply "The high speed combined with its stab ili ty on the road", I indicate 
that I call it good in virtue of its having these properties or virtues'. See Hare (1982) p. 131. 
The upshot is that my answer can never be '. just.its goodness and nothing else'. See Hare 
(1982) p. 130. 
14. Hare (1973) p. 15-16 . 
25. Hare says: . a natural response to the discovery that "good" behaves as it does, i s to suspect 
that there is a set of characteristics wh ich together entail a th i ng being good, and to set out to 
discover what these characteristics are. This is the genesis of that group of ethical theori es 
ca ll ed "natura l ist" ... I shall argue that what i s wrong with naturalist theories is that they 
leave out the prescripti ve or commendatory element in value-judgements, by seeking to make them 
derivable from statements of fact. If I am right in this opinion, my own theory, which preserves 
this e lement, is not naturalist.' See Hare (1982) p. 81-82. 
26. In formulating Hare's position I consulted his article on Supervenience . This article was written 
in 1950 and first published in Proceedings of Aristotel ian Society , Supp lementary volume 58, 1984. 
It is reprinted in Hare (1989): Essavs in ethical theory. C1aredon Press. Oxford. All subsequent 
references to th is article are to the version printed in 1989. The position Ha re defends i s, 
according to him, implicit in the 1950 article and in LM . Brief ly , Hare argues thus: 'A typical 
practical syllog i sm has one universal premiss, one singular premiss subsuming a particular case 
under the un i ve rsal premiss and a singular conclusion Let us call the two premisses and 
the conclusion of one of these inferences "p", "q", and "r". In full the inference will be of the 
form 
p: For all x, if Gx then Fx 
q' Ga 
So r: Fa 
We have to distinguish two theses 
The first is: 
(1) Necessar il y if q then r.' 
It is the second, not the first that supervenience requires. 
Hare then notes that' .. if we took as the universal premiss not "p" but "necessarily p", then 
(1) would follow directly' . But Hare argues that'. the universa l premiss, whose existence is 
necessarily posited when we ascr ibe a supervenient property, does not itself have to be a 
necessary t ruth - at least not in the sense that we are constrained logically or in any other way 
to subscribe to i t.' He then goes on to say that the second thesis, which also states a necessary 
truth, may be formulated thus: 
'(2) Necessarily , if r, then there is a valid inference of the "p, q, so r " form , the two 
premisses of which hold.' 
Hare notes that ' .. in say ing a premiss holds is to subscribe to it'. In this regard see also 
Hare (1982) p. 191. 'This', claims Hare, ' is what is involved in the claim that "r" ascribes a 
superven i ent property; it i s not, of course, un i versa lly true wha tever "r" is, but is what 
distinguishes "r's" which ascribe supervenient properties from those which do not.' The upshot i s 
that the' . . universal premiss should not be analytically true, or true in virtue of the meanings 
of words.' It should be noted that the' ... "necessarily" at the beginning of (2) means conceptual 
or logical necessity , simply because supervenience is a logical property '. See Hare (1989) p. 
69-71. See a lso Oldenqu;st (1968) p. 78. 
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27. Hare (1982) p. 111-126. 
28. Hare says: the instruction [cannot] be done successfully unless the instructor is consistent 
in his teaching. ' He also says: ' ... a standard is by definition consistent,"' See Hare (1982) p. 
132. See also note 13 above. 
29 . Ha re says: ... the relation of the expression "good motor-car" to the criteria for its 
application is very like the relation of a descriptive express ion to its defining characteristics, 
and this 1 ikeness finds a n echo in our language when we ask "Yhat do you mean, good?", and get the 
answer " I mean it'll do 80 and never breaks down", In view of this undoubted fact of usage , I deem 
it best to adopt the term "descriptive meaning" , See Hare (1982) p. 118. 
30 . To teach the descriptive meaning of 'A good P' is tantamoun t to " ... explaining or conveying or 
setting forth the standard of goodness in [P's) '. Hare also says: 'To know the descri pt ive meaning 
is to know by what standards the speaker is judging.' See Hare (1982) p. 114 and 146. 
31. Hare (1982) p . 122. 
32 . See nate 26 above . As I judge, if it is necessarily true that a reason can always be given for a 
value - or moral judgement, as Hare 's account of supe rvenience imp lies , the reason must be simply 
the universalized form of the judgement, and must be mentioned in the universal principle which 
Hare posits as the major premiss of the practical syllogism. Being prescriptive , the universal 
principle has 'act ion-guidi ng force'. To subscribe or assent to the prinCiple is to give it its 
'action-guiding' force, and this determines that if C is my reason for commending p, I am 
committed, on pain of self-contradiction, to commending an exactly or relevantly similar Pl ' 
assuming that I have not changed my mind . 
33 . Hare (1982) p. 17-31. 
34 . Hare (1982), p. 18-20. 
35 . Hare (1982) p . 144. 
36. Hare (1982) p. 25 - 28. 
37 . The examples and the analysis which follow are adapted from Hare (1989) p. 68 . 
38 . Hare (1982) p . 60 . 
39. See again note 26 above. Hare says that in LM he employed the concept of supervenience in ' . .. an 
attempt to find clear logical criteria for distinguishing between evaluative and descriptive 
words. I thought at that time that this characteristic of value-words co~ld be used for that 
purpose.' But he concedes that this was wrong . ' For supervenience is a feature, not just of 
eva luative words, properties , or judgements, but of the wider class of judgements which have to 
have, at least in some minimal sense, reasons or grounds or exp lanat ions .' See Hare (1989) p. 66. 
40. See note 39 above. 
41. Hare (1982) p . 97, 102 and 106. 
42. Hare (1982) p . 108. 
43 . Hare (1982 ) p. 118-120. 
44 . See again note 26 above. 
45. See again note 13 above. 
46. See again note 20 above. 
47. See again note 25 above, and a ldenqu i st (1968) p. 63-64. 
48. See aga in note 39 above. 
49. Hare (1982) p. 85. 
50 . Oldenquist (1968) p. 64. 
51. Hare (1989) p. 71. 
52. Hare (1982) p. 175-178. 
53. Hare (1982 ) p. 19-20. 
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54. Hare (1962) p. 20. 
55. Hare (1962) p. 20. 
56. See Gardiner (1955): On assenting to a moral principle. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 
vol. 55. p. 28-29 . 
57. Hare (1982) p. 164. 
58. Hare (1 982 ) p. 168- 169. 
59. Hare (1982) p. 169. 
60. Hare (1 982 ) p. 167. 
61. Hare (1982 ) p. 164-165. 
62. Hare (1982 ) p. 172 . 
63. Hare (1982) p. 169. 
64. Hare (1982 ) p. 169. 
65. Hare (1982 ) p. 169-170 . 
66. Hare (1982) p. 169. 
67. See Ga rdi ner (1 955) p. 29 and 32. 
68. I borrow t his point and the example from Hare (1981) Mora l th inking. Clarendon Press. Oxford. p. 
175-178. See also Gardiner (1 955 ) p. 39-40. 
69. See Gard iner (1955) p. 43. 
70. Gardiner puts the point thus: .. . "assenting to a moral pr inci ple P" excludes "not doing as P 
requires" in the absence of a wide and variegated range of circumstances and factors', wh ich are 
often the things that count. See Gard iner (1955) p. 44. 
71 . See Oldenquist (1968) p. 78. 
72. Hare (1982) p. 68-69. 
73. Hare (1982) p. 69. 
74. r borrow this point f rom R.B. Braithwaite . (1954). Critica l not ice of Language of morals . Mind, 
vol. 63. p. 252 . 
75. See Braithwaite (1 954) p. 250. 
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CHAPTER 2 
An analysis and critique of 'Freedom and reason' (FR) 
Hare's argument for utilitarianism turns crucially on premisses which 
commit an agent to settling a conflict of interests between distinct 
individuals as if it were a conflict of interests in his own person. This 
strategy is of particular importance in Hare's attempt to commit an agent 
to 'balancing' and maximally satisfying desires as a form of utilitarianism 
requires. At bottom Hare's strategy depends on what he thinks the thesis of 
universalizability can do. In this a demand for role-reversal, on a 
particular interpretation of what this demand requires, and a demand for 
imaginative identification with the desires of concerned parties, are the 
cr itical moves Hare makes to constrain an agent to accept utilitarian 
conclusions. 
In this chapter my object is to exam ine the claim that the moves Hare makes 
in the argument for utilitarianism are all justifiable with reference to 
the logical features of moral language. In Section 1 I offer an analysis of 
Hare's theory of moral reasoning in an attempt to show how 
universalizability and pre scriptivity generate a method of moral reasoning, 
and how Hare attempts to defend the moves he needs to make in order to 
defend the argument for utilitarianism. I shall argue that there are 
various gaps in this defence. In Section 2 I offer an analysis of Hare 's 
defence of the thesis of universalizability, and a critique of the claim 
that moral judgements are universalizable prescriptions. I attempt to 
arrive at a sense in which this claim should be understood. I try to show 
that the claims Hare makes for universalizability are of central importance 
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in establishing the strategy referred to above, and why I think Hare is 
unlikely to succeed in generating premisses from this logical feature of 
moral language which might commit an agent to accepting a form of 
utilitarianism. In Section 3 I isolate and discuss two problems in Hare's 
strategy which I think undermine the argument for utilitarianism. 
Section 1: Hare ' s theory of moral rea soning 
My object in this section is to present an outline of Hare's account of 
moral reasoning as it is presented in Freedom and reason. The account of 
moral reasoning which Hare presents in FR, contains a claim worth noting at 
the outset. This may be put thus : • 
1. The logical features of moral language (i.e. universalizability and 
prescriptivity), and 
2. claims about people ' s inclinations and desires, when conjoined in 
3. a method of reasoning requ i red by 1, 
compels a prescriber to give the inclinations and desire s of all recipients 
the same consideration as he gives his own. I mention this claim at the 
outset because it performs a pivotal role in Hare's attempt to attain a 
specific objective. This i s t o discover a moral justification for a course 
of action a prescriber may want to adopt , but which will affect other 
persons in various ways . The universalizability and prescriptivity theses 
may be formulated as follows. 
(UP) If some agent, A, accepts the moral judgement that X ought to be done 
in S, he is thereby, on pain of self-contradiction, committed to the 
view that X ought to be done in all situations like S, where 'like S' 
is similarity in respect of the non-moral but morally relevant 
features of S. l 
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(P) 'X ought to be done', if used evaluatively, entails 'Let x be done' . 
If an agent assents to the moral judgement 'X ought to be done', he 
cannot dissent from acting on the prescription 'Let x be done', if he 
is sincere in his assent, and if he is able (physically and 
psychologically) to act on it. 1 
I shall have occasion later (Section 2) to revise my formulation of (UP). 
For my present purposes, the stated version is quite adequate. To simplify 
matters, I shall separate the argument Hare presents in a case of bi-
lateral conflict from the argument he presents in the more complex case of 
multi-lateral conflict. The former proceeds in two stages. Hare first 
presents a case in which the parties actually stand to each other in 
exactly the same relation, and in which their inclinations do not differ. 3 
This serves as a preliminary to his argument for the case in which they are 
not, in fact, in the same position .4 I shall refer to the former as the 
'actual', and the latter the 'hypothetical' bi-lateral cases . Hare then 
presents his argument for the multi-lateral case of conflict as a 
generalization of the method he outlines in the 'hypothetical' bi-lateral 
case .5 
1.1 The 'actual' bi-lateral argument 
I begin with the 'actual' bi-lateral case in which Hare makes the 
simplifying assumption that the parties to the conflict share at least one 
inclination. This, in the creditor-debtor example below, is the desire to 
avoid imprisonment in case of non-payment of debt .6 Hare's argument may be 
reconstructed along the following lines. Suppose A ~ both creditor to B 
and debtor to c. 
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1. A wants to imprison B, because B cannot pay. This being so, he accepts 
initially - the prescription 'Let me imprison B, if B cannot pay .') 
2. Suppose now that A wonders whether imprisoning B would be the morally 
correct thing to do . If he accepts the judgement 'I ought to imprison 
my debtor, if he cannot pay', as a moral judgement, it must be the 
case that he also accepts the universalized form of this judgement -
'Anyone in my position ought to imprison his debtor, if he cannot 
pay'. (This is justified by appeal to universalizability.) 
3. However, it follows fro m the demand for universalization that A must 
accept that his cred itor ought to imprison him, if he cannot pay. This 
will commit him to accepting the prescription 'Let C imprison me, if I 
cannot pay .' (This is justified by appeal to prescriptivity . ) 
4. But, the prescription he has to accept in Step 3 is inconsistent with 
what he has to prescribe should happen to himself regarding his 
problem with C, for A is in fact in the same position as B, i.e. their 
situations are identical in all relevant respects - in respect of the 
relation between debtor and creditor, and particularly in respect of 
the desires which characterize this relation. 8 
5. Now, in order to be consisten t, A must reject the prescription that C 
should imprison him, if he cannot pay . If he rejects it - as he must, 
given that he strongly desires to avoid imprisonment and that tris 
desire is stronger than his desire to exact payment - he must also 
reject the universalized form of the judgement which entai ls this 
prescription. 
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6. Hence, if A is to be consistent, he cannot accept that the judgement 
he contemplates endorsing in 2, can be a moral judgement. 
As I judge, the stipulation that A actually stands to C in exactly the same 
relation as B stands to A, plays a key role, in conjunction with the appeal 
to universalizability and prescriptivity, in yielding Hare's conclusion. 
The significant point about this stipulation is that A's desire not to be 
imprisoned in case of non-payment of debt must be read as the desire he 
actually has for the envisaged situation in which C wants to exact the 
penalty which the law entitles him (C) to. This is critical in Step 4 of 
the argument . The assumption that A in fact .strongly desires to avoid 
imprisonment is intended to force him, via the application of 
universalizability and prescriptivity (Steps 2 and 3) to reflect on his 
position in relation to C, when as sessing what he ought to do as regards 
his probl em with B. The pOint is that if he wants to decide the issue 
morally , he must be willing to accept one universal judgement for the 
situation sketched above. This mean s that A cannot without logical offence 
derive a moral judgement from the mere fact that he desires to imprison B, 
unless, of course, he also accept s a universal desire to the effect that 
every creditor imprison every debtor, if the debtor cannot pay. However, to 
have such a universal desire, he must also desire, or at least accept that 
C should imprison him, if he cannot pay. 9 To accept the corresponding 
prescription , however , leads to inconsistency, which is exactly what Hare 
needs to bring A to a decision , via Step 5 of the argument . 
Now, the fact that A is actually in the same position with respect to C as 
B is with respect to himself, is obviously of critical importance, if Hare 
is to be able to maintain that A can be forced into a position of 
inconsistency (Step 5). As I judge, this stipulation runs together with 
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Steps 2 and 3 to yield Hare's conclusion, for by itself it does not 
determine that any inconsistency arises between A desiring to imprison B, 
yet desiring at the same t i me not to be imprisoned by C. But, the 
conditions under which A may be trapped in inconsistency require careful 
qualification. As I have formulated Hare's principle of universa li zability 
above, the requirement is that A's posit i on must be like B's in the 
relevant respects, i.e . similar in respect of the non-moral but morally 
relevant features of their respective situations, if A's decision about 
what he morally ought to do as regards his problem with B, can be made to 
turn, as an essential ingred i ent of the argument, on what he desires shou l d 
happen to himself regarding his problem with C. 
The point I am stressing here concerns a question about the link between 
Steps 1 and 2 of the argument. I think the contention that, to be moral, a 
desire must be universal, supplies one possible answer to the question why 
Step 2 is compelling. As I judge , to get the argument going, A must be 
manoeuvred into a position in which he is compelled to ask the question 
' How would I like it, i f that were done to me?' The expected response, of 
course, is that he would not like it, i.e. he would not assent to the 
prescription 'Let me be sent to prison, if I cannot pay.' It may be 
suggested that our expectation of this response is justified by Hare's 
stipulation that A's position is in fact like B's in the relevant respects 
(i.e . he cannot pay C as B cannot pay him), and particularly with respect 
to the fact that he actually shares B's desire not to be imprisoned in case 
of non-payment of debt. Hare, of course, supposes that the shared desire is 
the same in all respects, and particularly in respect of its strength or 
intensity.lo It may now be suggested that it fol l ows, from Steps 3 and 4 of 
the argument, that A would not assent to the prescription ' Let me be sent 
to prison, if I cannot pay' because he, in his position as creditor to B, 
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shares a desire which is like B's in all relevant respects. I am saying 
that his own desire not to be imprisoned in case of non-payment of debt 
must be thought to playa role in deciding what he morally ought to do 
regarding his problem with B. I think in compelling A to ask the question 
'How would I (the creditor) like it, if that were done to me?', Hare is 
presuming that it is A's desires, i.e. those he has in his position as 
creditor to B, which are crucial. He (A) considers those desires in 
deciding whether he is morally justified in sending B to prison. 
1.2 The 'hYDothetical' bi-lateral argument 
However, would our expectation of the response just referred to be 
justified if we were to suppose that there are relevant differences? 
Suppose , for instance, that though A is in fact debtor to C, he can pay his 
debt . Consider the following reconstruction of Steps 2-5 of Hare's 
argument. 
2. If A is seriously considering whether he ought to imprison S, i.e . 
whether the prescription he accepts in 1 above, is the one he is 
willing universally to endorse, he must imagine a hypothetical 
situation in which he stands to C in exactly the same relation as S 
stands to himself in t he actual situation, and treat this situation as 
counting for as much as the actual situation. 11 
3. If the situations in question are identical in all relevant respects, 
i.e . with respect to the relations between the parties and with 
respect to the desires which characterize their relations, 12 it follows 
from the universalizability of 'ought', that A can accept the 
judgement that he ought to imprison S, as a moral judgement, if he 
also accepts its universalization, which means, in effect, also 
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accepting the judgement that C ought to imprison him, if he cannot 
pay. 
4. But, if he accepts this judgement, it follows from the prescriptivity 
of 'ought', that he also accepts the prescription 'Let C imprison me, 
if I cannot pay.' This, however" leads to inconsistency, since in the 
hypothetical situation he has also to accept the prescription 'Let me 
not be imprisoned, if I cannot pay.' 
S. In order to avo id incons istency, A must reject the prescription that C 
sho uld imprison him, if he ca nnot pay. If he rejects it - as he must, 
given that he strongly desires to avoid imprisonment in the 
hypothetical situation in which he is situated like B in the relevant 
respects - he must also reject the universalized form of the judgement 
which entails this prescription. 
In this version of the argument, A is faced with inconsistency though he is 
not ex hypothesi actually in the same position as B. He is, however, 
hypothetically in a relevantly similar position, since Step 2 requires that 
he imagines himself to be the person, B, wh~ cannot pay his creditor. How 
is role-reversal supposed to work?!3 As I judge, A must take B's desire not 
to be imprisoned into his imagined role as debtor who cannot pay. This is 
the ground of our expectation that he will respond in the way mentioned 
above, i.e. that he would not accept the prescription that he not be 
imprisoned, were he B who cannot pay. He has to treat this desire as his 
dominant desire for what should happen to himself in that case . I do not 
think it need be supposed that he has a desire like B's at the outset, for 
there is no requirement in the 'hypothetical' bi-lateral argument presented 
above, that this must be the case. Step 2 of this argument is intended to 
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sh'ow that, if he were now, through an act of the imag ination, adequately to 
represent to himself what it would be like to be in B's position, he would 
acquire ~ desire which is like B's in all relevant respects. The adequacy 
of his representation obviously depends on this desire being of the same 
strength as B's, for otherwise it could be said that he misrepresents B's 
case in an important respect. I am saying that B's desire need not pertain 
to A in the actual situation, for he may in fact lack B's aversion to being 
imprisoned at the time that this is relevant to deciding what he ought to 
do regarding his problem with Bl4 This, of course, is not incompatible with 
being averse to himself suffering at the hands of his creditor, at the time 
he is considering imprisoning B. 
Now, I am suggesting that our expectation of A's response in the 
hypothetical situation is justified on the strength of our supposing B's 
desire to be the appropriate desire A has in that situation. Hare's appeal 
to imagination as a necessary ingredient of moral thinking is a point worth 
noting here. ls This appeal sits at the heart of the role-reversal procedure 
in the 'hypothetical' bi-lateral case. But it is not clear how Hare thinks 
this procedure is supposed to work. Putting A in B's position requires that 
he imagine himself to be the person, B, who cannot pay his debt . But, does 
this require that any other desires A may have for what should happen to 
himself in that situation, must be set aside at the time he considers 
whether he is willing to be imprisoned? Or, is the requirement at issue 
here that A must consider only B's desire in that situation? Step 2 of the 
argument can be read as requiring the latter. This, however, says something 
quite different from what I suggested above regarding how the argument 
works in the 'actual bi-lateral' case, for there A's own actual desire not 
to be imprisoned is the desire we suppose him to be willing to act on, 
whereas in the 'hypothetical' bi-lateral case B's desire appears to be this 
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desire. It is, however, worth noting that putting A in 8's position does 
itself not say why 8' s des i re not to be imprisoned should take precedence 
over any other desires A may have for what should happen to himself in the 
hypothetical situation nor why A must be thought to be willing to act on 
8's desire, as Step 5 of the argument suggests. 
I have noted the importance of appeal to imagination in the argument. This 
appeal helps to establish a cla im critical to the argument . This is that, 
in reversing roles with 8, A wi l l be compelled to concede that the actual 
and hypothetical situations are identical in the relevant respects, and 
hence that no morally relevant difference can arise between himself and 8 
in these situations . 16 This is a highly contentious claim, particularly 
since it requires clear identity conditions both with respect to ' 
circumstances and persons. 17 For Hare the required identity is identity with 
respect to the relations between A and 8 in the actual and imagined 
situations and with respect to the desires which characterize their 
relations in these situations. I sha ll examine the identity requirements in 
some detail in Section 2. For the moment I shall accept that Hare 's claim 
i s in order. It is worth noting that this claim supplies the link between 
Steps 2 and 3 of the argument. Now, if there can be no disagreements about 
the morally relevant facts, logic in the shape of universalizability and 
prescriptivity prohibits A from accepting different moral judgements, or 
the correlated prescriptions, for the situations in question . In this t he 
argument appears to be that, whatever judgement A feels himself constrained 
to universalize, he must be wil ling, if he is to make a moral judgement, to 
accept that the same judgement applies to himself, irrespective of which 
position he in fact occupies in the circumstances. ls This, I shall grant for 
the moment , follows from the (alleged) identity of the relations between A 
and 8 in the actual and hypothetical situations, and the desires which 
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characterize their relations in these situations, taken in conjunction with 
universalizability and prescriptivity. 
Now, there is no doubt that for Hare A is compelled to accept the 
prescription 'Let me be impr isoned, if I cannot pay' (Step 4) in virtue of 
the identity relations just referred to, together with universalizability 
and prescriptivity. Merely appealing to A's imagination, and to his 
inclinations, including inclinations we might reasonably suppose him to 
have, were his position to change and become like B's in the relevant 
respects, are not sufficient to compel him to accept this prescription. 
Acceptance, however, leads to inconsistency, since A is ex hypothesi not 
willing to prescribe that he should be imprisoned. As I judge, Hare 
understands the inconsistency to which A falls prey as one of not being 
able, without self-contradiction, to prescribe that incompatible desire s be 
satisfied. How he chooses, however, is a matter of inclination, for there 
is nothing self-contradictory about him prescribing th e frustration of his 
desire to avoid imprisonment. 19 If his inclination is such that he cannot 
accept the prescription ' Let me be imprisoned, if I cannot pay', he must 
(in accordance with Step 5 of the argument) also reject the mora l judgement 
that he ought to imprison B. Hare thinks that this is what he will do. But, 
as I judge, this assumes that A must be thought to care less about exacting 
the penalty in the actual situation in which he stands to B in the relation 
of creditor to debtor, than he cares about himself avoiding imprisonment in 
the hypothetical situation in which his position is like B's in the 
relevant respects. I think this points to a suppressed premiss in Step 5 of 
the argument. If the relevant desires are (1) that A desires to imprison B, 
and (2) that A desires not to be imprisoned by C, it has to be supposed 
that A is prepared to balance (1) against (2), and that (2) is stronger 
than (1), if Hare's argument is to yield the suggested conclusion . 2o I am 
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suggesting that trapping A in self-contradiction, in the logica l sense in 
which identity conditions and the demand for universalization make it 
impossible for him to accept different prescriptions, is itself not 
sufficient to yield Hare's conclusion. 
Step 5 of the argument raises a few issues which need brief discussion at 
this point. It is worth noting that (a) the requirement that A balance (1) 
against (2), and (b) the requirement that (2) be treated as the stronger 
desire, and hence the one he should satisfy, are genuinely different 
requirements of the argument. The 'hypothetical' bi-lateral argument 
requires that A compare and balance his own and B's desires as if they 
were, for him, incompatible desires for what should be done in a situation 
of a particular kind. But, it may be asked: What conceptual moves commit A 
to this strategy for settling his problem with B? A, of course, is expected 
to exchange roles with B and then to accept a prescription which might be 
called ' his own' on the basis of the desires he imagines himself to have in 
that role. In this the argument appears to be that, in reversing ro l es with 
B - on the interpretation of this procedure which I think Hare endorses - A 
is expected to identify with the person in B's position, and in particular 
with the desires B has in his role as recipient of the prescription which 
A's initial judgement entails. The argument then runs, in virtue of the 
demand for imaginative identification with B's desires, on committing A to 
wanting for himself what another person wants should happen, with the same 
strength as this person wants this something to happen, at the time that 
wanting this is relevant to deciding what he morally ought to dO. 21 
Now, to have a desire that something be done is, according to Hare, to 
accept a prescription that it be satisfied. 22 In committing A to identify 
with B's desires, A is expected, in virtue of prescriptivity, to prescribe 
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that that desire should be satisfied. A can, of course, not accept one 
prescription for the hypothetical situation and another for the actual 
situation. For universalizability and prescriptivity jointly set an 
independent constraint on what he can consistently accept . This is that, if 
he accepts the prescription that he should imprison 8, and thinks he is 
morally justified in doing so, he cannot consistently reject the 
prescription that C should imprison him, unless he can show that there is a 
relevant difference between his position and 8'S.23 This is because, if 
identity conditions obtain both with respect to circumstances and to 
persons, the demand for universali zation will compel him to accept that, 
whatever course of action he chooses to adopt, the same th i ng should be 
done to himself, irrespective of which position he occupies in the 
circumstances. 24 As I judge , this, together with the demand for imaginative 
identification, must be thought to determine that, in deciding what he 
ought to do regarding his problem with 8, his treatment of the de s ires 
respectively associated with being creditor to 8, and being debtor to C, 
must run along lines analogous to an agent's treatment of incompatible 
desires in a purely prudential context. 
It is perhaps important to stress that I take Hare's view to be that 
identity-conditions, in conjunction with the demand for role-reversal and 
imaginative identification, interpreted as constraints of 
universalizability, must be thought to constrain A to treat 8's desires 'as 
if they were his own' . 8y this Hare means that A must give those desires 
the same consideration as he gives hi s own, i.e. he must treat them on 
equal par with his own desires . 25 Hare's argument is simply that , if there 
are no morally relevant differences between A and 8 in the actual and 
imagined situations, A cannot give less consideration to 8's interests than 
what he gives to his own interests. Differential treatment of this sort 
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calls for justification, and can be justified only with reference to 
differences in respect of the universal descriptive features of their 
respective positions in (allegedly) identical situations. But, in the case 
at hand, there are ex hypothesi no such differences . Therefore, in this 
case differential treatment of the sort just mentioned cannot be justified. 
The demand that A compare and balance all relevant desires 'as if they were 
his own', is the demand that he must give them equal consideration, 
irrespective of the fact that he knows which position in the circumstances 
he in fact occupies. As I understand, this is the demand that nothing be 
made to depend on the fact that A plays the particular role which he does 
actually play, and that in this role he is the person who desires that a 
certain thing be done. The pOint seems to be that A cannot claim that the 
role he actually performs (as prescriber) accords a privilege which his 
hypothetical role (as recipient) does not accord, because a distinction 
between his roles on grounds that one is actual and the other hypothetical 
is not morally significant, i . e . being ' actual' and being ' hypothetical ' 
are not 'right-making' or 'wrong -making' features of anything. 26 Though A 
may know which role is the actual one in which he de s ires that a certain 
thing be done, this is of no special significance, for this gives him in 
his role as prescriber no privileged position vis-a-vis his recipient, i.e. 
his own desires get no extra consideration because they are his in this 
role. 
The requirement which I have just briefly outlined touches on a point 
crucial to Hare's defence of the import and scope of the principle of 
universalizability, which I shall examine in Section 2. Here I merely note 
its significance in the argument under consideration . Hare says: 
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'All that is essential to the argument is that [the prescriber] should 
disregard the fact that he plays the particular role in the situation 
which he does, without disregarding the inclinations which people have 
in situations of this sort. In other words, he must be prepared to 
give weight to [his victim's] inclinations as if they were his own.,2) 
Hare is here attempting to address the question of how it is possible for A 
to take account of what he would want - as his own current desire - if he 
were to be the person in B' s position. 28 I have suggested that appeal to 
role-reversal and the demand for imaginative identification, must be 
thought to constrain A to treat the desires he would have, if his position 
were to change and become like B's in the relevant respects, on equal par 
with his own (though his own actual motivational state for what should 
happen to himself in the hypothetical situation may differ from this). It 
is worth noting here that the constraints just mentioned are in themselves 
not evidence that A is committed to a balancing procedure as a way of 
settling his problem with B. I think a balancing procedure is tacitly 
assumed in the argument. This is a point I take up below. 
It may be thought that (1) the requirement that A must disregard the fact 
that he pl ays the role which he in fact plays, and (2) the requirement that 
he must treat B's desires 'as if they were his own', amount to the same 
thing, or at least that accept i ng (1) entails acceptance of (2) on the 
grounds that, if his role is disregarded, it follows that it is irrelevant 
whether he is A or B, in which case he must treat his own desires and B's 
in the same way . My own view is that this is unacceptable on the grounds 
that (1) and (2) are distinct, and that (2) is not entailed by (1). Hare 
thinks that A's deliberation about what he morally ought to do must remain 
unaffected by considerations concerning (a) who is actually who in each 
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position he occupies, and (b) which po s ition he in fact occupies in the 
circumstances . This is a matter which touches on Hare's defence of the 
import and sco pe of the universalizability thesis to which I return in 
Section 2. Here I wish to note that (a) and (b) are different requirements 
of universalizability . (a) is the necessary ground of the requirement that 
A must treat B's desires 'as if they were his own', and (b) is the 
necessary ground of the requirement that hypothetical situations count as 
actual. 29 I shall argue later (Sections 2 and 3) that the role-reversal 
procedure - at least the interpretation which I think Hare endorses -
demands that A must identi fy t he person in the imagined situation as 
himself, but that this gives rise to a problem about making coherent sense 
of his identity in that role. 
I understand Step 5 of the argument as requiring that A must treat B's 
desire not to be imprisoned as his on balance desire for what should happen 
to himself in t he circumstances, for otherwise how is the argument to yield 
the desired conclusion? I have suggested that on one count, imaginative 
role reversal enables Hare to fulfil the identity conditions which are 
needed for universalizability and prescriptivity to get a grip in the 
argument . Now, i n this there appears to be a suggestion that if A 
adequately represents to himself what it would be like to suffer, as B is 
about to suffer, his desire not to be imprisoned is likely to emerge as 
stronger than his desire to imprison B.30 It then appears that A must be 
willing to act on the stronger desire, for it may be suggested that this is 
what his rationality requires. This means that Step 5 of the argument 
requires that A, in his role as prescriber, must be rational, in the 
prudential sense of 'rational'. 
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It may, however, be asked what there is in the argument which determines 
that a prudential calculation is the appropriate response for the case in 
which A treats himself as one who has incompatible desires. This is to ask 
whether there is anything i n the argument which commits A to acting on the 
stronger desire. As I judge, the strategy Hare employs to give the desires 
and other relevant features of another person a place in A's deliberation 
is intended to show that his decision about what he ought to do regarding 
his problem with B, will turn, ~ rational agent, on what he most desires 
should happen to himself overall. 
There are three points to note about this strategy. The first concerns 
Hare's appeal to fact . So far in my exposition this appeal has been 
confined to stressing the significance of identity-relations in the 
argument. 31 There is, however, another aspect to this appeal. This is that A 
cannot be said coherently to be making a decision about what he ought to do 
regarding his problem with B, without his knowing what it is he would be 
doing, if he decided to do one or other of the things he could be doing in 
the situation in question. 32 For Hare this means that the determination of 
what he is willing to prescribe universal .ly, ~ rational agent, is a 
matter of weighing one set of consequences tb himself,- should he satisfy 
one desire, against an alternative set of consequences to himself, should 
he satisfy the other desire. 33 If his desire not to be imprisoned on grounds 
of non-payment of debt is stronger than his desire to imprison B on those 
grounds, as Hare thinks it will be, he must, if he is rational, choose to 
satisfy the former. In other words, Hare thinks A must be willing to 
concede, as rationality requires, that he i s not willing to override his 
stronger desire. 
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I suggested above that there is a suppressed premiss in Step 5 of the 
argument. This, as I noted, is simply that A's desire not to be imprisoned 
must be thought to be stronger than his desire to imprison B. Now, I think 
Hare's appeal to fact, and in particular to consequences, supplies 
indirectly one answer to the question why, in reversing roles with B, A is 
likely to accept his desire not to be imprisoned as the stronger desire 
overall. This brings me to the second point I wish to stress. The 
acceptability of Hare's answer rests on the acceptability of an empirical 
generalization. Hare says: 
'People ' s inclinations about most of the important matters of life 
tend to be the same (very few people, for example, like being starved 
or run over by motor-cars) . .. ,34 
I think this generalization sits at the heart of Hare's claim that A will 
be inclined to reject the prescription that he should be imprisoned in the 
case of non-payment of debt, and hence that he will reject the mora l 
judgement that he ought to imprison B. If I am right, this generalization 
accounts for the greater weight Hare thinks A will assign to himself 
staying out of prison, as against exacting the penalty to which the law 
entitles him. But, now, does it follow from this in itself that A will be 
led to accept a form of rational prudence? And, supposing it does, does 
rational prudence entail that A should not give extra weight to his own 
desires simply because they are his? I shall examine Hare's appeal to 
rational prudence below. The point to note here is simply that unless one 
assumes that A accepts his desire not to be imprisoned by C as his on 
balance desire for what should happen to himself in the circumstances, 
there is no reason to believe that trapping A in self-contradiction is 
sufficient to compel him to accept Hare's conclusion. 
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The third point to note about Hare's strategy is that it works on a 
contentious supposition. This is that just as it is rational for A to do 
what he, prudentially speaking, most desires should be done in his own 
case, so it is rational for him to do what he most desires should be done 
overall, in a situation in which he has, in addition to his own desires, 
other desires he treats 'as if they were his own'. I shall maintain below 
that there is in this no reason to believe that S's suffering commits A, or 
gives him a reason to act, as Step 5 of the argument requires. 
1.3 The multi-lateral argument: first thoughts 
As a preliminary step to reconstructing the argument for the multi-lateral 
case, I confine myself to a case involving two persons who hav e different 
inclinations, using Hare's 'trumpeter'-example. I shall then extend this 
argument to a case involving more than two persons, using Hare's 'judge-
criminal' example. My object is to establish by what conceptual moves the 
argument for the 'hypothetical' bi-lateral case may be generalized to cover 
multi-lateral cases as well. 
I begin by isolating the requirements Hare thinks must be met to 
accommodate genuine differences in incl inat ions. 35 Suppose A wants to play 
jazz on his trumpet, but S, who lives next door, likes to listen to 
classical music only. Should A str ike up on the trumpet? Suppose it occurs 
to A (1) that S dislikes jazz and (2) that if he were now to strike up on 
the trumpet, B would be bored beyond endurance. Hare says: 
it is obviously of no use for [AJ to ask himself whether he is 
prepared to prescribe universally that people should play trumpets 
when they live next door to other people who are listening to 
classical records. For if [AJ himself were listening to classical 
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records (which bore him beyond endurance) he would be only too pleased 
if somebody next door started up on the trumpet . ,36 
The point is simply that, i n imagining himself to be the person who would 
be discomforted, A must ascribe to himself that person ' s likes and 
dislikes. This is a point Hare justifies with reference to the requirements 
of universalizability, in particular with reference to the demand for role-
reversal and imaginative identification. 37 Identity conditions require that 
the i r situations be alike in all relevant respects . I reconstruct Hare's 
reasoning thus: any person who ha s some relevant desires of his own defines 
a case which is identical to another case in which he imagines that some 
other person plays his role in the same set of circumstances . ' A in S' 
presents a different case from ' 8 in S', because they have different 
relevant inclinations. But th e situation A has to imagine himself in must 
be the same situation that 8 is actuall y in , i.e . he has to imagine himself 
standing to someone else in the imagined situation in exactly the same 
relation as 8 stands to himself in the actual situation . This implies that, 
though there are different cases, the actual and imagined situations will 
be the same s ituations for both A and B, i .e. they will differ only in this 
morally irrelevant re spect that A and 8 have reve rs ed roles. 38 
Now, A can be said to be imagining himself to be in B' s position, if he 
ascribes to himself all and only the relevant features of 8's person and 
situation. These features must include all relevant personal 
characteristics and, in particular, the relevant de sires of 8's case. The 
relevant characteristics and desires must be those which characterize 8's 
position as recipient of a prescription (i.e . the one entailed by the 
judgement A initially makes in the actual situation). 39 For Hare, however, 
it is not possible to say that A, i.e. the person with his individual 
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ident ity and name, can reverse ro l es with B, because this implies that A 
can be himself in this sense while imagining himself to be someone else, 
viz. B. If Hare is right, it is possible to say that he can imagine himself 
to be B, if this is understood as meaning that he loses his identifying 
features, including his individual identity, and acquires another set. 40 
A then imagines himself to be the person who acquires all and only the 
relevant universal features of B's person and situation. For Hare role-
reversal turns on a notion of knowing what it would be like to experience 
what another person, in his role as recipient, is about to experience. 
Suppose, as I have assumed, tha t A knows 8 is about to be made to suffer. 
If Hare is right, A cannot know what it would be like for himself to 
suffer, as 8 is about to suffer, unless he shares, in the imagination, 8's 
desire not to be made to suffer.41 As I read Hare, to say that A has 
reversed roles with 8, it is necessary that he now (i .e. at the time he 
considers whether he ought to strike up on the trumpet) acquires a desire 
for what should happen to himself in the imagined situation, which must be 
of the same content and intensity as 8's desire. 42 Hare's point is that 
unless he responds, in the imagined situation , in a way that rules out 
remaining unmoved by what he is about to suffer, if he were 8, he cannot be 
sa id to have reversed roles with 8. 
Now, this way of putting the requirement Hare has in mind raises an 
interest ing point. Hare rightly observes that the moral judgement A makes 
about the imagined situation has to remain 'h is own', if it is to have any 
significance in the argument. 43 Hare says we should phra se the question A is 
expected to consider in the hypothetical situation thus: 
What do you say (in propria persona) about a hypothetical case in 
which you are in your victim's position?,44 
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It is of no use to ask him what he would say, or how he would like it, if 
he were B. For this apparently permits A (among other things) to evade 
expressing an opinion at the time that he contemplates striking up on the 
trumpet . The crucial consideration, however , does not touch this point. As 
I judge, Hare is suggesting th at i t is possible for A to say of himself 
that he desires what B actually desires for the situation in which A is 
about to strike up on the trumpet. For, in reversing roles with B, he has 
to imagine that he is the person who is about to be made to suffer. The 
requirement i s that he mu st think of himself as identical with the person 
in that position, though in that position he will have a different set of 
universal features. This requirement is an essential ingredient of the so-
called ' in propria per so na ' requirement, 45 which I think makes up a part of 
the identity-conditions Hare need s for universalizability and 
prescriptivity to get a grip on the argument. 
It is important to note that A's transition from lacking a desire that a 
not be made to suffer, to acquiring a desire t hat he not be made to suffer, 
if he were B, is effected through the role-reversal procedure. The 
contention that A is identical with the person in the imagined situation is 
the crucial point, though Hare does not make this explicit. This contention 
is the claim, noted in my discussion of the 'hypothetical' bi-lateral 
argument, that A i s being constrained to want for himself what another 
person wants should happen, at the time that wanting this is relevant to 
deciding what he morally ought to do. Now , this claim, which assumes an 
application of the principle of universalizability, 46 apparently helps Hare 
to establish another claim crucial to generalizing the argument outlined in 
the ' hypothetical' bi -lateral case. Consider what Hare says about how the 
argument is supposed to run. 
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'The natural way for the argument then to run is for [AJ to admit that 
he is not prepared to prescribe universally that people's likes and 
dislikes should be disregarded by other people, because this would 
entail prescribing that other people should disregard his own likes 
and dis 1 i kes. ,47 
How does this enable Hare to generalize the argument? Suppose, as I think 
Hare assumes, that a moral judgement applies equally to anyone who falls 
within its scope, i.e. to anyone who, like A, lives next door to someone 
else who likes classical music. 48 Just how A must be thought to be 
constrained might be made clear by saying that he is expected to balance 
the advantages to himself of disregarding B's desires, against the 
disadvantages to himself, if he were the person in B's position of having 
the desires he ascribes to himself in that position disregarded by someone 
else. It seems that the version of role-reversal sketched above, and 
particularly the demand for imaginative identification, interpreted as 
requirements of universalizability, must be thought to constrain A to give 
weight - prudentially speaking - to desires he would have, if his position 
were to change and become like B's in the relevant respects. 
Now, in prescribing universally, A must be prescribing for all situations 
which are like the actual one in the relevant respects, irrespective of 
which position he in fact occupies in the circumstances. For Hare the 
universalized form of a prescription expresses a universal desire that 
something be done in all relevantly similar situations, actual and 
hypothetical, which differ only in this morally irrelevant respect that 
different persons perform the various roles in them. How does a prescriber 
arrive at the universal desire which is presupposed in accepting a 
universal prescription? If the demand for role-reversal is interpreted as 
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demanding that he identify with his recipient in his role as recipient, and 
this is interpreted as demanding that he identify with the desires this 
person has in that role, then what he wants should happen universally will 
depend on what he and his recipient actually want should happen to 
themselves in their respective roles . If this be granted, A is expected, in 
deciding what he wants should happen universally, to consider all relevant 
desires. 
Now, as I have reconstructed the 'hypothetical ' bi-lateral argument, A need 
only balance out the relevant desires in order to arrive at a moral 
conclusion. In this, I suggested, A must be thought, ~ rational agent, to 
be deciding on the basi s of a principle of rational prudence . However, it 
appears that in generalizing the argument, the matter is not quite so 
straightforward. Consider how Hare thinks the argument is supposed to run . 
'It does not follow . .. that [A] will conclude that he ought never to 
play the trumpet when [B] i s at home , but only that he will not think 
that he ought to have no regard at all for [B's] interests.,49 
The conclusion is that A, the trumpeter, should not sacrifice his desire to 
play the trumpet, as A, the creditor, should sacrifice his desire to exact 
the penalty. Hare thinks A should co-operate and reach some sort of 
compromise with B, which he suggests would consist in a fair apportionment 
of time during which each may alternatively inflict his likes upon the 
other. What requires the compromise rather than the sacrifice? 50 
As I judge , the determination of what A wants should happen universally is 
not settled simply by appeal to the 'balancing' procedure. This procedure, 
as I suggested in my discussion of the 'hypothetical ' bi-lateral argument, 
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assumes a particular view about how the interests of the parties concerned 
are to be combined in order to yield a moral conclusion. In this regard I 
noted Hare's reliance on a strategy which allows their interests to be 
treated along lines analogous to a purely prudential calculation. It may, 
however, be thought that this strategy is less likely to work in cases in 
which inclinations are genuinely different, and that something needs to be 
added to show how it can be made to work. I am here referring to a link 
Hare sees between universalizability and a formal impartiality,5l i.e. an 
impartiality which takes equal account of A and B's desires, irrespective 
of their content. 
It seems that role-reversal, and particularly the demand for imaginative 
identification, interpreted as requirements of universalizabilty, must be 
thought to constrain A to give equal consideration to everyone who would be 
affected by what he proposes to do, which is to say, if my reconstruction 
of the argument is correct, that he must be thought to be constrained to 
take equal account of all relevant desires. In this there is a demand for 
at least a formal impartiality, which Hare thinks is secured by the demand 
that a universal prescription has to apply to all similar situations, 
including hypothetical situations in which the prescriber plays a different 
role. 52 This is to say, impartia lity is secured by the demand that the same 
moral judgement must apply to A, irrespective of whether he is jazz-player 
or classical-music lover. Hare's appeal to a formal impartiality tries to 
make the point that a prescriber is committed to treating the inclinations 
of his recipients as relevant to the moral appraisal of the act he 
contemplates performing, no less than his own, irrespective of the 
intrinsic worth, the rationality and possible causes of the desires he is 
expected to admit as relevant in the reversed situation. I am suggesting 
that the appeal to impartiality must be thought to address the question 
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about the proper treatment of A's acquired desires. It is important to note 
here that Hare is supposing that A is not apathetic about interests he 
imagines himself to have in his role as recipient. 53 This is the point, 
noted above, that A must be thought to be constrained to give weight, 
prudentially speaking, to the desires he ascribes to himself in that role. 
As I judge, this has a direct influence on the point Hare tries to carry 
via the appeal to impartiality, which is that A is expected to give 
positive weight to all relevant desires. 
Now, how does the appeal to imparti ality help Hare to establish his 
conclusion? I think impartiality requires that the ' balancing' be done in a 
certain way. 54 If A treats the frustration of his actual and hypothesized 
desires as of equal disvalue to himself, as I think the appeal to 
impartiality and rational prudence requires, it is not unreasonable to 
suppose that he will be willing to adopt a line of action which least 
frustrates th em , i .e. that he will be inclined to opt for a compromise with 
B. The demand for the compromise is, in effect, the demand for a principle 
that requires the action which maximizes the satisfaction of the desires of 
all affected persons, or the demand for a moral judgement consistent with a 
form of utilitarianism. 
1.4 The multi-lateral argument: second thoughts 
I turn now to the final moves Hare makes to generalize his argument. In the 
multi-person case the prescriber has to consider everyone who will be 
affected by what he propose s to do because their desires affect which 
universal prescription he can in the end accept. 55 Suppose, as Hare's 
'judge-criminal' example goes, a judge wishes to imprison a duly tried 
thief . But the thief objects thus: 
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'You wouldn't like to be sent to prison, if you were me, so how can 
you universalize your prescription to send me to prison? But if you 
can 't, then how can you ma intain that you ought to send me to 
prison?,s6 
Hare makes clear that the situation in which the judge imagines himself to 
be performing B's role, is but one of many imagined situations he has to 
cons ider . According to Hare's conception of the import and scope of the 
universalizability thesis, a moral judgement has to apply to all relevantly 
simi lar situations, irrespective of who is actually who in t ho se 
situations, and irrespective of which role the prescriber actually plays in 
them . The judge then is apparently entitled to reply thus: 
'If it were just you and I, then of course I might n( c feel obliged to 
send you to prison. But I am conSidering the people whom you will rob, 
and whom other people, encouraged by your example, will rob, if I 
don't put you in prison, and I find it easier to universalize the 
maxim that thieves should be put in prison., S7 
Now, suppose that A, the judge, is committed to considering all relevant 
desires in virtue of the moves outlined in (1.3) above, and that the 
relevant desires are those of all persons whom B might rob. As I read Hare, 
the judge is ju~tified in prescribing that his desire not to be imprisoned 
should be frustrated, if he were the person in B's pOSition. It is clear 
that the justification of the conclusion that the judge ought to imprison B 
presupposes a reference to the interests of everyone who would be affected . 
Hare is suggesting that, in sum, the weight of every citizen's desire not 
to be robbed outbalances B's desire not to be imprisoned. As I judge, 
appeal to the balancing procedure carries the argument. Two questions arise 
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here. What is there in the argument which commits A to summing and 
balancing desires? How, on what basis, are weights to be assigned to the 
competing interests? 
I think it is by now clear that the demand for imaginative identification 
with the desires of all persons concerned is the most significant move Hare 
makes to give the interests of distinct individuals a place in the 
prescriber's deliberation . Hare notes that 
in a multilateral situation, the agent has to consider the 
interests of every person who is affected. This seems in accord with a 
way in which we do sometimes argue, but it leaves unanswered the 
question of how, when we have considered al l these interests, we 
combine the consideration of them into a single answer to our moral 
probl em .'~ 
Hare suggests applying a corollary of the principle of universalizability. 
If two people ought to be treated differently, 
some difference must be cited as ' t~e ground for these different 
moral judgements.' ~ 
Now, what is there in this which commits A to the 'balancing'-procedure? I 
think the requirement that A treat all relevant desires 'as if they were 
his own' sits at the heart of the demand for summing and balancing. so The 
demand i s simp ly that A should combine each person's concern for the 
satisfaction of his desires in his own person, and then treat this on a par 
with a conflict of different interests in his person . 
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If appeal to the 'balancing'-procedure carries Hare's conclusion, there 
arises a need for some constraint which must be thought to commit A to 
Hare's principle of rational prudence, i.e. to acting on what he most 
desires should happen overall, in all relevantly similar situations, 
including hypothetical situations in which he identifies, in turn, with the 
desires of each person concerned. Hare thinks that rational prudence is 
required by universalizability, and particularly by the demand for role-
reversal and imaginative identification. 61 
But Hare is assuming that just as it is rational for A to act on the basis 
of what he, prudentially speaking, most desires should be done in his own 
case, so it is rational for him to act on what he most desires should be 
done overall, for the case in which he has, in addition to his own desires, 
other desires he is willing, through an act of the imagination, to treat 
'as if they were his own'. Without this assumption it is difficult to see 
why universal prescriptivism commits A to summing and balancing desires in 
a way that preserves a connection with his motivation to act on the 
stronger desire. If this assumption be granted, the argument leading to the 
conclusion that A should sum and maximally satisfy desires would then run 
on the appeal to rational prudence. It is, however, not clear that a 
request for rational prudence is justified in this context. It is not 
enough to say that A is constrained to treat all relevant desires 'as if 
they were his own'. For, besides the objection that this assumes that good 
sense can be made of A calling the judgement he makes in the reversed 
situation 'his own', Hare's assumption that a prudential calculation is the 
appropriate response in two-person and multi -person cases, itself assumes 
that A acknowledges a reason to act on the stronger desire, simply on 
grounds that such action accords with his own interests. 
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I have just suggested that the appeal to Hare's principle of rational 
prudence is an essential ingredient in the argument to the conclusion that 
A should sum and maximally satisfy desires. Hare's argument for a 
maximizing principle runs on the strategy he employs to combine all 
relevant desires in the person of the decision-maker. Hare treats the 
demand for imaginative identification with the desires of all affected 
persons, together with the appeal to impartiality and rational prudence, as 
implying a commitment to balancing all competing interests on the basis of 
the principle of equal interests, i.e. on the basis of the principle which 
bids that a prescriber give equal weight, strength for strength, to all 
relevant desires. 61 At bottom the argument is simply that anyone who is 
prepared to universalize his prescriptions, and who is not apathetic about 
interests he is expected to identify as his own, will be constrained, in 
virtue of this commitment, to treat the competing interests of different 
persons as a conflict of different interests in his own person, and hence, 
as one who is rationally prudent, to give the same weight to other 
interests as he gives to his own equal interests. 
If this be accepted, it is not unreasonable to suppose that A, ~ prudent 
universalizer, will opt for that course of action which satisfies more 
rather than less of his desires. This, of course, suggests that the 
determination of what A desires should be done universally, will be the 
result of summing like desires of different strengths, and allowing like 
desires of greater strength to override different, weaker ones. This is to 
say, the final outcome in any conflict of interests will depend, 
ultimately, on balancing desires for different courses of action solely in 
proportion to their strength, and accepting as right that course of action 
which is expected to yield the greatest possible sum of desire-satisfaction 
over all the possible situations - taken together - in which the prescriber 
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performs various roles. The desires in question may, but need not, 
correspond to his own actual desires for what should happen to himself in 
each hypothetical situation. It is the satisfaction of these desires he 
should seek to maximize by finding a moral principle that requires the 
action which ensures tha t the sum of desire-satisfaction will be maximized, 
as utilitarianism requires. 
Hare sums up what I have here presented as the conclusion of his argument 
thus: 
when I have been the round of all the affected parties, and come 
back, in my own person, to make an impartial judgement giving equal 
weight to the interests of all parties, what can I possibly do except 
advocate that course which will , taken all in all, least frustrate the 
desires which I have imagined myself having? But this (it is plausible 
to go on) is to maximize satisfactions.'~ 
It is, however, not clear why A should accept a maximizing principle . 
Specificall y, it is not clear what constrains A to act on the stronger 
desire, all things considered. Consider the following adaptation of Hare 's 
'creditor-debtor' example. Suppose that A, who is cred itor to 8, is also 
B' s judge. Assume that B's desire to avoid imprisonment is stronger than 
A's desire to imprison him on grounds of non-payment of debt. Assume also 
that A, in his role as judge, considers the following courses of action. 
(a) He considers imprisoning B, for the maximum period which the law 
allows, which action he expects will result in significant frustration 
of B's desires , but al so significant satisfaction of his own desires . 
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(b) He considers imprisoning B, for the minimum period which the law 
allows, which action he expects will result in less significant 
frustration of B's desires, but also some significant satisfaction of 
his own desires. 
(c) He considers imposing a suspended sentence, which action he expects 
will result in less than minor frustration of B's desires, but only 
small satisfaction of his own desires. 
(d) He considers imprisoning B, but with provision for release as soon as 
members of B's family had redeemed his debt, which action he expects 
will result in more than minor frustration of B's desires, and more 
than small satisfaction of his own desires . 
Now, if A balances all relevant desires on the basis of the principle of 
equal interests, but wishes only to min imize frustration of desires, he 
should opt for (d). On the other hand, should he seek to maximize 
satisfaction of desires, (c) would be the logical option. What is there in 
the argument presented which commits A to (d) rather than (c)? As I judge, 
the case for maximizing the average has as strong a claim, on the argument 
Hare presents, to what is moral ly right, as maximizing the sum which he 
attempts to run on the basis of giving equal weight to equal i nte rests. 
Section 2. The defence of the universalizability of moral judgements 
reconsidered. 
I have in the course of presenting an outline of Hare's theory of moral 
reasoning drawn attention to the role he assigns to the thesis of 
uni versalizability. In this section I shall examine a renewed attempt to 
defend this thesis. My main concern will be to show how Hare understands 
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the claim that moral judgements are universalizable prescriptions. The 
defence of this claim proceeds via the defence of universalizability with 
reference to the notion of a descriptive meaning-rule. I shall, 
accordingly, first have something to say about this. 
2.1 Universalizability and the descriptive-meaning thesis 
In Section 1 of Chapter 2 I drew attention to Hare's view that it is not 
possible without logical offence to derive a prescriptive conclusion to the 
effect that a particular act ought to be done, from the mere statement that 
the act has certain descriptive features, unless one also accepts a 
universal prescriptive principle which says that acts of the given 
description ought to be done. I also indicated that for Hare some set of 
the act's descriptive features are, or can be, the ground of the 
prescriptive conclusion, if one accepts the principle in Hare's evaluative 
or prescriptive sense. I tried to show, by means of an examinati on of 
Hare's account of supervenience, that the features of the act in question 
are necessarily relevant to the judgement one makes about the act, in 
virtue of one's acceptance of the principle, but that Hare's account of 
supervenience provides no direct support for the cl aim that the principle 
must be universal in the sense advanced in U. 
In Freedom and reason Hare reiterates the claim, advanced in LM, that in so 
far as moral words have descriptive mea ning, they behave much like ordinary 
descripti ve terms. It is part of what it means for a term to be a 
descriptive term that it applies to all things which are simila r in the 
relevant respects. 64 In FR Hare says that what this simi lar ity is, is laid 
down by a descriptive meaning -rule, which being a rule governing the use of 
the term, is a universal rule. 65 There is in this an innovation which I wish 
to draw attention to. This is the explicit claim - which I shall cal l the 
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descriptive meaning thesis - that the universalizability of singular moral 
judgements is the logical consequence of the fact that they carry 
descriptive meaning. Hare expresses this by saying that the claim that 
moral judgements have descriptive meaning, as one element of their meaning, 
entails the claim that they are universalizable, which implies that they 
are universalizable in much the same way as ordinary descriptive judgements 
are.~ 
But, Hare is careful to point out that though descriptive meaning-ru l es 
govern the use of moral terms, just as descriptive meaning-rules govern the 
use of purely descriptive terms, the other element in the meaning of moral 
terms, the evaluative or prescriptive meaning, determines that their 
meaning-rules are more than just descriptive meaning-rules. This 'more' is 
an agent's commitment to a particular substantive moral principle. 57 What 
Hare has in mind here might be clarified thus: if an agent accepts a moral 
judgement, say about some act, this implies that he also accepts the moral 
principle which is presupposed in making the judgement, since it entails 
the judgement when asserted in conjunction with a statement of those 
descriptive features of the act which he deems to be relevant to its moral 
appraisal. Now, his decision to treat these features as morally relevant 
logical l y depends on his decision to apply his principle to the act, or to 
make a moral judgement about it. If he is using the moral term employed in 
the judgement in its evaluative or prescriptive sense, he implies that he 
accepts a prescription to the effect that the act ought or ought not to be 
done because it exhibits the features in question, i .e. he in effect offers 
moral instruction. Hare thinks that this fact alters the logical character 
of the descriptive meaning-rule to which he is committed whenever he offers 
his judgement about the act, which change is reflected in the fact that by 
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applying a moral term to some set of the act's descriptive features, he in 
effect accepts a moral principle of substance. 
Now, the descriptive meaning thesis says that whenever an agent makes a 
moral judgement about something, he is committed to a universal rule, which 
in turn commits him to the 
proposition that anything exactly like the subject of the first 
judgement, or like it in the relevant respects, possesses the property 
attributed to it in the first judgement. ,58 
As I interpret Hare, in using a word like 'ought' in a moral judgement 
about some act, an agent is committed not merely to a universal rule, but 
also to a moral principle of substance which gives certain descriptive 
features of the act their relevance, and which says that those features are 
the logical ground of his ascription of exact or relevant similarity to all 
acts conforming to the given description. Hare is careful to point out that 
the thesis of universalizability is a purely logi cal thesis, in the sense 
that nothing of substance can be derived from it alone. Hare says: 
'By a "logical" thesis I mean a thesis about the meanings of words, or 
dependent solely upon them . I have been maintaining that the meaning 
of the word 'ought ' and other moral words is such that a person who 
uses them commits himself thereby to a universal rule.,s9 
As I understand, universalizability is logically dependent on a meaning-
rule. Thi s is the property of being governed by a universal quantifier and 
containing no references to individual constants (other than by 
description). To exemplify, using one of Hare's own examples,7o the 
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judgement that it is illegal to marry one's own sister cannot be 
universalized in the sense in which the meaning-rule requires, since legal 
judgements refer, implicitly or otherwise, to the jurisdiction of some 
country. It is interesting to note that the judgement is not 
universalizable in the sense that it commits an agent to the view that it 
is il l ega l for anyone 
in any country that was otherwise like England,7l 
i.e. 'otherwise like England' in the relevant respects, to marry his 
sister. For this still ass umes a reference to the jurisdiction of some 
country, however similar the countries in question may be in the relevant 
respects, i.e. in respect of the prohibition on marriages between 
siblings. 72 In contrast, the moral judgement 'No one ought to marry his own 
sister' is universal in the sense Hare requires. 
Hare's reason for maintaining that the legal judgement referred to above 
cannot be universalizable is simply that it is not possible to substitute 
for ' like England ' a description in purely universal terms. If I am right, 
Hare's sense of 'simi lar ' (which is similarity only with respect to the 
universal descriptive features of whatever a proposition is about), i s 
critical for Hare's defence of moral judgements as universalizable 
prescriptions. This is a matter I shall attend to short ly. I think it is a 
direct consequence of the fact that this is the sense of 'similar' required 
by a meaning-rule, that the following claim, which I shall call the 
incons istency thesis (IT), is possible. 
(IT) An agent, A, contradicts himself if he allows that it is legitimate 
for himself, or anyone else in relevantly similar circumstances, to 
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make different moral judgements about two acts or situations he 
concedes to be exactly or relevantly alike. 
To forestall a possible misinterpretation of the import of (IT), it is 
important to be clear on what it commits an agent to. On Hare's view, A 
cannot intelligibly judge that he ought to do x in S while refusing to 
commit himself to the view that anyone else in relevantly similar 
circumstances, say B, ought also to do x. To be consistent, A must judge 
that C does wrong, if C decides differently in those circumstances . But 
there is no requirement binding on C which commits him to the view that he 
contradicts himself, if he decides differently. 
As I read Hare, it does not matter who is in circumstances relevantly 
similar to S, for a charge of self-contradiction to stick to A, should he 
allow that this person ought not to do x in S. It is clear that if A can be 
said to be guilty of self-contradiction, should he allow that C ought not 
to do x in relevantly similar circumstances, it must be the case that he 
can justifiably claim that what is not a morally relevant difference for 
him, can also not be a morally relevant difference for C, though he and C 
are different persons. As I judge, the defence of a claim to the effect 
that A contradicts himself in the sense made clear in (IT), would have to 
show that no morally relevant difference can arise for A from this simple 
fact . It is worth noting that (IT) defines one sense in which moral 
judgements are universalizable. This, of course, implies that the defence 
of moral judgements as universalizable prescriptions must show how the 
problem of relevance is to be addressed. To this matter I now turn. 
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2. 2 The universalizability of moral judgements 
In Section 1 of Chapter 1 I tried to show that Hare's principle of 
supervenience is much too weak to support the sense in which he claims 
moral judgements are universalizable . I argued that on Hare's principle of 
supervenience, it does not follow that A contradicts himself, should he 
allow that doing x may be wrong for C, for this principle allows that the 
same act in the same set of circumstances may without logical or linguistic 
error be judged differently by different persons . 
Now, does it follow from the meaning of the word 'ought', that in accepting 
the moral judgement 'X ought to be done in S', that A is thereby committed 
- on pain of self-contradiction - to the view that C ought also to do x in 
S? I begin with some considerations concerning what is involved in · 
committing A to a universal moral judgement . 
I have in Section 1 of this chapter briefly shown how Hare thinks the role-
reversal procedure can establish similarity in the relevant respects. I 
indicated that for Hare relevant similarity between two situations is 
always similarity in respect of some set of their universal descriptive 
features. A relevantly similar situation, however, need be only an imagined 
situation. For, as Hare observes, it is un l ikely that two situations will 
arise in practice in which the parties concerned stand to each other, 
respectively, in exactly the same relations. 73 Now, granted that this is so, 
it may be asked which universal features of the persons concerned and of 
their circumstances are the ones that make up the imagined set in order to 
secure the identity with respect to persons and circumstances which Hare 
needs to commit A to a universal judgement. As I tried to show above in my 
discussion of the role-reversal procedure, Hare thinks that the relevant 
set of features is the set which characterizes the relation between 
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prescriber and recipient in his position as recipient of the prescription 
entailed by the judgement the prescriber initially offers in the actual 
situation. Hare thinks that identity in the relevant respects between the 
actua l and imagined situations si mply is similarity with respect to the 
relations between prescriber and recipient in each situation, and with 
respect to the desires which characterize their relations in each. 
On what grounds might it be claimed that Hare is entitled to this view of 
what shall count as ' relevantly similar'? It is necessary here to 
distinguish between two separate requirements of universalizability. These 
are that, in un i versalizing a prescription, a prescriber must treat all 
relevant desires independently of who is actually who in each position he 
occupies, and independently of the fact that he knows which position he in 
fact occupies in the circumstances. The first is the requirement that 
references to certain features, for instance, to particular individual 
identities, which cannot be specified without the use of singular terms, be 
granted no weight in his deliberation about what he morally ought to do . 
The point seems to be that he cannot claim that the fact that he is 
identical with himself is a feature which distinguishes his case from his 
recipient 's , because this is a feature of his recipient's case as well, 
i.e. being identical with oneself is not the kind of feature which 
introduces a moral ly significant difference. The second is the demand that 
nothing be made to depend on the fact that he plays the particular role 
which he does in fact play, and that in this role he desires that a certain 
thing be done. The point is that he cannot claim that the role he actual ly 
performs (as prescriber) accords a privilege which his hypothetical role 
(as recipient) does not accord, because a distinction between his roles on 
grounds that one is actual and the other hypothetical is not morally 
significant, i.e. being actual and being hypothetical are not 'right -
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making' or 'wrong-making' features of anything. 74 The point is that though A 
may know which role is the actual one in which he desires that a certain 
thing be done, this is of no special significance, for this gives him in 
his role as prescriber no privileged po si tion viz-a-viz his recipient, i.e. 
his own desires get no extra consideration because they are his in this 
role. 
Now, the requirements just mentioned should be distinguished from the 
requirement which demands that a prescriber must ascribe to himself the 
relevant universal features of his recipient's person and situation. Hare's 
strategy for dealing with the problem of relevance runs via this demand, 
which is, of course, the by now familiar demand that he must identify with 
the person in his recipient 's position. As I have interpreted this demand 
above, a prescriber is expected to identify with his recipient's desires. 
This is part of what Hare needs in order to maintain that a prescriber is 
situated like his recipient in the relevant respects, i.e . that he is the 
recipient of the prescription which directs that he be treated in the way 
in which his recipient does not want to be treated. It is obviously 
important that the judgement a prescriber accepts in the imagined situation 
must be thought to be 'his own', for otherwise how is it to have a bearing 
on the claim that he contradicts himself should he accept different 
singular judgements for situations which are relevantly alike? The crucial 
point is that one and the same person must be thought to be occupying 
different positions in the circumstances and desiri~g that different things 
be done in those circumstances. If I have understood Hare correctly, then 
the following version of the universalizability thesis must be the one he 
presupposes in his attempt to establish the required identity conditions. I 
shall call it the stringent version (SUP) . 
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(SUP) If some agent, A, accepts the moral judgement that x ought to be done 
in S, this impl ies that he is willing to prescribe x in each position 
he occupies in the circumstances, indifferently of the fact that he 
prefers to be in one position rather than another, and indifferently 
of the fact that in that position he desires that x be done, which is 
to say that the object and intensity of his desire mus t be 
independent of which role he in fact plays and of the fact that in 
this role he is the person who desires that x be done . 7s 
As I understand the import of (SUP), a judgement qual ifies as a moral 
judgement if and only if an agent accepts that the action it enjoins is 
right for himself, and from his perspective, right for anyone else who is 
in circumstances relevant l y similar to those in which the judgement 
app l ies. If this is right, there can for A, and from A's perspective, for 
anyone else in a relevantl y similar set of circumstances, be no action 
wh i ch is ri ght and wrong. But, it be i ng ri ght for A, on pen a lty of self-
contradiction, as this is presented in (I T), presupposes that no morally 
relevant difference can arise for A and C from the fact that they are 
different individuals.I think this view about the import and scope of 
universalizability reflects Hare's confidence about the adequacy of the 
role-reversa l procedure, and the demand for imaginative identification, to 
accommodate relevant differences between persons, and to establish that it 
is possible, in principle at least , to get agreement about what the morally 
relevant facts of a situation are. I shall argue later that the suggested 
extension of the scope of (SUP) to include a refe rence to 'anyone else', as 
this is presented in (IT), is strictly illegitimate. 
Now, if, in making a moral judgement, an agent is committed to a universal 
meaning rule, the content of the rule wil l depend on what features of an 
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action or situation he will be constrained to treat as relevant in virtue 
of his acceptance of the judgement. If this is correct, Hare needs a 
criterion of moral relevance. I formulate this criterion as follows: 
(MR) Any universal feature of an action or situation is a feature relevant 
to their moral appraisal, if an agent treats the feature as relevant 
in any position he occupies in a given set of circumstances, 
indifferently of which position he in fact occupies and indifferently 
of who is actually who in each position. 76 
In what follows I shall test this criterion against one of Hare's own 
examples. My object is to establish whether Hare can be said to have 
succeeded in establishing that moral judgements are universalizable 
prescriptions in the sense explained in (IT). Hare's defence of this matter 
runs via the test of relevance. This is to say, in effect, that Hare's 
attempt to establish (IT) depends on whether he can make the test of 
relevance work. 
Suppose that A, who is white, wants to discriminate against B, because B is 
black. Now, in reversing roles with B, it fol l ows, if Hare is right, that 
no morally relevant difference can arise between A and B in the actual and 
imagined situations. The contention that A is identical with himself in the 
imagined situation, though in that situation he ascribes to himself a 
different set of universal features, which include B's desires, helps to 
establish this claim. But we may ask: what prevents A from disregarding his 
acquired desire on grounds that the situation in which he imagines himself 
not to want to suffer, as he proposes to make B suffer, is merely 
hypothetical? And what prevents A from disregarding B's desire not to be 
made to suffer on the grounds that, if he were to acquire the relevant 
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universal features of 8's person and situation, including 8's black skin, 
' he' would not be A, and hence that the contention that he has to choose 
between satisfying two incompatible desires is false? 
Hare's answer to the first question is simply that being hypothetical 
cannot be a morally relevant feature because it cannot be a 'right-making' 
or ' wrong-making ' feature of anything. Hare says: 
whenever we desire anything, we desire it because of something 
about it; and , since being hypothetical and being actual are not, in 
the required sense, "things about" objects or events .. . it i s 
impossible for there to be anything about the hypothetical similar 
situation which makes us desire something different concerning it. ,77 
Part of Hare 's answer to the second question is contained i n the assumption 
that there is nothing logi cally amiss with A imagining himself to be the 
person who has all and only the relevant universal features of 8's person 
and situation. It is, however, clear that for Hare to be able to maintain 
that A contradicts himself should he accept different singular moral 
judgements for relevantly similar situations , it must be possible to make 
good sense of the claim that he is identical with himself in each position 
he occupies in the circumstances, though this means ascribing to himself 
different sets of universal features. I shall allow, for the moment, that 
this claim makes sense on the supposition that the actual and imagined 
situations exist within a logically possible world in which it is possible 
that A is identical with himself in alternate positions in which he is 
successively white and black, and in which the desires respectively 
associated with being white and being black are both for him desires of the 
self . It might now be suggested that A's treatment of the desires 
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respectivel y associated with being white and being black will run along 
lines analogous to an agent's treatment of incompatible desires in a purely 
prudential context. One might say that A is the decision-maker who 
contemplates realizing one of two possible situations, and that his choice 
between the alternatives depends on which one of his desires he feels 
himself constrained to satisfy. Hare cl early needs this supposition in 
ord~r to make his criterion of relevance run, all other things being equal, 
on the logical impossibility that the proposed act of discrimination can 
have different and opposite values for A. 7S If this is right, A is, within 
Hare's possible world, being constrained to accept that, whatever universal 
rule he adopts, the same moral judgement must apply to himself, 
irrespective of whether he is white or black. This is a crucial point. This 
way of putting the matter restates what I have called the stringent version 
of universalizability (SUP). 
For Hare it follows from the constraint of universalizability just referred 
to, and the thesis of prescriptivity, that A cannot coherently reject the 
singular judgement which entails the prescription that he should be 
discriminated against in the case in which he is black, and not al so reject 
the universalized form of this judgement. The test, then, whether A is 
putting forward a moral argument is whether he is willing to treat B's · 
black skin as relevant in the case in which he is black. If it be granted 
that there is a possible world in which A is the person who desires that 
different things be done in alternate positions in which he is successively 
white and black, he would contradict himself if he prescribes that both 
desires be satisfied. A is then in a position in which he can avoid self-
contradiction only by universalizing one of two possible judgements, which 
is to say that he can avoid self-contradiction only by making a decision of 
relevance. 
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I noted above that A's choice between realizing one of two possible 
situations depends on which one of his desires he feels himself constrained 
to satisfy . The decision of relevance will run - all other things being 
equal - on A being constrained to balance the desires respectively 
associated with being white and being black as if they were, for him, 
incompatible desires of varying strength. This amounts to saying that the 
decision of relevance turns on the respective strengths of these desires. 
If A is inclined to reject the prescription that he should be discriminated 
against in the case in which he is black, as Hare supposes,79 he must also 
reject the moral judgement which entails this prescription. This means that 
he cannot then accept that having a black skin is a morally relevant 
feature . The point is simply that the prescription which he is willing on 
balance to accept must be thought to constitute a moral judgement. I have 
suggested t hat A needs to make a decision of relevance - which amounts to 
saying tha t he needs to balance two incomp atible desires of varying 
strength - in order to establish which one of two possible universal rules 
he should adopt. For Hare A's final decision depends on him conceding that 
he is not willing to override his stronger desire, i.e. the desire that he 
should not be discriminated against in the case in which he is black. 
Though it would not be self-contradictory for him ·to prescribe the 
frustration of this desire, Hare thinks he is unlikely to do want to do so. 
I think Hare here appeals to the empirical generalization to which I have 
drawn attention above. Hare also thinks that role-reversal and imaginative 
identification would fail to be effective as a bar to him prescribing this, 
only if he fails to make it sufficiently clear to himself what his 
experiences at the receiving end would be like. This , of course, is to 
contend that given the required depth of representation of what it would be 
like , the desire not to be made to suffer is likely to emerge as the 
stronger desire. so 
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If I have correctly reconstructed the line of reasoning which leads to the 
test of relevance, the following three premisses are the crucial ones. 
(a) A can want for himself what another person wants should happen, with 
the same strength as this person wants something to happen, as the 
demand for role-reversal and imaginative identification require, at 
the time that wanting this is relevant to deciding what he morally 
ought to do . 
(b) A must accept, as universalizability requires, that whatever universal 
rule he adopts, the same moral judgement must apply to himself, 
irrespective of whether he is white or black. 
(c) A must be willing to concede, as rationality requires, that he is not 
willing to override his stronger desire that he should not be 
discriminated against in the case in which he is black. 
As I suggested above, (b) is a restatement of what I have called the 
stringent version of universalizability (SUP). It is obvious that (b) 
provides a basis for the test of relevance, and · that (b) pl~ys a role in 
committing A to (a) and (c). Now, this test will run only if the strategy 
Hare employs to give the desires and other characteristics of distinct 
individuals a place in the decision-maker's deliberation, works in the way 
suggested, viz . that one and the same person must be thought to be making a 
decision, which affects another person, on the assumption that he is 
identical with himself in each role he performs. This is essential to 
maintaining that the proposed act of discrimination cannot, without 
inconsistency, have different and opposite values for A. I have also 
suggested that the test of relevance runs, in part at least, on an appeal 
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to the 'balancing' procedure and Hare's principle of rational prudence as 
applied in bi-lateral cases. The application of a prudential rule in these 
cases works on the supposition that A will not be apathetic about interests 
he deems to be 'his own' in hypothetical situations. This supposition works 
with an assumption of rationality . This is the assumption, implicit in (c) 
above, that just as it is rational for A to do what he, prudentially 
speaking, most desires should be done in his own case, so it is rational 
for him to do what he most desires should be done in a situation in which 
he treats himself as one who has incompatible desires. 
Now, for Hare a descriptive meaning-rule is a universal rule. Hare notes, 
however, that any principle can be rendered properly universal simply by 
substituting universal terms for all terms that function as individual 
constants. This is what Hare calls the 'first stage' of universalization. 8l 
However, a principle which conforms only to this stage of universalization 
does not neces sarily qualify as a moral principle. To qualify as such, the 
principle has to pass what he calls the 'second stage' of universalization, 
which involves meeting the requirements of the test of relevance. From a 
principle which meets the requirements of this test, a moral judgement may 
be deduced, together with a statement of ·relevant fact. To qualify as 
moral, A's desire to discriminate against B must be deducible from the 
uni versal desire that every white man should discriminate against every 
black man. However, to say that A has this universal desire, is to say that 
he desires its satisfaction in all cases subsumable under the corresponding 
universal principle, including the case in which he is black. This means 
that the desire to discriminate against B would be universal in the sense 
required by (SUP), if and only if what he desires for himself gQ£ white is 
also what he desires for himself gQ£ black . The action which this desire 
motivates would then be morally right. 
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Here I wish to note two things. First, Hare's account of why A must be 
thought to be constrained to accept one moral judgement for the situation 
in hand needs an argument to the effect that it is coherent to suppose that 
the person in the imagined situation is A, and hence that he cannot without 
self-contradiction allow that the act of discrimination can have different 
and opposite values for himself gQ£ white and gQ£ black. Second, it is not 
difficult to see that Hare's sense of 'universal' places extraordinary 
strain on his account of supervenience. 
In Section 1 of Chapter 1 I tried to show that on Hare ' s account of 
supervenience, it is possible for different persons, without logical or 
linguistic error, to evaluate the same act in the same set of circumstances 
differently. For Hare supervenience works on the presupposition of a 
universal prescriptive premiss, which together with a secondary substantive 
premiss (a statement of relevant fact), yields the conclusion that 
something is right or good. But from this it does not follow that the same 
thing is right or good for anyone else who does not subscribe to the same 
principle. To put this differently, it does not follow from supervenience 
alone that, if A judges the act of discrimination to be right and anyone 
else in relevantly similar circumstances judges 'it to be wr6ng, that A can 
say this person is in error, simply by appeal to consisteccy . For this 
result to obtain, it has to be the case that ' anyone else' is ' anyone else 
relevantly similar to A' , i.e. anyone else who accepts the same substantive 
moral principle about the rightness of the act. 
Now, to get to a point where it can be allowed that there is a place for 
supervenience in Hare ' s response to the problem of relevance, A must be 
thought to be the same person, gQ£ white and gQ£ black . It can then be 
allowed that there is something about what A desires for himself gQ£ white, 
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and what A desires for himself gQ£ black, which makes it appropriate for 
him to attach different moral predicates to whatever this something is in 
each case. This, of course, will be the quality of A's experiences gQ£ 
white and gQ£ black. It must also be accepted that one logically possible 
world is at issue here, for Hare's notion of supervenience requires only 
that within this world there not to be two things which are exactly or 
relevantly alike, and which differ solely in their value. 82 It can then be 
allowed that there is a universal premiss which holds for A gQ£ white and 
gQ£ black, and which together with a secondary substantive premiss, entails 
the conclusion that the proposed act of discrimination has a certain moral 
value for A. 
But, in the context of Hare ' s logically possible world it strains to speak 
of supervenience, at least of the weak version Hare claims to accept. For, 
as I judge, there is nothing in supervenience itself which requires that 
the universal premiss Hare presupposes must conform to what he calls the 
second stage of universalization. 83 How, then, does Hare make space for the 
sense of ' universal ' which hi s meaning-rule requires on the strategy he 
employs to deal with the problem of relevance in the two-person case? (b) 
above, of course, implies that differential treatment must be justified, 
and can be justified only with reference to differences in respect of the 
relevant universal descriptive features of A and B's positions in the 
actual and imagined situations. This conception of what universalizability 
requires must be thought to constrain A to accept only one moral judgement 
for experiences he would have gQ£ white and gQ£ black, as if being white 
and being black make no difference to who he is. 84 The important feature in 
this is the demand for consistency . This demand, however, presupposes that 
good sense can be made of the claim that A is identical with himself in his 
role gQ£ black. Role-reversal and imaginative identification, however, do 
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not help Hare to establish that this person must be thought to be A, 
because in themselves these things set no bar to A thinking of that person 
as B. There can, of course, be no contradiction between the different moral 
judgements which different persons may accept for the same set of 
circumstances, a point which my formulation of Hare 's principle of 
supervenience allows. Hare's response to the problem of relevance in the 
two-person case requires that A must not disregard the knowledge that it is 
he who occupies different positions in the circumstances. I think this is a 
point which recourse to a logically possible world cannot sustain, though 
Hare nevertheless thinks that it is appropriate to deal with the problem of 
relevance in the two-person case along lines appropriate to a decision of 
relevance in the single-person case. But, to proceed in this way, is to 
assume that the constraints of supervenience have the same force as the 
constraints of universalizability, in the sense in which (b) above and 
(SUP) make this clear. 
Now, Hare concedes that (SUP) will not commit everyone to accepting (c). 
The fanatical racist is Hare's prime example of the person who can without 
offence to rationality escape from the argument. If I understand the 
fanatic 's position correctly, he can rejec t (c) on grounds that the 
fulfilment of his ideal requires that nothing be made to turn on the 
respective strengths of the desires of prescriber and recipient, i.e. that 
nothing be made to turn on a 'balanci ng ' procedure which works on the basis 
of desire-strength alone. 65 The difference between him and any other moral 
agent just is that he is willing to make some radical sacrifices, which 
include prescribing the frustration of his desires not to be made to 
suffer, desires which he would come to have, if his position were to change 
and become like his victim's in all relevant respects. If I read Hare 
correctly, the fulfilment of his ideal justifies his preference for 
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satisfying the weaker desire to disadvantage blacks, rather than the 
stronger desire that he not be disadvantaged, if he were black . We might 
say that he universalizes independently of how anyone's interests may be 
affected, including his own interests. B6 
Hare, of course, is saying that his attempt to make the test of relevance 
work on the basis of (b) above, will work only if ideal-dependent desires 
are left out of the reckoning. B) As I judge, it works only for persons who 
accept (a) and (c), and particularly only for persons whose inclinations 
will be as Hare supposes in (c). I have in my di scussion of the 
'hypothetical' bi-lateral argument suggested that this view smacks of an 
empirical generalization. This assumes a premiss very suited to Hare's test 
of relevance, one which presupposes the kind of motivation Hare needs to 
make the test work. 
Hare's generalization about what people are likely to want and not to want 
suggests that the extension of the scope of (SUP) to include a reference to 
'anyone else', as this is presented in (IT), may be rejected as 
illegitimate. As I judge, there is a clear difference in import between 
(UP) on the one hand and (SUP) and (IT) on the other, which is just the 
difference between how Hare's moral agent and the fanatic must be thought 
to be universalizing .88 I f the assumption that people's inclinations will be 
as Hare supposes in (c), is set aside, the reference to 'anyone else' can 
be construed only as meaning 'anyone else relevantly similar to A in 
relevantly similar circumstances ' , i .e. anyone else who accepts as right 
what A accepts as right. 89 
Yet, I think the descriptive meaning-rule thesis must work on the 
unrestricted sense of 'universal', if Hare is to be able consistently to 
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maintain that legal judgements are not universalizable, and if Hare is to 
succeed in generalizing the argument he outlines for bi-lateral cases. Hare 
clearly needs something like (SUP) and (IT) above, if his contention that, 
in prescribing universally, a prescriber is committed to the view that his 
prescription applies to anyone else in relevantly similar circumstances, is 
to have any meaningful import . It is, however, difficult to see how the 
unrestricted sense of 'universal', may be thought to cover the vast number 
of cases which an agent's universal principle subsumes . In this Hare's 
generalization about what people are likely to want, or not to want, plays 
the crucial role. There is a peculiar anomaly in Hare ' s account of this 
matter, which is best brought out by noting his contention that judgements 
which express the ideal-dependent desires of the fanatic are 
universalizable in exactly the sense in which judgements which express mere 
desires, are universalizable. 9o But it is obvious that if the fanatic can 
ignore (c) without offence to rationality, it fo l lows that the judgement he 
universalizes, will not be limited in the scope of its application to the 
restricted sense in which the non-fanatic must be thought to be 
universalizing. Now, I do not think that judgements which express ideal-
dependent desires are universalizable in exactly the sense in which other 
judgements are universalizable. Hare ' s contention to the contrary, however, 
reinforces my view that there are different notions of universalizability 
in his theory of moral reasoning, viz. the unrestricted sense in which the 
fanatic universalizes, and a restricted sense in which the non - fanatic must 
be thought to be universalizing, but which assumes Hare's genera li zation 
about what people are likely to want or not to want. 
Section 3. From universal prescriptivism to utilitarianism: two problems 
In this section I shall maintain that the strategy Hare employs to combine 
all relevant desires in the person of the decision-maker gives rise to two 
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problems which undermine his attempt to derive a form of utilitarianism 
from his universal prescriptivism. The strategy in question is that by 
which Hare attempts to reduce a conflict of interests between distinct 
individuals to a conflict of interests in the person of the decision-maker, 
the resolution of which Hare interprets as demanding a mere prudential 
calculation. Hare's claim that a prescriber is committed to balancing all 
relevant desires in his own person depends crucially on the acceptability 
of this strategy. I think however, that the contention that all relevant 
desires are a prescriber's 'own' desires, is one central weakness in the 
argument to the effect that a prescriber is committed to summing and 
maximally satisfying desires. 
What exactly is this weakness? Suppose, again, that A, the judge, is 
considering whether he ought to imprison B, the thief. Now, in settling his 
problem with B, as morality demands, A must be willing to adopt a universal 
principle, which means that he must be willing to accept that the moral 
judgement it implies, applies equally to himself (1) irrespective of which 
position he in fact occupies . Hare suggests that if A is willing to concede 
the moral irrelevance of (1) , it follows, in deciding what he morally ought 
to do , that (2) it is irrelevant whether he is A or B, in which case he is 
committed to treating all relevant desires in the same way, i.e. on equal 
par with his own desires. There is, regarding (2), a question about the 
coherence of the demand that A must be thought to be the person who accepts 
a judgement in propria persona in the situation in which he imagines 
himself to be the person in B's position, 91 which raises a question about 
the acceptability of Hare's strategy for the resolution of inter-personal 
conflicts . 
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How does Hare understand the demand that A think of the person in the 
imagined situation as himself? This is to ask how Hare understands the so-
called . in propria persona requirement. Hare says: 
we shall make the nature of the argument clearer if, when we are 
asking [someone) to imagine himself in the position of his victim, we 
phrase our question, ne ver in the form "What would you say, or feel, 
or think or how would you 1 ike it, if you were he?", but always in the 
form "What do you say (in propria persona) about a hypothetical case 
in which you are in your victim's position". , 92 
As I understand Hare, the in propria persona requirement demands that A 
address the question ' What do you say ... ?' to himself, as one whose 
strongest current desire is not to be imprisoned. Hare thinks that his 
theory would fail to trap A in self-contradiction if the 'What would you 
say ... ?' question is all A need ask. The reason seems to be that this 
question loses the contact Hare is trying to preserve between desiring, 
prescribing and acting over a range of situations, including hypothetical 
situations in which the prescriber has to ascribe to himself different 
current motivational states, other than those he might actually have for 
those situations. 
Now, as Hare observes, in order to trap A in self-contradiction, it must be 
the case that he now holds an opinion about the hypothetical situation 
which is inconsistent with the opinion he now holds about the actual 
situation. 93 I am in doubt whether making this point, via the demand for 
role-reversal and imaginative identification, as Hare understands this in 
terms of the in propria persona requirement, is at all necessary in order 
to force A into a position of self-contradiction. Consider, for instance, 
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that A might reason along the following li nes. A might say that since B is 
a thief, he ought to be imprisoned, and offer as reason 'Anyone who is a 
thief ought to be imprisoned.' This would commit A to conceding that, if he 
were a thief, he ought to be imprisoned. It is not necessary to fulfil the 
requirements of role-reversal to make this point. So, what could the point 
of role-reversal be? One answer, which I have suggested in Section 1, is 
that role-reversal and imaginative identification are needed to establish 
identity in all relevant respects between A and B in the actual and 
imagined situations. These moves, however, raise the question about who the 
person in the imagined situation might be. But, it may be argued that these 
moves are not essential in order to trap A in self-contradiction. If it be 
supposed, for instance, that A believes that thieves ought to be 
imprisoned, he would, given certain conditions, fall prey to a charge of 
inconsistency, should he also believe that he ought not to be imprisoned, 
if he were a thief. Now, this inconsistency is not dependant on role-
reversal requirements, and so is not dependent on settlins identity-
questions. 
What Hare takes the point of role-reversal to be links with his conception 
of what constitutes adopting the moral perspective. Hare standard1y offers 
something along the following lines. If A is to make a moral judgement, he 
has to subject the judgement he in i tially offers to the role-reversal test, 
i.e. he has to imagine himself performing , in turn, the role of each person 
who would be affected by the action which his initial judgement enjoins, 
and then determine whether he is willing to assent, in propria persona, to 
that action being performed in each role in which he ascribes to himself, 
in turn, all and only the relevant universal features of all concerned 
persons and their situations. The determination of whether he is willing to 
assent depends on whether he chooses to perform that action, if he knew he 
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might be, in turn, the recipients of the proposed action. This is the 
crucial test of the moral value of an action. 
Hare takes care not to identify this interpretation of what constitutes 
adopting the moral point of view with utilitarianism, for he allows that it 
is possible, without logical or factual error, to accept non-utilitarian 
principles, as his 'fanatics' indeed do. There are two incompatible 
interpretations of what constitutes adopting the moral point of view. On 
the one hand, the demand that A universalize his prescriptions reads as a 
demand for an interest-dependent decision, one which A might be willing to 
accept, if he is also willing to accept that action which he expects will 
maximize overall desire-satisfaction, on the assumption that he might be, 
in turn, the persons whose interests would be adversely affected by the 
action which his initial judgements enjoins . On the other hand, the demand 
that he universalize his prescript ions reads as a demand for an ideal-
dependent decision, supportable by reasons which are indepe ndent of how 
anyone's interests may be affected, such as Hare's 'fanatics' may offer . 
This is a tension I noted in my discuss io n of Hare's defence of moral 
judgements as universalizable prescriptions in Section 2. Interest-
dependent reasons turn out, if I am right, to have restricted force, in so 
far as the scope of the universal prescription which underlies the reason, 
will be limited to other agents who accept as right what the decision-maker 
accepts as right. Interest-dependent reasons, on the other hand, are not 
similarly restricted. 
Now, the important assumption about the possibility of imaginative 
identification in the role-reversal procedure Hare attempts to defend is, 
as stated above, that A can intelligibly be said to be imagining himself to 
be performing B's role. There are, however, at least three ways in which 
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the in prooria persona requirement may be understood. 94 In asking the 'What 
do you say ... ?' question, A might be asking one of three questions: 
(1) 'What do I say about the hypothetical situation in which I am in my 
victim's position?' 
(2) 'What does B say about the situation in which he stands to me (A) in 
the relation of recipient to prescriber?' 
(3) ' What would I say about the hypothetical situation in which I imagine 
that I have a different set of universal features?' 
(1) demands that A imagine what it would be like for himself to be the 
person in B's position, as if he (A) were the person who is about to 
experience what B is about to experience. This may be understood as 
analogous to A imagining what it would be like to be in some future state 
of himself, and now desiring what he currently believes he will then want . 
But , as I judge, (1) demands what is logically impossible, viz. that A can 
imagine himself to be the person who can have B's experiences. 95 On Hare's 
view, the ' himself ' in question here must refer to A, for in order to trap 
A in self-contradiction it must be the case that he and the person whose 
experiences he imagines himself to be having, must be the same person. But 
how is this possible? It is obvious that the person he identifies as 
himself and the person he imagines being do not share the same set of 
universal features. If I am right it is not possible that A can 
intelligibly treat his representations of what it would be like to be B, as 
representations of what it would be like for himself to be in B's 
situation. For the representations in question cannot be the 
representations of one and the same person. I think it is clear enough that 
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what I have just said here applies equally to the 'What do I say ... ?' and 
the 'What would I say ... ?' questions, i.e. to (1) and (3). If this is 
right, then in the imaginatively reconstructed situation (2) above must be 
the question A must be asking. 96 I am suggesting that Hare's strategy for 
settling interpersonal conflicts suffers from this weakness that the 
desires A is expected to ascribe to himself in the hypothetical situation, 
cannot be 'his own' in the sense in which the 'What do you say .. . ?' 
question requires. This means that the demand for imaginative 
identification, as Hare understands this demand in terms of the in propria 
persona requirement, suffers from incoherence. 
A second weakness in the argument that a prescriber is committed to summi ng 
and maximally sat i sfying desires, concerns an assumption of rationality to 
which Hare appeals. Thi s is the assumption that just as it is rational for 
an agent to act, prudentially speaking, on what he mos t desires should be 
don e i n his own cas e, so i tis rat ion a 1 for him to act 0 n wh a the mo s t 
desires should be done in a situation in which he treats all relevant 
desires 'as if they were his own'. My problem with this is simply that it 
is being supposed that an agent, in hi s role as decision-maker, recognizes 
a reason to act on a prescription offered by a recipient, and not just that 
he would recognize such a reason if he were forthwith to be in the position 
of his recipient .97 This distinction is crucial. As I judge, Hare has the 
former in mind, for that is what he needs to run the strategy for settling 
conflicts between the interests of distinct individuals along lines of a 
purely prudential calculation as in the single-person case. We may ask: 
what constrains me to accept that your reasons for wanting something are 
also reasons for me to want this something? 
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The prescriptivity thesis says simply that if an agent sincerely assents to 
a moral judgement, this implies that he sincerely assents to the entailed 
prescription, i.e. that he is committed to performing a certain act, 
provided that it is within his power (physically and psychologically) to do 
what he commits himself to doing. Hare is careful to point out that from 
this it does not follow that it is logically impossible sincerely to assent 
to a moral judgement, yet fail to perform the action it enjoins. The point 
is that sincere agents may be morally weak. 98 But, barring cases of this 
phenomenon, it is a tautology to say that if an agent sincerely assents to 
a moral judgement, he is committed to acting on the entailed prescription. 
It is necessary to point out that for Hare prescriptivity is the logical 
ground of the claim that inclinations (wants or desires) are relevant to 
what people may choose to prescribe, simply because their prescriptions 
express in language what they may want or desire to do. As Hare puts it, to 
have a desire, in the sense of 'desire ' in which any felt disposition to 
action counts as a desire, is to accept a prescription that it be 
satisfied, i.e. that something be done. 99 
Now, in Section 2 I argued that universalizability plays ~ crucial role in 
committing an agent to Hare's strategy for the resolution of inter-personal 
conflicts. Universalizability enters the argument via the requirement that 
A must give equal consideration to all affected persons, and via the demand 
for role-reversal and imaginative identification, to compel him to give 
equal consideration to all relevant desires. I think the demand for 
imaginative identification assumes an appeal to self-interest, i.e. to what 
an agent might reasonably be supposed to have reasons for wanting, if he 
were to be, in turn, the persons whose positions he occupies . 100 This 
appeal is Hare's way of preserving a connection between desiring, 
prescribing and acting over a range of situations, including hypothetical 
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situations in which the decision-maker has to consider having different 
current motivational states, other than those he might actually have for 
those situations. 
On what grounds does Hare think the appeal to self-interest is compelling? 
Consider, again, what Hare thinks is involved in adopting a universal 
prescription. On Hare 's account of what role-reversal requires, A, the 
creditor, cannot be said to have reversed roles with B, the debtor, if he 
remains unmoved by what he would have to endure in his role as recipient. 
Hare, of course, is here supposing that A will not be apathetic about how 
his interests would be affected, if his position were to change and become 
like B's in the relevant respects. The appeal to prudence, in this sense, 
is essential in supposing that A acknowledges a motivational state which is 
like B's in all relevant respects. One might say that if he applies the 
prescription he offers in the actual situation to himself, in his role as 
recipient of this prescription, he must, as one who is prudent about 
interests he deems to be 'his own', concede a desire that he should not be 
made to suffer as B is about to be made to suffer. This, as I have 
understood Hare, is how the interests of affected parties are accorded a 
place in a decision-maker's deliberation, and hence receive equal 
consideration in generating a universal reason which the acceptance of a 
moral judgement requires. 
If A sincerely assents to the universal prescription that debtors ought to 
be imprisoned, this implies that he is prepared to accept this prescription 
for every case in which he performs the role of an affected party. 
Acceptance of the prescription under this condition implies the existence, 
from his perspective, of a universal desire that debtors should be 
imprisoned, and hence a universal reason for action which he regards as 
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binding on himself and anyone else in relevantly similar circumstances. It 
does not follow from this that other persons in relevantly similar 
circumstances have reason to act in accordance with the prescription he 
accepts . It merely follows that he is committed to the view that they have 
reason to act as required. Now, to say that A has this universal desire 
means that he desires its satisfaction in each position he occupies, which 
involves accepting (1) that the fact that some interest is B's and not his 
will always be irrelevant to a decision about which interests are to be 
admitted to the calculus, and (2) that anyone's interests generate reasons 
which rank on equal par with anyone else's, including his own, in support 
of particular judgements about what ought to "be done in the circumstances. 
Hare attempts to establish a connection between A's motivation to act as 
his original judgement enjoins him to act, and his motivation to act on 
other judgements which he is expected to accept and consider himself as 
having reason to act on . In this Hare appeals to what he has reason to do 
in each position he occupies . Now, the contention that A is constrained to 
think of the person in the hypothetical situation as himself, in the sense 
in which the in propria persona requirement demands this, is, I think, the 
key to understanding Hare's not i on of moral motivation . As I judge, the 
appeal to self-interest rests on this contention. The justification of this 
appeal begins with Hare's conception of what it means to adopt the moral 
perspective, which derives, if I am right, from his definition of what is 
involved in prescribing universally that something be done, i.e. from 
premisses which the logical features of moral language commit an agent to 
in reasoning morally. 
Universalizability , it seems, puts the stamp on what it means to adopt the 
moral point of view. Hare also sees the demand for universalization as a 
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criterion or standard of rationality. A cannot be said coherently to be 
deciding what he ought to do in ignorance of the relevant facts of the 
situation he is judging, which are fact s about 'what it would be like' for 
himself to be the person in B's position, and how much he would 
li ke/dislike having B's experiences, in a 'felt'-sense of 'how much' . This 
is to say that he has to know the relevant facts of the situation he is 
judging in a sense of 'know' which assumes a 'felt'-disposition account of 
'desire' .101 But, it is difficult to see what there is in this which 
requires that a form of rational prudence be adopted in order to arrive at 
a final decision . Appeal to a form of rational prudence is an essential 
supplement to what Hare offers as a mere tautology. We may ask: just how 
does Hare's definition of what constitutes sincere assent to a moral 
judgement itself commit someone to conceding a motive or reason to act i n a 
certain way? It looks as if Hare is saying that an agent will have reasons 
to act as morality requires simply in virtue of what it means to use mo ral 
language in the way he thinks is conceptually appropriate. 
Conc lusi on 
I conclude this chapter with some brief remarks concerning the direction in 
which Hare 's think ing develops in Ethical th eo ry and utilitarianism (ETU) 
and Moral thinking (MT). Hare sticks to the defence of universalizability 
which I examined in Section 2, but the argument for utilitarianism is 
significantly modified. The important change concerns the development of a 
set of rationality constraints which are implicit in FR, though not fully 
exploited in the argument for utilitarianism. The renewed argument for 
utilitarianism runs strongly on an appeal to these constraints. This 
argument is present, in undeveloped form, in ETU. I shall in Chapter 3 
examine some of the moves Hare develops in ETU - particularly an attempt to 
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give a more prominent role to his rationality constraints - as a 
preliminary to examining the argument for utilitarianism in MT (Chapter 4). 
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1. This formulation follows that given in Chapter 1. In FR Hare operates with a stronger version of 
the universalizability thesis, the import of which exceeds that of the principle of consistency. 
fannulate this version in Section 2. 
2. In FR Hare does not substantially alte r the thesis of prescriptivity. Hare says: 'tn the language 
of morals I performed what some have thought an evasive manoeuvre by defining "value-judgement " in 
such a way that if a man did not do what he thought he ought, he could not be using the word 
evaluatively. I have in this book done something similar with the word "prescriptive" - only with 
the qualifications mode above.' The most important of these qualifications is that the' ... sense 
of "imply" in which "ought" implies "can" is not that of logical entailment.' Hare explains as 
follows: ' ... if we say that somebody ought to do a certain thing, and "ought" has its f ull (i.e. 
universal ly prescriptive) force , then we give our hearers to understand that we think that the 
question a r ises t o which this is a possible answer, which it would not, unless the person in 
question were able to do the acts referred to. ' I have formulated the prescriptivity thesis with 
this qualification in mind. See Hare (1980): Freedom and reason. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 
p. 53-54 and p. 84. All subsequent references are to the 1980 reprint. 
3. For Hare's account see Hare (1980) p. 90-93. 
4. Hare (1980) p. 93 - 111. 
5. For Hare's account see Hare (1980) p. 112-136. 
6. Hare (1980) p. 92 and p. 112. 
7. Acceptance of the prescription 'Let me imprison B, if B cannot pay' is conditional. The object of 
the argument is to establish whether A is willing to accept this prescription universa lly. Hare 
draws a parallel between his argument and the 'Popperian theory of scientific method'. Hare says: 
'Just as sc ience, seriously pursued, is the search for hypotheses and the testing of them by the 
attempt to falsify their particular consequences, so morals, as a serious endeavour, consists in 
the search for principles and the testing of them against particular cases. Any rational activity 
has its discipline, and this is the discipline of moral thought: to test the moral principles that 
suggest themselves to us by following out their consequences and seeing whether we can accept 
them.' See Hare (1980) p. 92. 
8. I am here allow ing that my initial formulation of the princip le of universalizability is adequate. 
As formulated, it is equiva lent to the principle of consistency. I take Hare to be saying that A 
cannot without inconsistency accept different prescription for situations which are identical in 
the relevant respects. Hare says: 'The demand for universalization compels [A) to make the 
same moral judgement, whatever i t is, about both cases.' See Hare (I9BO) o. 102. 
9. Hare says: 'Because moral judgements have to be universalizable [A] cannot say that he ought to 
put [B] in to prison for debt wit hout committing himself to the view that C, who is ex hypothesi in 
the same position viz-a- viz himself, ought to put him into prison See Hare (19BO) p. 92. 
10. Hare (1980) p. 112. 
11. Hare says: 'In the example which we have been using , the posit ion was deliberate ly made simpler by 
supposing that [A] actually stood to some other person in exactly the same relation as [B] does to 
him. Such cases are unlikely to arise in practice. But it is not necessary for the force of the 
argument that [A] should in fact stand in this relation to anyone; i t is suffic ient that he should 
consider hypothetically such a case, and see what would be the consequences i n it of those moral 
principles between whose acceptance and rejection he has to decide.' See Hare (1980) p. 93. 
12. See note 13 below. 
13. Hare's account of the role-reversal test requires that A imagines himself to be the person in B' s 
position , with B's inclination and desires. Hare says: 'All that is essential to [the argument) is 
that [A] should disregard the fact that he plays the particular role in the s i tuat ion which he 
does, without disregarding the incl inat ions which people have in s ituat ions of this sort. In other 
words, he must be prepared to give weight to B's inclinations and inte rests as i f they were his 
own.' See Hare (1980) p. 94. 
15. Hare (1980) p. 94. 
16. By assuming that the cases are identical (in the relevant respects , i.e. in respect of what 
universal descriptive features they exhibit). '. it follows a fortiori that there are no morally 
relevant differences'. See Hare (1980) p. 106 and 107. I think the important point to stress is 
that the cases are identical in respect of the relations between A and C and A and B, and in 
respect of the desires which characterize these relations . In this I follow H.J. White. See White 
(1969): An ana lysis of Hare's application of the thesis of universalizab i lity in his moral 
arguments. Australasian journal of philosophy, vol. 47, p . 17 4-175. 
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17. Here! follow D.L . Norton . Norton says: 'The action which is in itself or in its pr inciple 
universalized is the product of the conjunction of two factors . namely persons and c ircumstances.' 
Norton notes rega rding an 'inte rna l disparity in un;versalizability-criterion formulations' that 
'[parity] will be achieved by acknowledging relevant differences in persons no less than in 
circumstances' . He goes on to show that Hare offers a ' r evised formulation of the 
universalizability criterion' which covers this. The rev i sed formulatio n runs as follows: '[A] has 
got. not to imagine himself in [8 ' s] situation with his own [A's] likes and dislikes, but to 
imagine himself in [8'5] situation with [8'5] likes and dislikes.' Hare (1980) p. 113 . See Norton 
(1980): On an internal disparity in universalizability-criterion formulations . Review of 
metaphysics, vol. XXIII , p. 519 and p. 521. 
18. See note 9 above . 
19. Hare says: 'Logic does not prevent me wanti ng to be put in a gas chamber if a Jew ... " to be put 
1n prlson and "to be put in a gas chamber if a Jew" , are not prescriptive exp ressions; and 
therefore these th i ngs can be wanted without offence to log ic . It is, indeed , ; n the log i ca 1 
possibility of wanting anyth ing (neutrally described) that the "freedom" which i s alluded to in my 
title essentially consists. ' See Hare (1980) p. 110 . 
20 . Roxbee Cox argues that (I) does not figure as a component of the 'hypothetica l bi - lateral ' 
argument . He says : the inclination of the agent to perform the action, if he has such an 
inclinat ion, is not mentioned as one of the ingredients in this simplest case i.e . the 
'debtor-creditor' case . He sees th i s as inconsistent with the requirements of utilitarianism. He 
says : 'Any inclination that X may have to.£ does not enter into the UP re-3.soning; wh il e for a 
utilitaria n X's inclination will be relevant.' See Cox. (l986): From un iversal prescr ip tivism to 
uti li tarianism. The phi losophical quarter ly , voL 36,: p. 3 and 4. My own view is that Cox' s 
reconstruction of the argument is incorrect. I think the 'balancing- procedure' is tacitly assumed 
in step 5 of the argument . Cox argues later, in his discussion of the 'trumpeter ' -case , that the 
agent ' s inclination to perform x plays a role , and that the 'ba lanc ing'-procedure is assumed in 
this case. He says, regarding the 'connexion between UP and uti li tarianism ' , tha t the 'defence of 
the position starts wi th the trumpeter examp le, which [Hare] takes to show (wrong ly, I have 
argued) that the UP approach will proceed by weightng the competing inclinations of those involved 
... ' See Cox (1969) p . 8-11. 
21. See aga in notes 13 and 14 above. 
22. Hare says : wanting i s like assenting to a singular imperative, not to a moral or other va lue-
judgement . ' See Hare (i980) p. 71. 
23. See aga in notes 8, 13 and 16 . 
24 . See again nate 9. 
25. See again note 13. 
26. See Hare (1980) p . 197. 
27. See Hare (1980) p . 94. 
28. Roxbee Cox says the following: Hare contrasts the agent ' s motivational states with those of 
the person who would be affected by the act ion and who does not want to be so treated , and it is 
natura l to include the agent's des ire among his motivational states . It is possible, however, that 
this contrast is mentioned [1] not because the agent's incli nation to perform the action is to 
feature in the reasoning, but because [2] it poses a question : how am I to take account of what I 
shou ld want if I had the motivation of another person , if my own actual state is so different?' 
See Cox (1986) p. 5 . I agree with Cox regarding [2] I though not regarding [1] . My own view is that 
the 'hypothetica l ' bi-lateral argument assumes the ' balancing' procedure . 
29 . See Hare (1980) p. 219 . I take Hare's view to be that universalizability requires the role-
reversal procedure and that hypothetical situat ions be treated as actual . 
30. I am indebted to K. A. Milkman for this point. Milkman raises this point in his cri t icism of Ha re's 
article 'Relevance ' (Reprinted in Hare (1989) : Essays in ethical theory. Clarendon Press . Oxford . ) 
See Milkman (1982) : Hare , universalizability, and the problem of relevant descriptions. Canadian 
journal of philosophy, vol. XII, p. 27, 
31 . See Hare (1980) p. 90-93 . 
32. Hare says: if [the person making the decision] is igno rant of the mater ial facts (for example 
about what is like ly to happen to a person if one takes out a wr i t against him), then there is 
nothing to tie the moral argument to particular choices . ' One of the cho;'.::;es he has to make is 
whether he is wi l ling to allow that the same thing be done to himself in the case in which he 
performs the other's role . Hare says : i f the person who faces the moral decision has no 
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imagination, then even the fact that someone can do the very same thing to him may pass him by.' 
See Hare (1980) p. 94-95. 
33. One consequence of prescribing a line of action universally is that we are thereby committed to 
the view that the same thing be done to ourselves in any case in which we are in the position of 
' the weak . who went to the wall'. Hare regards 'appeal to universalized self-interest' as the 
' foundation' of the argument he is presenting. See Hare (1980) p. 105 and p. 194. 
34. Hare (1980) p. 97. 
35. Hare (1980) p. 112-113. 
3S. Hare (1980) p. 112-113. 
37. See again note 17 above. I agree with Norton that generalizing the argument to cover cases in 
which the inclinations of the parties differ requires the rev ised formulation of the principle of 
un iversa 1 izab; 1 ity. 
38. For the distinction between 'cases' and 'situations' see M. McDermott (1983): Hare ' s argument for 
utilitarianism. The philosophical quarterly, vol. 33 , p. 389. 
39. See again note 16 above. White says: 'The set of qualities defining a person's role, I take as 
including everything about that person relevant to one's moral reasonings about the situation in 
question. ' See White (1969) p. 175. 
40. This point is not explicit in FR. I consulted Hare (1981) Moral thinking. Clarendon Press. Oxford 
p. 119-121. These pages clearly express how Hare understands the requirements of the role- reversal 
procedure. 
41. Hare (1980) p. 94. 
42. Hare (1980) p. 112. 
43. Hare (1980) p. 113. 
44. Hare (1980) p. 108. 
45. Here follow White. White says: 'My phrase "as his own" is intended to be equivalent to Hare's 
phrase " in propria persona".' See White (1969) p. 174. 
46. r have Norton's revised formulation in mind. See again note 17 above . 
47. Hare (1980) p. 113. 
48. I think Hare here assumes that moral judgements are 'U-type' valuations. in the sense explained in 
Chapter 1. 
49. Hare (1980) p. 113. 
50. Here r follow Cox. Cox says: 'This compromise arrangement might arise in the special case where 
two agents initially propose an action that will be unwelcome to the other and then engage in 
bargaining.' He says further: 'The Question of what [one] ought to do when [one] has been 
bargaining is a more specific one, not discussed by Hare.' See Cox (1986) p. 9 and p. 10. 
51. Hare (1980) p. 123. 
52. See Hare (1980) p. 123 and p. 125. 
53. Hare says: ' If , in becoming impartial , [A] became also completely dispassionate and apathetic, and 
moved as little by other people's interests as by his own, then ... there would be nothing to make 
him accept or reject one moral principle rather than anothe r.' See Hare (1980) p. 94. This point 
is more clearly expressed on p. 94. Hare says :' if he is not a fanatic , and is guided sole ly 
by self-interest , together with a willingness to universalize the max ims it suggests, then he will 
not be willing to prescribe that even he himself, were he to come to dislike the trumpet, should 
have his dislike of it disregarded by his neighbours.' 
54. This is suggested by Cox. Cox says: 'It is in order to solve the problem of how the weighing 
should be done that Hare gives the argument that leads to a utilitarian pasition in FR ... ' See 
Cox (1986) p. 10 and note 52 above. 
55. Hare (1980) p. lIS . 
5S. Hare (1980) p. lIS-liS. 
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57. Hare (1980) p. 117. 
58. Hare (1980) p. 117. 
59. Hare (1980) p. 118. 
60. Cox argues that there is 'a large gap' between the corollary and Hare's attempt to arrive at a 
uti l itarian conclusion. See Cox (1986) p. 11 and note 52 above. I agree with Cox. but. as I read 
the phrase ' as if they were my own', a decision-maker is expected to combine all relevant desires 
in his own person and then to treat this as a conflict of interests in his person. White proposes 
the following: .... we ask that [A] exhibit rationality by proposing that mo r al judgement which 
eliminates so far as possible conf licts among the prescriptions he makes in the various roles. I By 
'rat ionality' he means' ... the practice of choosing courses of action which best lead to the 
satisfaction of one's various desires'. Regarding the ' judge-crimi nal' case, he says that the 
judge is '. exh ibiti ng rationality , because this action [to imprison the thief] best satisfies 
the desires of all parties, which he came to think of as in him t hrough his consideration of 
hypothetical cases .' See White (1969) p. 182. 
61, See notes 33 and 53 above. I am here anticipating a move - Hare ' s appeal to hypothetical se1f-
interest - which r d iscuss at greater length in Chapters 3 and 4. 
62. Hare (1980) p. 120-121. I agree with Don Locke that there is ' ... no conclusive argument to the 
PEl [Principle of Equal Interests] from Universal Prescriptivism alone'. Locke notes that in FR 
there is an argument to support the PEl, but this argument is not' ... a consequence of the logic 
of moral discourse or the nature of moral reasoning as such' . This argument is rather a 
consequence of '. the nature and function of morality itself ' which is to ' .. . provide 
impartial, mutually acceptable solutions to conflicts of indiv idual interest, solutions which all 
the part i es can accept ... ' See Locke (1981): The pr i nc i p le of equa 1 interests. The ph i losoph ica 1 
review, vol. XC, p . 541 and p. 556. Locke regards the PEl as a substantive moral principle. See 
Locke (1981) p. 559. A similar point is made by L. Versenyi. Versenyi argues that the requirement 
of role -reversal turns on appeal to a '. substantial principle - give weight to others ' 
interests as if they were your own - that for all his disclaimer Hare has introduced by a sleight 
of hand as if it had been a merely logical one.' See Versenyi (1972): Prescription and 
universalizability. The journal of value inquiry, vol. 6, p. 30. I am inclined to th ink that Hare 
appeals to rational prudence in his argument for the PEl, and that the problem is to account for 
this appeal in reversed-role situations. 
63. Hare ( 1980) p. 123. 
64. Hare (1980) p. 11. 
65. Hare (1980) p. 13-15. 
66. Hare (1980) p. 16 . 
67. Hare (1980) p. 22-23. 
68. Hare (1980) p. 12. 
69. Hare (1980) p. 30. 
70. Hare (1980) p. 35 - 36. 
71. Hare (1980) p. 36. 
72. I think the sense of 'un i versa 1 ' at issue here is that advanced in U. Compa re Hare's 'ba lance of 
payments' example discussed in Chapter 2. 
73. Hare (1980) p. 93. W.G. Lycan charges Hare with having' ... avo ided the problem of finding 
criteria of "relevant similarity" by basing his moral-argument paradigm on the agent's ability to 
imagine himself in an identical case ... ' See Lycan: (1969) Hare, Singer and Gewirth on 
universalizability. The philosophical quarterly, vol. 19, p. 138. 
74. Hare (1980) p. 197. 
75. This formulation assumes that moral judgements are 'u-type' valuations , i.e. that they make no 
reference to individual constants. 
76. This criterion is implicit in FR. See Hare (1980) p. 107. The crucial point is that any universal 
feature of an action or situation may be morally relevant provided that we treat it as relevant in 
any pos ition we occupy in a given set of circumstances. If A treats B' s black skin as a reason why 
he ought to discriminate against B, he has to be prepared to accept that having a black skin in 
the case in which he performs B's role is also a reason why he ought to be discriminated against. 
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If he does not. he has not'. met the demand for un iversalizab ili ty, and cannot c laim to be 
putting forward a moral argumen t at a ll ' . 
77. Ha re (1980) p. 197. 
7B. He re I fol low Jaegwon Kim. Regarding the 'superven ience of A on B', Kim says that weak 
supervenience only requires that within any possi ble world the re not be two things agreeing 
in B but diverging in A ... ' See Kim (1984): Concepts of supervenience. Philosophy and 
phenomenolog ical research, vol. XLV. p . 159-160 . 
79 . See again note 30 above. The clearest statement of th is point is to be found in Hare (1989): 
Relevance. Repr in t ed in Essa ys in ethica l theory. Clarendon Press. Oxford. p. 210. Hare says: 
' Having this desire [not to be discrim inated against in the case in whi ch he were black], which ex 
hypothes i is greater tha t his or i gina 1 des i re to do the act , he cannot, ; f he is to make the sam;-
judgement about t he actual situation as about this hypothetica l similar one ... give greater 
weight to his own original desire than to his victim ' s; for t o do so would be to g ive greater 
we ight to the lesser desire among desires which he himself has ' See also Ha re (1980) p. 193. 
80. See notes 30 and 79 above . 
81 . Hare (1 980) p. 219. 
82. See again note 78 above. 
83. Kim judges that Hare's concept of supervenience corresponds ' roughly' to what he calls ' weak 
supervenIence See Kim (1989) p. 161 . 
84. Don locke notes that the requirement t ha t judgement s be made in propria persona presupposes a 
special sense in which moral judgements are universalizable . This is the sense in which it is 
a lways possible to apply 2ni moral principle to anyone, at lea st in a hypothetical case'. 
locke says: ' .. the plain fact is that not all moral principles do apply to everyone. "Wives 
ought to honour and obey the i r husbands" does not app ly to me, and "Thou sha 1t not commit 
adu ltery" , taken strictly, does not apply to anyone who is not married.' See Locke (1968): The 
t r ivializabillty of universalizability. The philosophical review, vol. LXXV II. p. 41. 
85. I am assuming that Hare's 'fanatic ' is not committed to the PEl. The ' fa natic' may. without 
offence to rationa l ity, prescribe that the desires he has in the case in which he per forms someone 
e lse's role , be frus trated. See Hare (1980) p. 110, 
86. Hare says: he [the fanatic] thinks that , even if the other interests of peop le (including his 
own) are sacrificed , the ideal st ate of society ought to be purs ued ... ' Hare notes that 'A person 
who was moved by considerations of self-interest, and was prepared to universalize the judgements 
based on it , but had no ideals of t his f ana ti cal kind, could not think this .. ,' Hare (1980) p . 
161. 
87. Hare (1980) p . 160. 
88. I think the fanatic 's moral judgement is universal in the sense in which moral judgements are 'u -
type' va luations . He is committed to the view that his moral principles apply to anyone 
indifferentl y of who they are. It is worth noting that Locke charges Hare with fa ili ng to notice 
the difference in meaning between 'uni versal ' and ' u- type ' . '''All Locke's are muddle-headed 
philosophers" i s a universal proposition, but it is not u-type because it contain s the proper name 
"Locke"' . See Locke (196B) p. 34 and p. 36 . I agree with Locke. On my view (UP) is simply a 
restatement of the principle of consistency and indistinguishable from Hare's principle of 
supervenience. (UP) a llows reference to particular individuals - (SUP) and (IT) do not. 
89, The sense of the word 'universal izable' at issue here is the triv ial sense Locke has in mind. 
locke says : Hare has established that if something ought to be done, then anything to which 
the same reason applies ought also , ceteris paribu s , to be done . He has not established that 
different people ought in the same situations to do the same thing, for t he fact that they are 
different peopl e might mean that the reasons which apply to t hem are dif fer en t ... ' See Locke 
(1968) p. 33-34 . 
90 . Hare (1980) p. 162, Hare says that the fanatic is ' , .. maki ng prescriptive universal jUdgemen t s , 
and the only difference between himself and his opponent is that the Naz i sticks to his judgements 
even when they conf l ict with his own interest in hypotheti ca l cases (for example the case where he 
himse lf is imagined as having the characteristics of Jews)' . 
91. For this point 1 am indebted to C C.W . Tay lor. Taylor remarks that' ... it is necessary for Hare 
that his opponent should be obliged to assent in propria oersona to an impe rative prescribing that 
a certain action be done to him, given t hat he is in the same position as the vic tim of the ac t ion 
at present in question. In certain cases, however , it is logically impossible for Hare's opponent 
to be in the victim ' s position, since anyone who had the characteristics of the vict im would be a 
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differen t person from the man who is now Hare's opponent'. See Taylor (1965): Review of Freedom 
and reason. Mind . vol. 74, p. 286. 
92. Hare (1980) p. 108. 
93. Hare (1980) p. 108. 
94. He re agai n I am indebted to Taylor. Taylor notes that the role-reversal procedure may be 
understood i n different ways: ' ... (a) imagining that one is some person other than the person one 
in fact i s. (b) "putting oneself in someone else's place", Le. imagining what one would oneself 
feel were one in the same situation as someone else is in , or in a similar situation, and (c) 
imagining what someone else feels in a particular situation. ' See Taylor (1965) p. 28B . 
95. Here again I agree with Taylor. See Taylor (196S) p. 288. 
96. A can imagine what it is like to be B (or to be having a similar experience) though not what it 
would be like for himself to be B. The fo rmer , Taylor says , ' ... is never logical ly imposs ible, 
though it may be practically very difficult or even impossib l e. ' See Taylor (1965) p. 289. 
97. Here again I am indebted to Taylor. Taylor observes that Hare's'. 
a mor al i ssue ;s to show him that he actua l ly has overrid ing reasons 
not merely that he would have such reasons were he in some different 
p. 287. 
98. Hare (1980) p . 67-85. 
99. Hare (1980 ) p. 170. 
way of conv incing someone on 
for acting in a certain way , 
situation ' . See Taylor (1965) 
100. Taylor says the prescriber has to '. regard the suffer ing of his vict im as a reason fo r him not 
to do the act which will cause the suffering' . 1 agree with this view , but I thi nk that Taylor 
overlooks Hare's appeal to self-interest. See Taylor (1965) p. 289. 
101. I am indebted to E.F. Crowel l. Regard ing the connection between' ... wanting and mora l reason ing 
... ' Crowe l l observes that'. to regard desire as a felt di sposition ... ' makes i t more difficult 
to give an adequate account. See Crowel l (1974): Hare on desire and mora l reasoning. Theoria, vol. 
Xl, p. 161. 
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CHAPTER 3 
AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF 'ETHICAL THEORY AND UTILITARIANISM ' (ETU) 
Introduction 
In this chapter my main concern is to examine the place and function of a 
set of rationality constraints in the argument Hare advances in support of 
utilitarianism. Hare's argument appeals to a knowledge requirement of 
rationality, which embodies a certain view of what it means for a moral 
agent to have knowledge of someone else's situation. The peculiarity of his 
view is that it includes certain motivational constraints as a crucial 
component of the knowledge requirement. As I read Hare in ETU, the force of 
these constraints depends crucially on the force of the formal con straints 
of universalizability, and particularly on certain formal restrictions of 
the role-reversal procedure. I shall endeavour to show how these 
constraints work , and what i s involved in the main thes is Hare advances, 
viz., that we are gQ£ rational agents, comm itted to endorsing act-
util itarian solutions to moral disputes. I shall argue that we may reject 
this thesis on grounds that the knowledge requirement and the motivational 
constraints which it subsumes do not offer a coherent view of what 
constitutes a rational decision. 
Section 1. An outline of the argument for utilitarianism 
In ETU Hare advances the following thesis: A rational agent, i.e. anyone 
whose reasoning obeys the constraints which the formal/logical features of 
the moral concepts (universalizability and prescriptivity) impose on hi s 
thinking, and who has an adequate grasp of the relevant facts of a 
situation, will always endorse, as morally correct, that judgement which is 
required by act-utilitar ia nism . The suggested contention is that a fully 
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rational deliberator would not endorse any other judgement as morally 
correct, unless he has made some logical error or is not apprised of all 
the relevant and available facts of the situation he is judging. 
I begin with a general statement of the argument Hare advances in ETU in 
support of this thesis. If I say that x ought (morally) to be done in a 
given situation, I thereby commit mys elf to the prescription that x be done 
in all situations which are just like the original (actual) one in the 
relevant universal respects. Hare thinks that the prescription to which I 
commit myself expresses, in linguistic form , the desire that x be done. l 
Now, since, to be moral, this desire must be universal, in the sense that I 
must desire that it be satisfied in all situations in which I occupy (in 
turn) the positions of the persons who would be affected by its 
satisfaction, t o say tha t x ought (morally) to be done is to say that I 
have a desire of overriding strength that x be done in all situations of 
the given kind. If this desire is reall y overridingly strong relative to 
any other desires I may ha ve for what should be done in any of the 
relevantly similar situations at issue, its satisfaction would be 
rationally required on grounds that this would maximally satisfy, in sum, 
all my rational desires, including those I treat 'as if they were my own' 
in hypothetical reversed-role situations. The significant normative claim, 
which I shall be contesting in Section 2, is that a fully rational 
deliberator will, on the basis of full knowledge of the relevant facts of 
the situation he is judging and a complete understanding of the reasoning 
to which he is committed in virtue of the formal / logical features of the 
moral 'ought', endorse the prescription that x be done , and therefore that 
he will be adopting a position consistent with that required by the 
preferred form of utilitarianism. 
lIS 
In what follows, I shall attempt to explain what I take Hare's argument to 
be. My main concern is to show the place and function of Hare's rationality 
constraints in this argument. I quote at length the passage from ETU in 
which Hare explains the role of his rationality constraints in committing 
his agent to act-utilitarianism. 
'When I do the judging [in the various positions I occupy in 
hypothetical situations). I have to do it as rationally as possible. 
This, if I am making a moral judgement, involves prescribing 
universally; but in prescribing (albeit universally) I cannot, if 
rational, ignore prudence altogether, but have to universalize this 
prudence. Put more clearly. this means that, whether I am prescribing 
in my own interest or in someone else's I must ask, not what I or he 
does actually at present wish, but what, prudentially speaking, we 
should wish. It is from this rational point of view (in the prudential 
sense of ' rational') that I have to give my universal prescriptions. In 
other words, it is ~ rational that I have to judge; and this involves 
at least judging with a clear and unconfused idea of what I am saying 
and what the actual consequences of the prescription that I am issuing 
would be, for myself and others. It also involves, when I am 
considering the desires of others, considering what they would be if 
those others were perfectly prudent - i.e. desired what they would 
desire if they were fully informed and unconfused . Thus morality, at 
least for the utilitarian, can only be founded on prudence, which has 
then to be universalized., 2 
Here I wish to raise and discuss two questions about the view expressed in 
the passage just quoted. Regarding the claim that in making a moral 
judgement, I am, ~ rational agent, committed to prescribing universally, 
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it may be asked what is involved in this claim, and what sense to attach 
to the appeal to prudence. A brief answer to the first of these questions 
runs along the following lines. We begin our mora l thinking by asking what 
we are committed to in our reasoning by our understanding of the moral 
concepts we employ whenever we make a mora l judgement. Our understanding of 
the logic of these concepts, particularly of the moral 'ought', brings with 
it an understanding of the requirement, in moral reasoning, to prescribe 
universally for all situations of a given kind. The important constraint to 
which our reasoning is subject, is that our prescriptions have to apply to 
all situations of the kind in question, including situations in which we 
are in the les s advantageous position which our recipients in fa ct occupy. 
We are, because our prescriptions have to be universal, prevented from 
prescribing differently for the situations in which we occupy these 
positions. As I read Hare, the significant point is simply that since we 
have to decide which prescription we are willing to universalize (1) in 
ignorance of which positions we in fact occupy, and (2) in ignorance of who 
is actually who in each of these positions - i.e. in ignorance of any 
information about particulars which enable us to identify particular roles 
as our own - that we have to all ow that it is equally probable that any of 
the situations at issue might be the actua l situation, and that it is 
equal ly probable that we might actually be any of the persons whose 
positions we occupy ~ affected parties. 3 It is because of this that, in 
deciding what we morally ought to do, we cannot, without offence to the 
constraints of universalizability, accord our own interests extra or 
special consideration because they are our own, on grounds that we are the 
particular individuals whom we in fact are, or on grounds that we occupy 
the positions which we do in fact occupy. If Hare is right, this means that 
we will have to decide in the interests of everyone who would be affected 
by our choice of universal presc r ipti on, and that, in making this choice, 
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we will be willing to accord equal conside ration to the interests of all 
concerned, i.e. the same consideration as we accord our own interests. 
It is a major contention of Hare's argument for utilitarianism that we are, 
gQ£ rational agents, committed to treating all affected persons as 
deserving of equal consideration. This contention is part of what is 
involved in the claim that the requirement to universalize our 
prescriptions, is a requirement of our rationality . But much more is 
involved here . In coming to a decision about which prescription we are 
prepared to universalize, we need to know the facts of other people's 
si tuation s. Hare sees this requirement to know the facts as a logical 
requirement stemming from the requirement to universalize our 
prescriptions . He offers an account of how these facts are relevant to our 
decisions. Briefly, we cannot be said to know what it is we are doing, 
should we universalize anyone prescription from the set of prescriptions 
which make up the alternatives available to us, in ignorance of what its 
acceptanc e entails for ourselves and others. 4 This knowledge of what 
acceptance of a universal prescription entails depends crucially on what we 
want for ourselves and what others want for themselves . The facts of our 
own and other people's situations to which we should· be attending are facts 
about how we and others would be affected by its acceptance, particularly 
facts about how much we and others would like/dislike the effects of 
accepting this prescription. 
It is important to note that Hare has in mind a ' felt ' sense of 'how much', 
or 'how strongly' we would like/d islike the effects of universal iz ing a 
prescription. 5 This sense of 'how much' or 'h ow strongly' works from the 
perspective of the first person, on the basis on an appeal to the 
imagination. My knowledge of the facts of your situation is acquired by 
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imagining 'what it would be like' for myself to be in your precise 
situation. But the decision I make in the hypothetical reversed-role 
situation regarding what you want for yourself, is a decision I construe as 
affecting myself , i.e. the decision is made in propria persona, on the 
basis of the supposition that I might actually be the person in that 
situation. 
As I understand Hare, the requirement to universalize my prescriptions 
brings with it the requirement that I must know the facts about your 
situation. We might put th e point at issue here in terms of what it means 
to have a universal desire, and say that since, to be moral, a desire has 
to be universal in the sense that I must desire, on balance, that it be 
satisfied in all situations of the given kind, the requirement to 
universalize my prescriptions cannot be met in ignorance of what things are 
desired. and how strongly they are desired. The point is s imply that since 
the universal prescription whi ch am prepared to accept expresses, in 
linguistic form , a desire strong enough to override all other competing 
desires for what should be done in the various situations for which I am 
prescribing, I must consider, as counting among the relevant facts of my 
own and your situations, the strengths of all competing desires. 
There is, however, an important restriction on wh ich desires should be 
admitted for consideration. As Hare makes clear in the passage quoted 
above, we are, in prescribing universally, required to have regard for the 
constraints of prudence. 6 To be prudent is to want to satisfy only those 
desires which best promote our own interests to the greatest extent 
possible. In ETU Hare does not offer an account of prudence, ? but it is 
possible to in terpret the request for prudence as making a demand on an 
agent's motivation , wh ich I shall treat as the demand that he must have a 
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desire of overriding strength to do only that which best serves his own 
interests over time. 8 
To see just how the requirement to universalize our prescriptions bears on 
the request for prudence, it is necessary to point out that the argument 
for utilitarianism turns upon the application of universalizability to 
prudential reasoning. 9 As I understand, i n reversed-role situations the 
request for prudence translates to an appeal to hypothet ical self-
interest. IO If the motivational interpretation of the request for prudence 
is correct, we are required, before we are allowed to universalize our 
prescriptions, to criticize our own and other people's desires by asking 
whether they are the ones we would want to satisfy, given that we are, 9Q£ 
rational agents, motivated to sat is fy our own interests to the greatest 
extent possible. The basic idea is simply that just as I decide what I, 9Q£ 
prudent, most desire should happen in my own case, so I decide, from the 
perspective of first-personal rationality (i.e. prudential thinking), in 
the case in which I am in your precise situation, what I most desire should 
happen to myself in that situation. And, just as I decide, 9Q£ prudent, 
what is best for myself in my own case, so I decide, in the case in which I 
deem myself to be one who has incompatible desires, which include desires I 
treat 'as if they were my own', what is best for myself overall. The 
significance of criticism from the perspective of prudence is simply that 
we are expected to identify only with the prudent desires of others, and to 
admit only our own and other people 's prudent desires for consideration at 
the time we choose the prescription we think we can universally endorse. II 
For only these desires have a claim, if satisfied, to what is best for 
ourselves and others, and hence only they give the alternatives between 
which we are to choose . This is part of what i s meant by saying that we are 
required to know what it is we are doing when we universalize our 
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prescriptions. The idea that there is a place for prudential calculations 
in making a decision to universalize a prescription depends crucially, as 
suggested, on an appeal to universalizability, which is needed to constrain 
prudence to the demands which rational decision-making in morals imposes on 
agents. 
The points raised above concerning the sense in which the requirement to 
universalize my prescriptions is a requirement of my rationality, imply 
that I am fully rational 
(1) if I reason in accordance with the constraints which the formal/logical 
features of the moral ' ought' impose on my thinking, and make no 
logical errors in deciding which universal prescription to endorse; 
(2) if I decide what I morally ought to do in the light of all relevant 
(and available) information, and admit only prudent desires for 
consideration at the time I make this decision. 
Given the general claim that reasoning in accordance with (1) and (2) leads 
us to accept moral judgements consistent with those required by act-
utilitarianism, we might express Hare's notion of what constitutes a 
rational course of action in terms of the maximization of desire-
satisfaction. A course of action is rational if and only if it maximizes 
the satisfaction, in sum, of the (rational) desires of all concerned 
parties. A rational course of action will also be the morally right course 
of action if and only if there is no other course of action which -
according to the available evidence - is likely to yield a greater net sum 
of desire-satisfaction for all concerned. 
I indicated above that the requirement that I must know the facts about the 
situation I am judging is a logical requirement which stems from the 
121 
requirement to universalize my prescriptions. I shall now endeavour to show 
in what sense of 'know' I am required to know these facts. Following Hare, 
to say that I am acquainted with the relevant fac ts of the situation I am 
judging, i.e. that I know what it is I am doing should I universalize a 
prescription for this situation, turns on a notion of knowing 'what it 
would be like' for myself to be at the receiving end of this prescription. 
For Hare this knowledge derives from the imagined experie~ce of 'what it 
would be like'. I shall call this request for an imagined experience the 
knowledge requirement of rationality. (KR) 
Two things about KR are here worth noting. First, KR ca n be satisfied only 
by appeal to the demand for imaginative role-reversal, which involves 
imaginative identif ication with the prudent desires of all affected 
parties. These are desires ascribe to myself in hypothetical reversed-
role situations, and which I accept as desires I would have, were I 
actually to be in those situations. According to KR, my present full 
knowledge of yo~r desires , were I to be in your precise s · tuation, entails 
my now having the same desires as you have for what should be done in the 
hypothetical situation in question. 12 I do not fully know these hypothesized 
desires unless I accept not only that I would have them, but also 'what it 
would be like' to have them. As I understand Hare's notion of 'what it 
would be like ' , I am expected to endorse your prudent desires as 'my own', 
which involves wanting for myself, in the hypothetical situation in which I 
occupy your position, what you want should happen to yourself. Add to this 
the contention that I have to allow, as counting among the relevant facts 
of your situativn, the relevance of facts about experiencps I would have, 
were I to be in your position, particularly facts about how much I would 
like/dis like having these experiences (albeit only imagined experiences 
treated as actual), satisfying KR would seem to be a matter of adopting 
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your concern for the satisfaction of your desires. 13 As I judge, a strong 
sense of this concern is required, one akin to the sense - appropriate in 
the sphere of prudence - in which a single person experiences concern for 
the satisfaction of his desires . 14 One significant point which I wish to 
stress is that, since I am required to identify only with your prudent 
desires, KR would seem to bear only on these desires, which means that KR 
cannot fully be satisfied without the appeal to prudence. With this point 
in mind, I formulate KR as follows. 
KR: If I know that you desire x, as one who is perfectly prudent as far as 
his own interest goes, this entails that I desire x in the hypothetical 
situation in which I am in your precise ' situat ion . 
Second, KR it self entai ls a claim which I shall call the suffering thesis 
(5T). If it is correct to say that Hare's theory requires a st rong reading 
of KR, as suggested, and supposing that my experiences, in the situation 
in which I occupy your position, are experiences of suffer ing, then the 
suggested claim which KR entails might be formulat ed as follows: 
5T: I do not fully know what it wou l d be li ke for myself to be in your 
position, unless I am equally averse to myself suffering as you are 
suffering, or are about to be made to suffer. ls 
As I judge, 5T implies that t here is a requirement to the effect that the 
things other people have good prudential reasons for wanting are, or must 
be construed as, reasons for a prescriber to want the same things. Hare 's 
notion of knowing 'what it would be like' supplies an answer to the 
question, ' Why are the things you have good prudential reasons for wanting 
also reasons for me to want the same things?' This is that I might actually 
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be any of the persons whose positions I occupy in hypothetical situations, 
and that the quality of my experiences in these situations is itself a 
reason for me to want what my recipients want. 
I said above that KR can be satisfied only by appeal to the demand for 
role-reversal. It is worth noting that KR requires a particular account of 
what the demand for role -reversal involve s . There are two significant moves 
in this account. Hare clearly indicates which desires shall count as 
relevant in hypothetical reversed-role situations, and he amplifies some 
suggestions offered in FR which show how he sees the relations between 
prescribers and recipients . 16 I begin with the distinction Hare draws 
between an agent ' s ro l e gQ£ author of a moral decision and the various 
roles he performs gQ£ recipient of the decision. QQ£ author, I am expected 
to disregard my own ac t ual (current and future) desires for what should 
happen to mys elf in a hypothetical situation, and consider only the desires 
of the person whose role I perform in this situation. My own desires are 
con sidered only in my role gQ£ affected party, which is si mply my own 
actual role so understood. The important stipulation is that all desires 
which do not pertain directly to what a re cipient wants should happen to 
himself are irrelevant t o a pres criber ' s representati on of 'what it would 
be like' to be in his position. I quote at length the passage from ETU in 
which Hare presents this view. Where Hare refers to a desire, a liking or a 
wish, this must be understood as a desire, liking or wish of one who is 
perfectly prudent. Hare says: 
when we speak of the "situations' of the various parties, we have 
to include in the situations all the desires; likings etc. that the 
people have in them - that is to say, I am to do for the others what I 
wish to be done for me were I to have their likings etc. and not those 
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which I now have . And, similarly , I am not to take into account (when I 
ask what I wish should be done to me in a certain situation) my own 
present desires, likings etc . There is one exception to this: I have 
said that one of the situations that I have to consider is my own 
present situation, I have to love my neighbour as, but no more than and 
no less than, myself, and likewise to do to others as I wish them to do 
to me. Therefore, just as, when I am considering what I wish to be done 
to me were I in x's situation, where x is somebody else, I have to 
think of the situation as incl uding his desires, 1 ikings etc. and 
discount my own, so, in the single case where x is myself, I have to 
take into account illY desires, likings etc. In other words, ~ author 
of the moral decision I have to discount my own desires, etc., and 
consider only the desires, etc., of the affected party; but where (as 
normally) I am one of the affected parties, I have to consider my own 
desires, etc., ~ affected party, on equal terms with those of all 
other affected parties . 
It will be asked: if we strip me, ~ author of the moral decision, of 
all desires and likings, how is it determined what decision I shall 
come to? The answer is that it is determined by the desires and likings 
of those whom I take into account as affected parties (including, as I 
said, myself, but only qua affected party and not ~ author). I am to 
ask, indeed, what I do wish should be done fo r me, were I in their 
situations; but were I in their situations , I should have their desires 
etc., so I must forget about my own present desires (with the exception 
just made) and consider only the desires which they have; and if I do 
this, what I do wish for will be the satisfaction of those desires; 
that, therefore, is what I shall prescribe, so far as is possible.,17 
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It seems that the point of separating an agent's role ~ author from the 
various roles he performs ~ recipient, is to put him in a position in 
which his role, ~ author, cannot influence his decision about what he 
morally ought to do. The position Hare 's agent occupies, ~ author, is in 
this respect similar to that explained in FR. QQg author, he may know which 
role is the actual one in which he desires that a certain thing be done, 
but this knowledge gives him no privileged position vis-a-vis his 
recipients, i.e . his own desires get no extra or special consideration 
because they are his in this role. The important constraint operative here, 
which derives from the demand that he has to bracket or put aside all 
information about parti culars which enable him to identify a particular 
role as his own, is that all affected persons (among whom he counts 
himself), are deserving of equa l treatment. 
It is worth noting tha t ~ author of the moral decision he is expected to 
adopt a position of complete impartiality. iS For Hare impartiality is 
secured by the requirement that a universal prescription has to apply to 
all situations which are exactly or relevantly alike, including 
hypothetical situations in which the role of the parties concerned are 
precisely reversed. Put more clearly, the request for impartiality draws on 
the constraint that whatever line of action he chooses to endorse 
universally, the same thing should be done to himself in any of the various 
positions he occupies ~ affected party. And since he is expected to 
prescribe in full awareness of the relevant facts of the situations of the 
persons who actually occupy these positions (which are, for him, facts 
about experiences he would have, were he to be in their positions, 
particularly facts about the quality of these experiences, i.e. how much he 
would like/dislike having them), it seems that he must be prepared to be 
impartial in the formal sense which Hare's theory requires. This is an 
126 
impartiality with respect to the content of all relevant rational desires . 
Briefly, he is expected 
(1) to make no judgement about the intrinsic worth (moral legitimacy) of 
the relevant desires; 
(2) to make no judgement - initially - about the rationality of these 
desires; 
(3) to make no judgement about their (psychological) causes, even if such a 
judgement affects the issue about the rationality of these desires. 
The important requirement of the reversibility test is, however, the one 
which demands that he must bracket or put aside his own actual desires for 
what should be done in the hypothetical situations in which he occupies his 
recipients' positions, and ident i fy only with their (prudent) desires. How 
is this requirement to be accounted for? Hare ' s explanation touches on the 
requirement that hypothetical situations must be identical (in the relevant 
respects) to actual situations. This requirement, which derives from 
universalizability, has the effect of restricting the desires, 
likes/dislikes to be counted as relevant in a reversed -role situation to a 
recipient's desires, likes/dislikes. I think this restriction is a 
necessary condition of the identity which Hare's theory requires, which is 
simply identity with respect to the relations between a prescriber and his 
recipients, and with respect to the desires, likes/dislikes which 
characterize these relations. The upshot is simply that the desires, 
likes/dislikes which a prescriber is expected to ascribe to himself in a 
reversed-role situation must be identical to his recipient's for otherwise 
the claim that he would not want what his recipient in fact wants must 
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dictate that the actual and imagined situations are not identical in the 
relevant respects . 
It is not difficult to see that to violate the requirements of the 
reversibility test is also to violate Hare's rationality constraints. This 
is obvious enough, if it is correct to say that these requirements derive 
from universalizabil i ty, and that reasoning in accordance with the logic of 
this feature of the moral 'ought' is a requirement of my rationality. As I 
understand, the requirement that I, QQ£ author of the moral deci sion, must 
suppress all information about particulars as irrelevant to the moral 
decision, constrains me to allow - since I have no way of telling which 
situation is the actual one in which I desire that a certain thing to be 
done - that any of the situations at issue might be the actual situation in 
which I am the affected party . This is necessary if I am to be constrained 
to accept - as a step towards according the same consideration to everyone 
who would be affected by my decision - that whatever line of action I wish 
universally to endorse, the same thing be done to myself in any of the 
various positions I occupy QQ£ affected party. And the requirement that J, 
QQ£ author of the moral decision, must, in reversing roles with you, put 
aside all knowledge of my own actual desires, compels me to consider, as 
counting among the relevant facts of your situati on, the relevance of facts 
about experiences I would have, were I actually to have your desires for 
what should happen in that situation. I am assuming that it is correct to 
say that I have not reversed roles with you unless I want for myself in the 
hypothetical situation what you want for yourself in the actual situation, 
and that an adequate representation of 'what it would be like ' for myself 
cons i sts, not in having an aversion to you being subjected to an experience 
you would rather not have, but rather in having an aversion to myself being 
subjected to the experience. This way of putting the matter is, of course, 
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consistent with the in propria persona requirement, which is an essential 
feature of Hare's argument for utilitarianism. 
With these points in mind, I am in a position to formulate a specific 
requirement of my rationality. Any prescription which I endorse as applying 
to myself in a hypothetical reversed-role situation, must, to be rational, 
be endorsed in the light of the relevant facts of this situation. 19 Rational 
endorsement proceeds on the assumption that I know these facts, in the 
required sense of 'know'. Allow, for the moment, that the desires with 
which I am expected to identify must be only those desires of my recipient 
which can be rationally defended, as desires he has good prudential reasons 
to want to satisfy (or would have, if he were perfectly prudent). Now, one 
condition of saying that I know what these desires are, is that I must 
identify with them. If I genuinely identify with these desires, I must 
assent - initially at least - to the prescriptions which are their 
expression in linguistic form. 2o I formulate this request for assent as a 
requirement of my rationality. 
R: Rationality requires that I must assent - initially at least - only to 
those prescriptions which express in linguistic form, the dominant 
rational desires I would have in each situation in which my position 
were to be different. 
One implication of R is worth noting here. In ETU Hare casts his argument 
for utilitarianism in terms of desires, for this he thinks is required by 
his prescriptivity thesis. Desires, says Hare, are in the generic sense in 
which any felt disposition to action counts as a desire, 'assents to 
prescriptions' .21 This move helps Hare to establish a connection between his 
rationality constraints and the prescriptivity thesis. We might say that 
not to assent to my recipient's (prudent) prescriptions implies that I do 
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not know the relevant facts of the situation I am judging, contrary to what 
KR and ST require, in which case my acceptance of any other prescription in 
the hypothetical situation in which I occupy his position would run counter 
to R, and therefore be irrational .. 
I have above indicated that there are similarities between FR and ETU 
regarding Hare's treatment of the role his agent performs ~ author of a 
moral decision. What, then, are the differences? It is worth recalling that 
in FR it is possible for an agent to prescribe the frustration of his 
recipient's desires purely on grounds of an ideal which favours the 
satisfaction of an ideal-dependent desire over any other desire. Hare's 
problem in this regard seems to have been that the constraints of 
universalizability and prescriptivity cannot compel the 'fanatic' to grant 
other person's desires the same consideration as he grants his ideal-
dependent desires. For, as Hare maintained in FR, ideal -dependent desires 
have a universalizability of their own, 22 i.e. they qualify as moral simply 
because there is always something about an ideal which makes it legitimate 
for the 'fanatic ' to override other competing desires. Indeed, Hare seems 
to have conceded that applying a maximizing desire-satisfaction rule to a 
situation in which an ideal-dependent desire is a feature, is always likel y 
to yield the prescription that it shou ld be satisfied, simply because the 
'fanatic's' commi tment to the ideal allows his concern for the satisfaction 
of his ideal-dependent desire to take precedence over his concern for the 
satisfaction of any other desires. This is in line with a view, expressed 
in FR, that there is nothing logica lly amiss with an agent prescribing the 
frustration of desires he would have, if his position were to change and 
become like his recipient's in all relevant respects. 23 In ETU, however, 
this is no longer possible. What accounts for this? 
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Hare's explanation touches on his appeal to the rationality constraints. I 
said that it is not possible to violate the requirements of the 
reversibility test without also violating these constraints. The point 
raised above concerning the separation of an agent's roles ~ author and 
~ recipient, which I said gives an agent, ~ author, no privileged 
position vis-a-vis his recipients, is intended to prevent the 'fanatic' 
from taking his commitment to an ideal into account in his role, ~ 
author, of the moral decision. 24 As I judge, Hare thinks that he is, in 
effect, being prevented , ~ author, from ranking the value to himself of 
satisfying the various desires in the calculus in terms of the value he 
places on the pursuit of the ideal. Hare expresses this constraint as the 
demand that, ~ author, the ' fanatic ' must treat his ideal -dependent 
desire simply as one desire among others, i.e. as a desire which has an 
equal, initial claim to satisfaction, along with all other desires in the 
calculus. 25 Moreover, since the ' fanatic ' has to make his decisions in 
ignorance of any information about particulars which enable him to identify 
a particular role as his own, and on the basis of the supposition that he 
might actually be any of the persons whose roles he performs in 
hypothetical situations , he would, if Hare is right, be constrained by this 
supposed fact, and the requirement that he has to know the relevant facts 
of the situations he is judging, in the required sense of 'know', to grant 
positive weight to desires he is expected to ascribe to himself in these 
situations. 26 As I have understood Hare, he can be said to know the facts of 
the situations he is judging if and only if he is willing to prescribe -
albeit only initially - that these desires be satisfied. Add to this 
requirement of his rationality the request for prudence, and the constraint 
to which he is subject might be expressed as the demand that he must have 
regard - prudentially speaking - for the (prudent) desires of others, and 
hence prescribe their satisfaction strictly in proportion to their 
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strengths. The suggested point is that he cannot, without offence to his 
rationality, accord his ideal-dependent desires any extra weight because of 
the value he places on its satisfaction, which is to say that he cannot, 
9QS rational agent, disregard the principle of equal interests. 2? I shall 
shortly present Hare's argument for this principle. Here I merely note 
Hare's confidence that the constraints just considered are sufficient to 
block the kind of 'fanaticism' which presented a problem in FR. 28 Hare 
concedes, however, that another form of it may yet survive. It might still 
be possible for the 'fanat ic ' to override the balance of other competing 
desires in the calculus, but only if his ideal is pursued with overriding 
intensity . On the argument for utilitarianism which Hare presents in ETU, 
this ideal-dependent desire ought to be satisfied. But, though this resu l t 
is theoretically possible, it is unlikely to present practical problems for 
the simple reason that this sort of case is unl ikely to arise in practice. 
I am, in effect, maintaining that the force of the rationality constraints 
mark a difference between FR and ETU. In FR, Hare 's concession that 
utilitarianism does not cover the whole of morality is a consequence of the 
problem which the 'fanatic' presented. As Hare argued in FR, a deliberator 
may, on his met hod of reasoning, without logical or factual error (i.e. 
without offence to rationality), accept moral judgements inconsistent with 
those required by utilitar i anism. In ETU, however, this is not possible. 
The crucial move, as suggested above, is the one which binds a deliberator, 
in virtue of his rationality, to the principle of equal interests. 
It is now time to state Hare's argument for act-uti l itarian i sm. This 
argument proceeds via an attempt to derive the so-called principl e of 
equal interests (PEl) from universalizability, prescriptivity and the 
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rationality constraints. I begin by stating the argument for this 
principle, in summary form, in Hare's own words. 
'In this position [i .e. in the position I occupy Q.I,@. author of the 
moral decision] I am prescribing universally for all situations just 
like the one I am considering; and thus for all such situations, 
whatever role, among those situations, I might myself occupy. I shall 
therefore give equal weight to the equal interests of the occupants of 
all the roles in the situation; and, since any of these occupants might 
be myself, this weight will be positive. ,19 
Now, to comply with the PEl is, as Hare suggests in the passage just 
quoted, to prescribe that the dominant rational desires I would have in 
each of the various positions I occupy Q.I,@. affected party, should be 
satisfied, strictly in proportion to their strengths . This means that I 
have to give equal weight to the equal interests of all concerned parties, 
or equal weight, strength for strength, to all relevant rational desires. 
The basic line of reasoning in Hare's defence of this principle might 
briefly be presented as follows. There are three main points. 
First, in any conflict situation all relevant rational desires are 
deserving of equal, initial consideration. The argument for this is by now 
familiar. I have to allow, since I am constrained to make a decision 
concerning what prescription to universalize in ignorance (1) of the fact 
that I play the role which I do in fact play , and (2) of who is actually 
who in each of the various positions I occupy - i.e. in ignorance of any 
information about particulars which enable me to identify a particular case 
as my own - that all cases which have been put up for consideration are 
deserving of equal consideration, i.e . the same consideration I accord to 
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my own case. There is , as I have suggested above, a crucial contention in 
this brief statement of the argument. I have to suppose, since I have no 
way of telling which situation is the actual situation in which I desire 
that a certain thing be done, that it is equally likely that any of the 
situations at issue might be the actual situation, and that it is equally 
l i kely that I might actually be any of the persons who occupy the various 
positions in these situations. These suppositions, which Hare takes to be 
justified with reference to the elimination of all irrelevant information 
about particulars, constrains me to accept that all affected persons, among 
whom I count myself, are deserving of equal treatment. If we construe this 
constraint in terms of how Hare understands the identification requirement, 
then the point is si mply that I must treat all relevant rational desires as 
equally worthy of satisfaction, albeit only initially . 
Second, I cannot rationally decide what the morally correct course of 
action would be in ignorance of t he relevant facts about my recipients ' 
situations. This demand for correct fa ctual information, which is the by 
now familiar demand to know 'what it would be like' for myself to be in 
their situations, can be satisfied only by appeal to the role-reversal 
procedure . If the suggested interpretation of what this procedure involves 
is correct , as I have amplified it with reference to the rationality 
constraints, I am, in reversing roles with you, committed to fulfilling a 
condition of rational assent to your prescriptions. This is, as KR and ST 
imply, that I am not in possession of correct factual information about 
your case, unless I myself want, were I to be in your situation with your 
desires, that these desires should be satisfied. 3o As I understand , I cannot 
rationally deny you the satisfaction of your desires, unless I know what it 
is I am doing. Knowing this involves knowing what it is like for you to be 
experiencing the frustration of your desires . Suppose that this is causing 
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you to suffer. Hence, knowing what it is I am doing involves knowing what 
it is like for you to be suffering. I cannot, however, know what it is like 
for you to be suffering without knowing that this involves your wanting the 
suffering to stop. Now, since the facts of your situation to which I 
should be attending are facts about experiences I would have, particularly 
facts about how much I would dislike having your experiences, and since an 
adequate representation of 'what it would be like' for myself consists in 
having an aversion to myself suffering as you are suffering, I am committed 
to prescribing that, were I in your situation with your desires, my 
suffering should stop . So, putting myself in your position involves 
accepting the prescription 'Let me not be denied relief from my suffering', 
as my rationality requires . 
As I understand the argument so far, by entertaining the thought (1) that 
some state of another person might actually be a state of myself, I thereby 
(2) acquire a concern for the satisfaction of desires I would have, were I 
to be in his precise situation. (1) draws on the supposition that this 
situation might be the actual situation in which I am the affected party, 
which der i ves from the demand for universalization. If construed in terms 
of how Hare understands the identification requirement, I am, in my role 
gQl affected party in this situation expected to identify with the 
(rational) desires of the person who is actually the affected party. Now, a 
full account of the justification of this move, and of (2), involves an 
account of how the facts of his situation are relevant to the moral 
decision. Briefly, what he wants should happen to himsel f, and how strongly 
he desires this, are relevant because these things affect what universal 
prescription I think I can rationally endorse. Rational endorsement 
proceeds on the assumption that I know these things, in a specific sense of 
'know'. I have to know 'what it would be like' for myself to be in his 
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precise situation - i.e. how much I would dislike having his experieces, in 
a 'felt' sense of 'how much' - in order to know what it is I would be doing 
should I universalize a particular prescription, for this prescription 
would otherwise be faulted for lack of information. If I am correct in 
maintaining that Hare's theory requires a strong reading of KR, one in 
which the sense of my concern for the satisfaction of your desires is akin 
to the sense, appropriate in the sphere of prudence, in which a single 
person experiences concern for the satisfaction of his desires, then my 
initial assent to the prescription 'Let me not be denied relief from my 
suffering' is a requirement of my rationality in the prudential sense which 
Hare's theory requires. The significant points to note are, I think, that 
assent to this prescription presupposes that I know fully the relevant 
facts of your situation, and that the requirement to universalize my 
prescriptions constrains me to have regard, prudentially speak ing, for 
desires I am expected to deem 'my own' in hypothetical reversed-role 
situat ions. 
The latter point brings me to the third leg of the argument for the PEl. 
This concerns Hare's appeal to the requirement of prudence. 3l In 
hypothetical reversed-role situations, this appeal translates to an appeal 
to hypothetical self-interest,32 and affects my treatment of desires I am 
expected to deem 'my own' in these situations. As I understand, I have to 
decide, on the basis of the supposition that any of these situations might 
be the actual situation in which I am the affected party, what I want 
should happen to myself in each situation, as one who is perfectly prudent 
about interests I deem to be 'my own'. It is obvious, as I have suggested 
above, that this supposition, taken together with the requirement that I 
must know the relevant facts of the situations I am judging, in the 
required sense of 'know', functions as a constraint on what universal 
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prescription I think I can rationally endorse. It is, however, equally 
obvious that without this supposition Hare's appeal to self-interest cannot 
be extended to cover hypothetical situations in which I am expected to 
ascribe to myself motivational states other than those I might in fact have 
for what should happen to myself in them, and that it goes some way towards 
explaining how prudence might be constrained to the demands which rational 
decision making in morals impose on agents, at least as Hare conceives of 
these demands. If, then, we grant Hare this supposition, we might allow 
Hare the premiss that, to the extent I think of the motivational states of 
another person as motivational states of myself, to that extent I acquire a 
concern for the satisfaction of his desires, and hence am willing to 
prescribe, at least initially, that these desires shou ld be satisfied, as 
my rationality requires. Then, as one who is prudent as far as his own 
interest goes, which includes interests I deem to be 'my own' in 
hypothetical reversed-role situations, I would give (positive) weight to 
all relevant rational desires, and strictly in proportion to their 
strengths, just as the persons who are actually in these situations would, 
if they were perfectly prudent. 
Hare 's theory requires that a prudential calculation be made in each 
position I occupy gQ£ affected party. If, in each of these positions, I 
prescribe as one who is perfectly prudent, I must give positive weight only 
to those desires that can be ra tionally defended, as desires each affected 
party has good prudential reasons to want to satisfy. If I understand Hare 
correctly, two applications of prudence, at different levels, are needed to 
bring me to a final decision, first to determine the criticized desires of 
my recipients, which then become the desires with which I am expected to 
identify, and then to determine what, in the end, all things considered, I 
ought rationally to prescribe, which involves only the sub-set of 
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criticized desires. 33 I shall have more to say about the second application 
later on. It is worth noting that only the desires in this subset are to be 
accorded an equal, initial claim to satisfaction, strictly in proportion to 
their strengths, as the PEl requires. 
I am now in a position to pull a few strings together. To decide, ~ 
rational agent, what I morally ought to do, I have to be prepared to accept 
a universal prescription for al l relevantly similar situations. Since my 
prescription has to be universal, I cannot, in choosing the one I think I 
can endorse, accord my own interests any special or extra weight, but have 
to choose in the interests of everyone who would be affected, considered 
impartially. This involves choosing on the basis of the contention that I 
have no reasons, which satisfy the constraints of universalizability, to 
treat other people's rational desires differently from my own. The test of 
this is simply whether I am willing to treat these desires as all equally 
worthy of satisfaction, and whether am willing to assent, at least 
initially, to the prescriptions which express these desires in linguistic 
form. I am, however, expected to choose ~ rationally self-interested 
person, i.e. as one who wants (or is motivated by a desire of overriding 
strength) to satisfy his own interests to the greatest extent possible. If 
my final decision is ultimately determined by an application of 
universalizability to prudential reasoning, I have to prescribe, on the 
basis of the supposition that it is equally probable that any of the 
situations at issue might be the actual situation in which I am the 
affected party, that the rational desires I would have in each of these 
situations, should be satisfied strict ly in proportion to their strengths. 
Regarding the treatment of these desires, I am, ~ rational decision-
maker, in a position which is structurally similar to a single-person's 
treatment of his rational desires. This is to say that I am, in a way 
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which parallels his treatment of these desires, in the two-person or multi-
person case, committed to the principle which bids that desires of equal 
strength must count equally.34 
Before proceeding to the final stages of the argument for utilitarianism, I 
wish to note two pOints concerning Hare 's contention that all the moves he 
needs to make in his argument for the PEl derive from a 'consideration of 
the logic of the moral concepts alone' .35 In my reconstruction of the 
argument for the PEl, I have accordingly taken the view t hat the appeal to 
prudence in hypothetical reversed-role situations rests on the constraint, 
which derives from universalizability, that it is equally probable that any 
of these si tuations might be the actual situation i n which I am the 
affected party. It is, however, not difficult to see that in this I am 
assumed to be motivated by self-interest. If this is correct, the argument 
for the PEl must be thought to begin with the appeal to prudence, i.e. that 
this appeal log icall y precedes all other moves in this argument. 36 The 
second point concerns an assumption implicit in the conditions for arriving 
at a universal prescript ion. I have above indicated that two applications, 
at different levels, of the requirement of prudence are needed to bring me 
to a decision about what I ought, all things considered, rationally to 
prescribe. Now, following Hare , a rational desire to do something qualifies 
as moral if and only if the des ire is a universal desire, i .e. if and only 
if I desire, on balance, that that action be done in all positions I occupy 
~ affected party. I arrive at this on balance desire via two applications 
of the request for prudence. The second application, which parallels the 
single-person case, will affirm that the action ought morally to be done if 
and only if its performance is likely (on the available evidence) to secure 
the greatest possible sum of desire-satisfaction for all concerned. It is, 
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however, not difficult to see that in this the appeal to prudence must be 
thought to have overriding force. 
Now, the two pOin t s just made concerning the place and function of the 
appeal to prudence in Hare's argument for the PEl supply the clearest 
evidence that this appeal exceeds what might reasonably be supposed can be 
justified with reference to the formal constraints of Hare's theory alone. 
It is clear enough that appeal to universali zability is needed to constrain 
prudence to the demands which rational decision-making in morals impo se on 
agents, at least as Hare conceives on these demands. But it is equally 
clear that the justification of this appeal rests on the unproblematic 
contention, which might be posited at the outset of the argument, that it 
is rational to be prudent. think it is correct to say that the request 
for identification with only the prudent desires of my recipients rests 
squarely on the prior assumption of prudence , and its overridingness, in 
the argument for the PEl. Hare might argue for these things as necessary 
additions to the method of reasoning provided by the logic of the moral 
concepts . However, it seems to me that such a line of reasoning would alter 
the overall structure of Hare 's argument for the PEl, and the nature of the 
project he claims to be pursuing , viz., to set up an argument for 
utilitarianism which draws only on premisses derivable from 'the meanings 
of the moral words'. 
Now, just how does being committed to the PEl lead to utilitarianism? Hare 
has the following to say: 
'I f I am trying to give equal weight to the equal interests of all 
parties in a situation, I must, it seems, regard a benefit or harm done 
to one party as of equal value or disvalue to an equa l benefit or harm 
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done to any other party. This seems to mean that I shall promote the 
interests of the parties most, while giving equal weight to them all, 
if I maximize the total benefits over the entire population, and this 
is the classical principle of utility.,37 
Hare, however, points out that his theory does not work in terms of 
maximizing benefits (understood as including the reduction of harms).38 
Being committed to the PEl should be understood as committing an agent to 
the following interpretation of the principle of utility. 
'Let us say that what the principle of utility requires of me is to 
do for each man affected by my actions what I wish were done for me in 
the hypothetical circumstances that I were in precisely his situation; 
and, if my actions affect more than one man ... to do what I wish, all 
in all, to be done for me i n the hypothe tical circumstances that I 
. d 11 h' . t t . ,39 occup1e a t e1r Sl ua 10ns ... 
What I have just said here might be expressed differently, in terms of a 
condition Hare th inks must be satisfied in order to arrive at a universal 
prescription . If, supposing again that the things my recipients have good 
prudential reasons for wanting are also reasons for me to want the same 
things, I can rat ionall y affirm that a particular action ought to be done 
if and only if its performance is likely (on the available evidence) to 
secure the greatest possible sum of desire-~atisfaction for all concerned 
parties . Now, this clearly presupposes a constraint which must be thought 
to commit me first to sum and balance desires of different strengths and 
then to balance the result. What might this constraint be? 
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The answer is by now obvious though it involves many complications. We 
might begin by asking what constrains me to accept that all relevant 
rational desires are, for me, self-interested desires, which I have reason 
to balance against each other. The key to understanding the force of 
universalizability in Hare's argument for the PEl, is that it requires that 
I treat other people's rational desires 'as if they were my own' . The 
significant point is that I cannot reject the prescription ' Let me not be 
denied relief from my suffering', as ' my own' in the situation in which I 
occupy your position, for the objection is - put in terms of the 
supposition of equal probability referred to above - that I am not really 
accepting that this hypothet ica l situation might be the actual situation in 
which I am the affected party. Let us grant that this supposition, combined 
with the request for prudence, constrains me to have regard, prudentially 
speaking, for the satisfaction of your desires. The pOint then is that I am 
expected to treat the desires I associate with being in different positions 
as desires I have reasons to want to satisfy (albeit only initially). This 
is crucial, for this supplies the motivation to sum and balance which the 
principle of utility itself lacks. 
Now, my suggestion is that the move to sum and balance runs on Hare 's 
appeal to the notion of hypothetical self-interest in reversed-role 
situations. Let us grant that I am constrained to accept that any of these 
situations might be the actual situation in which I am the affected party. 
Suppose now that in all but one of the many situations in which I am the 
affected party, I desire, as one who is perfectly prudent, that x not be 
done (with a certain determinate strength, which is the same jn all these 
situations). Suppose also that this one exception is the actual situation 
in which I desire that x be done. Now, I have to accept that there is 
greater probability that the desire that x not be done will be satisfied, 
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because there is greater probability that I will actually have this 
desire. 4o The point is simply that since there is but one situation in which 
I desire the contrary, the probability that any of the other situations 
might be the actual situation, will be much greater. I am here assuming 
that we may weight the probability of a situation actually occurring in the 
world as it is in terms of the number of instances that it actually 
occurs. 4l To this have to be added the strengths of the desires which 
accompany the occurrence. If, to be fully informed involves knowing both 
the probability of the situation occurring and the strengths of the 
desires, I must, in order correctly to represent the strength of the desire 
that x not be done, sum all the desires that it not be done . 
The idea underlying the move to summing and balancing might be expressed as 
an as sumption about my rationality in a two -person or multi-person case. 
This is that just as it is rationa l , in the prudential sense of ' rational ' , 
for me to act on what I most desire should be done in my own actual case, 
so it is rational for me to act on what I most desire sho uld be done in the 
case in which, in addition to my own desires, I have other desires which I 
treat ' as if they were my own ' through an act of the imagination. This 
assumption works on the basis of the contention that my final decision 
applies in one logically possible world in which it is equally probable 
that I might actually be any of the persons whose roles I perform ~ 
affected party. 42 The s ignificance of this contention is two-fold: it helps 
to retain the sense in which it is rational for me to be prudent in 
situations which differ from the actual situation in this respect that I 
have different universal features in them, and it prevents me from 
overriding the desires that conflict with my own actual desire, each taken 
separately (assuming, of course, that the strength of my own actual desire 
entitles me to do this). It is obvious that the prudential calculation 
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which I am then expected to make reduces to a choice between a greater and 
a les ser satisfaction. Since it is imprudent to forego greater 
satisfactions for lesser ones, I must, qua rationally self-interested 
person, opt for the greater satisfaction, and this is likely to be the 
satisfaction of the 'summed' desire that x not be done. 
I have just suggested that the link Hare sees between the PEl and the 
principle of utility assumes that my final decision in a two-person or 
mUlti-person case paral lel's a prudential decision in the single-person 
case. Prudence requires that balance the 'summed' desire that x not be 
done against my own actual desire that x be done. There are two points 
worth noting regarding this request for balancing. First, I am expected to 
compare the value I assign to the consequences of acting on one of two 
prescriptions. In comparing these values, from the perspective of first-
personal rationa l ity, it has to be assumed that the reduction of inter-
personal conflicts to intra-personal ones provides an adequate basis for 
the required comparison . The assumption is, in effect, that by construi ng 
all relevant rational desires as 'my own', I bring these desires onto the 
same scale of comparison. Second, since I would not, if prudent and fully 
informed, prescribe a course of action should it, over the .range of 
situations at issue, yield less rather than more desire-satisfaction for 
myself, I would opt to maximize the satisfaction of my (rational) desires. 
It is now time to show how the argument for utilitarianism works. The 
crucial claim is this: if I were apprised of all relevant information about 
a conflict situation, and made no logical errors in my reasoning, I would 
endorse an act-utilitarian solution to the conflict. This would be a 
solution which requires that I accept that line of action which is likely 
to yield the greatest net sum of desire-satisfaction for all concerned 
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parties. On the assumption that I have made no logical or factual error, I 
am entitled to conclude that this line of action is morally correct, since 
there would be no other course of action, among the alternatives open to 
me, which is likely to yield a greater net sum of desire-satisfaction. 
How might we reconstruct Hare's argument for this claim? We begin with 
universalizability. Now, for Hare, universalizability is a property of 
moral judgements. Moral judgements entail identical judgements about all 
situations which are identical in what universa l descriptive features they 
exhibit. The thesis of universalizability may be formulated thus: 
If I accept the moral judgement that x ought to be done in a certain 
situation, this implies that I am willing to prescribe x in each 
position I occupy in this situation, indifferently of the fact that I 
prefer to be in one position rather than another, and indifferently of 
the fact that in that position I desire that x be done, which is to say 
that my desire that x be done must be independent of which position I 
in fact occupy and of the fact that in this position I am the person 
who desires that x be done . 
Let us grant that this thesis commits me to the supposition of equal 
probability which I have discussed above. 43 I am, then, by the thesis of 
universalizability, committed to the following premiss: 
1. If I accept the singular moral judgement that I ought to do x to you, I 
am thereby committed to the view that, were I to be in your precise 
situation (which involves treating this situation as the actua l 
situation in which I am the affected party), x ought to be done to me. 
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The prescriptivity of moral judgements is the thesis that moral judgements 
entail prescriptions for action. If I accept the singular moral judgement 
that I ought to do x, I am thereby committed to the prescription 'Let x be 
done'. Since accepting the singular moral judgement commits me to accepting 
the universal principle which supports it, I am committed to this 
prescription in all cases that fall under the principle. Th i s is to say 
that prescriptivity, combined with universalizability, commits me to the 
following premiss: 
2. If I accept the singular moral judgement that I ought to do x to you, I 
am thereby committed to the prescription 'Le t x be done to me', were I 
to be in your precise situation . 
Hare argues that I cannot be said rationally to be accepting this 
prescription, as the one I would be willing universally to endorse, in 
ignorance of the relevant facts of your case. I can be said to know these 
facts if and only if I know, in the required sense of 'know', 'what it 
would be like' for myself to be in your precise situation . Suppose I know 
that you are suffering, and that you want the suffering to stop . Given that 
these things are relevant to my appraisal of your si t uation, and that 
knowing them involves knowing how much I would dislike having your 
experiences, in a 'felt' sense of 'how much', I cannot be said to be 
acquainted with the relevant facts of your case unless I have equal 
motivation not to suffer as you are suffering. Th i s is the point that an 
adequate representation of 'what it would be like' for myself requires that 
I adopt your concern for the satisfaction of your desires. I am suggesting 
that the requirement to universalize my prescriptions, which I must satisfy 
if I am to decide the issue between you and me rationally, commits me to 
the following premiss: 
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3. If I know that you desire that x not be done (because doing x to you is 
causing you to suffer), this entails that, in the case in which I am in 
your precise situation, I desire that x not be done, with the same 
strength or intensity as you desire this. 
Now, I am rationally required to assent to your prescriptions on grounds 
that my final decision will otherwise be faulted for lack of information. 
Unless I assent - albeit only initially - to the prescription 'Let x not be 
done to me', it can be said that I lack the required knowledge of your 
case, because I have failed to make it clear to myself 'what it would be 
like' to be suffering as you are. My assent implies that I grant positive 
weight to desires I would have, were I to be in your precise situation, and 
that I am treating these desires 'as if they were my own', in the sense 
which the appeal to hypothetical self-interest requires. It is, for Hare, a 
necessary condition of my assent to this prescription that I desire (i.e. 
am motivated) to do what the prescription enjoins me to do in the case in 
which I am in your precise situation . Indeed, this would seem to be a 
necessary condition of my assent to £nY prescription, irrespective of 
whether I assent in actual situations or in hypothetical situations treated 
as actual . Hare says that des i res are, in the generic sense in which any 
felt disposition to action counts as a desire, 'assents to prescriptions', 
and that prescriptions are simply the expression of desires in linguistic 
form. I formulate the premisses Hare has in mind as follows: 
4. (a) I am fully informed about the facts of your situation only if I 
assent - albeit only initially - to the prescription 'Let x not be 
done to me' in the case in which I am in your precise situation. 
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4. (b) I assent to the prescription 'Let x not be done to me' only if I 
desire (i.e. am motivated) to do what the prescription enjoins me 
to do in the case in which I am in your precise situation. 
2 and 4 are the crucial premisses. I am, by 2, committed to accept the 
prescription 'Let x be done to me'. By 4(b), this acceptance implies that I 
desire that x be done in the case in which I am in your precise situation. 
If I wish to universalize the prescription that x be done, it must be the 
case that I desire, on balance, that it be done in all situations of the 
given description. I am, however, by 4(a), committed to accept the 
prescription 'Let x not be done to me'. By 4(b), this acceptance implies 
that I desire that x not be done in the case in which I am in your precise 
situation. If I wish to universalize the prescription that x not be done, 
it must be the case that I desire, on balance, that it not be done in all 
situations of the given description. Now, if I were fully rational, in the 
prudential sense of 'rational', I would choose to act on what I most desire 
should be done. If, then, I desire, on balance, that x not be done, 
rationa li ty wil l require that I act accordingly. It is not difficult to see 
that to extend this simple bi-literal case to multi-person cases involves 
the argument for summing which I set out above. In multi-person cases I am 
required first to sum and then to balance. If it is correct to say that 
this summing and balancing procedure runs, in multi-person cases, along 
lines analogous to a prudential decision in the single-person case, Hare 
would have shown that I am, gQi rational agent, required to endorse, as 
morally correct, that line of action which is likely to maximize the 
satisfaction, in sum, of the (rational) desires of all concerned parties. 
This is to say, I shall not, if rational, endorse a moral judgement if it 
runs counter to the preferred form of utilitarianism. In this 
reconstruction of how Hare's argument works, I have assumed that the 
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argument begins with Hare's appeal to prudence, i.e. with the gene ral 
motivational assumption that a rational agent wants to satisfy his own 
(prudent) desires to the greatest extent possible . 
Section 2. A critique of the argument for utilitarianism 
In this section my main objective is to contest the claim that we are, in 
any conflict situation, rationally required to accept an act-uti litar ian 
solution. I shall concentrate on the moves Hare makes to commit his agent 
to assent to his recipient's prudent prescriptions. I formulated this 
request for assent as follows: 
R: Rationality requires that I must assent, initially at least, only to 
those prescriptions which express in linguistic form, the dominant 
rational desires I would have in each s ituation in which my position 
were to be different. 
Hare's point is that unless I assent to your prudent prescriptions, it 
cannot be said that I know the relevant facts of your situation, in the 
required sense of 'know'. As I have under stood Hare, the knowledge I am 
expected to have of your situation is knowledge of 'what it would be like' 
for myself to want what you in fact want, and that this requires a strong 
reading of the sense in which I am expected to know the facts of your case. 
Briefly, I can be said to know these facts, if I know how much I would 
dislike to have a certai n 'suffering'-experience, in a 'felt ' sense of 'how 
much' which must correspond to how much you dislike having the experience . 
The crucial claim is that if I know that you desire x with a certain 
strength, this entails that I desire x with the same strength, and hence 
that I have equal motivation not to suffer as you are suffering in the case 
in which I am in your precise situation. It is from the firs t-person 
149 
perspective, made available to me by an imagined experience treated as 
actual, that I have to know 'what it would be like'. If we grant Hare the 
supposition that wanting for myself what you want for yourself works from 
this perspective, and in a sense of ' want' which is appropriate in the 
sphere of prudence, then the point is simply that the quality of this 
(imagined) experience must be thought to make a difference to my current 
motivational state, and hence is a reason for me not to want to suffer. 
This, of course, involves the appeal to hypothetical self-interest. As one 
who is assumed to be prudent about interests I deem to be 'my own', I am 
expected to identify only with those desires you would retain, if you were 
perfectly prudent, and to grant them (positive) weight, strictly in 
proportion to their strengths. 
Now, I said that the crucial claim is that my knowledge of your (prudent) 
desire that x entails that I desire x, and with the same strength as you 
desire it. This claim rests on two considerations, 
(a) that some state of another person might actually be a state of myself, 
and 
(b) that I am, because I identify this state as a state of myself, and 
because I am prudent about interests I deem to be 'my own', concerned 
to satisfy the desires I associate with being in this possible state of 
myself. 
If I am right , (a) derives from universalizability.44 I have to accept that 
there is an equal chance that the hypothetical situation in which I occupy 
your position might be the actual situation in which I am the affected 
party. The move from (a) to (b) draws on an application of 
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universalizablity to prudential reasoning,45 which involves the assumption 
of an antecedent motivational state to want to satisfy one's own (prudent) 
desires to the greatest extent possible. The point is simply that to the 
extent that I think of your motivational states as states of myself, to 
that extent I acquire a concern for the maximal satisfaction of desires I 
would have in the case in which I am in your precise situation, given that 
I am prudent about interests I deem to be 'my own' in thi s situation. If 
this is correct, Hare 's argument in support of R above, as well as the PEl, 
rests crucially on the supposition of equal probability combined with the 
appeal to hypothetical self-interest. shall accordingly, in what follows, 
concentrate on two problems which arise from this feature of the argument, 
and, in particular , on how these problems affect Hare's answer to the 
question 'Why should I assent to your (prudent) prescriptions?' 
The first problem concerns the ' identity ' -question which I discus sed in 
Chapter 2. I am, in reversing roles with you, expected to concede t hat I am 
the person who occupies your position, and hence that I am, ~ rationally 
self-interested person, concerned about the satisfaction of (rational) 
desires I deem to be 'my own ' in this position. I shall argue that it is 
not possible to make coherent sense of the claim that the motivational 
states I am expected to deem 'my own' are properly states of myself, which 
is to say that it is not possible to make coherent sense of the claim that 
I am the person in your precise situation. The point is simply that it is 
not possible to make coherent sense of the claim that I can imagine 'what 
it would be like ' for myself to be in your precise situation, and hence 
that the claim that I can know the relevant facts of your situation, in the 
required sense of 'know', in propria persona, is itself incoherent. 
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The second problem concerns the 'motivational'-question which I discussed 
in Chapter 2. This touches on the claim that the things you have good 
prudential reasons for wanting are also reasons for me to want the same 
things. I shall argue that your reasons are not also reasons for me on 
grounds that Hare's appeal to hypothetical self-interest does not work for 
him in the way he requires. The point is simply that my representation of 
what you have prudential reasons to want or to do in your own case cannot 
be construed as a representation of what I have reason to want or to do in 
that case, in the sense in which having those reasons makes a difference to 
my actual current motivational state. 
I begin with the ' identity ' -question. I have maintained that the 
rationality constraints work from the perspective of the first-person. It 
is worth noting that in ETU Hare presents his understanding of what is 
involved in the requirement that I must know the relevant facts of the 
situation I am judging in much the same idiom as that employed in FR . In a 
comment on Rawl s' use of formal apparatus, he has the foll owi ng to say: 
rather than put the argument in [Rawls'] way, I will do overtly 
what he does covertly - that is to say, I do not speculate about what 
some fictitious rational contractors would judge if they were put in a 
certain position subject to certain restrictions; rather, I subject 
myself to certain (formally analogous) restrictions and put myself 
(imaginatively) in this position, as Rawls in effect does, and do some 
judging. ,46 
The question is not what I would have reason to say, to want or to do, were 
I to be the person in your precise situation, but rather what I do have 
reason to say, to want or to do, in propri a persona. It is worth recall i ng 
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that in this situation my position, gQ£ affected party, is best understood 
as the position of the recipient of the action I wish universally to 
prescribe in the actual situation. In this position I am stripped of all 
information about the particulars of my own actual case. The information 
Hare supposes is available to me is information about how I would be 
affected, given that I am situated just as you are in your actual position, 
gQ£ recipient, in all relevant respects. 
There are two points which must be stressed regarding this notion of 'in 
all relevant respects'. First, for Hare there is nothing incoherent about 
supposing that I am identical with myself in the case in which I am in your 
precise situation, though in that case I will have a different set of 
universal features. This works on the contention that there is nothing in 
logic which prevents me from imagining that I may lose one set of universal 
features and, at a different time and in a different position, acquire 
another set, yet r emain the same person in spite of this change. 47 Second, 
it must then be thought that I am the person who has different experiences 
in (supposedly) identical situations. For Hare the relevant sense in which 
I am expected to know 'what it would be like' for myself to have your 
experiences is the ' felt ' sense of how much ]. would dislike having them. 
Hare thinks that I must be able at least to imagine what this would be like 
for myself. This is best understood as analogous to imagining what it would 
be like to be in some future state of myself, and now desiring what I 
currently believe I will then want. The idea is simply that my imaginative 
representation of what you have reason to count as relevant to a prudential 
decision in your own case serves as a representation of what ] have reason 
to count as relevant to a prudential decision in the case in which] am in 
your precise situation. If this is correct, I must be thought to be having 
the same experience as you are having, albeit only an imagined experience 
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treated as actual. This sets one condition of knowing the facts of your 
case, in the required sense, which I must fulfil if I am to ' 
judging rationally' . 
do some 
But, it may now be objected, that I cannot do this judging rationally, at 
least not in the way Hare understands what is involved in rationally 
deciding on a course of action. 48 It is worth noting that the request for 
correct factual information about your case may be understood in different 
ways. It may mean that I am expected, as Hare puts it, 'to do some 
judging', from the perspective of the first-person, in which case the 
request for correct factual information may be understood as demanding an 
answer to the following question: 49 
(1) 'What do I say about the hypothetical situation in which I am in your 
precise situation?' 
(1) assumes that it makes coherent sense to say that I am imagining 'what 
it would be like' for myself to be in your precise situation. Recall that 
in the reversed-role situation, I am expected to make a decision on the 
basis of all and only the relevant features of your situation. The question 
then arises how I might make this decision from the perspective of the 
first-person, and the answer is that, stripped of all knowledge of the 
particulars of my own case, I merely have to imagine that I am the person 
who has your universal features, including your motivational states. 
However, it is not difficult to see that this must mean, not that I am 
imagining myself to be you, but rather (and simply) what it is like for you 
to be having a certain experience. 50 Imagining the feel of what it is like 
for you is possible on the assumption that I have access to your 
experiences, just as I have access to my own. 51 Hare, however, assumes, on 
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the basis of the assumption just mentioned, that it makes sense to say that 
I am the person standing in your shoes, i.e. that I can imagine the feel of 
what it is or would be like for myself, in a way which parallels imagining 
the feel of what it is or would be like to be in my own future shoes. But 
this makes no sense because that person, standing in your shoes, stripped 
of all the particulars of his own actual case, and who has only your 
motivational states and other relevant characteristics, cannot be myself. 
So the request that I ' ... do some judging', understood as demanding an 
answer to (1), is incoherent, because it requires what is logically 
impossible, viz, that I can imagine myself to be standing in your shoes. 
I have suggested that it is possible to imagine the feel of what you are 
experiencing. So let us construe the request for correct factual 
information about your case as a request to know this, which knowledge I 
then construe as knowledge of what I would want, in some appropriate sense 
of 'want'. This is to say, let us construe this request as demanding 
answers to the following questions: 
(2) 'What do you say about the situation in which you stand to me in 
relation of recipient to prescriber?' 
(3) 'What would I say about the hypothetical situation in which I want what 
you in fact want?' 
(2) assumes that I have, through an act of the imagination, access to the 
feel of your experiences, just as I have access to the feel of my own 
experiences. I can imagine, that is, feeling the intensity of your 
suffering and desiring that it be stopped, just as I can do these things in 
my own case. The question now arises how having this knowledge of what it 
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is like for you translates to a motivational state in me. 52 Recall that my 
having your motivational states, as ST formulates this, is a condition of 
my fulfilling KR. Now, Hare operates with a generic sense of 'desire' 
according to which any felt disposit ion to action counts as a desire. It is 
in this generic sense in which a desire is a felt disposition that I have 
to desire what you in fact desire. But, it may now be objected that this 
'felt disposition' account of my knowledge of your desires does not work in 
the required way. This account, which is implicit in KR and ST, defines the 
bottom-line of what constitutes knowledge of your case. However, if I am 
right, I cannot construe the feel I have of what it is like for you as 
knowledge of what it is or would be like for me to be in. your precise 
situation because it makes no sense to say that I can imagine myself to be 
you. And, if knowledge of your experiences is not available to me from the 
first-person perspective within the reversed-role situation, the crucial 
claim that my knowledge of your desires entails that I desire what you in 
fact desire, may be rejected as false. The upshot is simply that I 
(logically) cannot fulfil either KR or ST, since they run on a specific 
sense of 'know' which is not available to me in the required way. 
Now, I have suggested that I can imagine what it feels like for you to be 
having a certain unpleasant experience by representing the feel of this 
experience to myself in a way which parallels how I represent the feel of a 
current or anticipated future unpleasant experience to myself. This way of 
putting the matter retains something of the 'felt disposition' account of 
my knowledge of your desires, though not the motivational implication Hare 
wants. If this is correct, (2) is the question I should be asking, and not 
(3). I can, however, not provide an answer to (3) if what I am expected to 
say must be thought to depend on my imagining that I am the person in your 
precise situation. Indeed, this appeal to the imagination is what is wrong 
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with (1), and if it is dropped, I could sensibly ask either 'What do I say 
about your situation?' or 'What would I say about it?', and my answers must 
correspond to what you say or would say about it. But, dropping this appeal 
to the imagination would mean dropping role-reversal as well, which leaves 
Hare without an account of the possibility of KR and ST. 
I am arguing that (2) is the question I must ask, and that if this question 
is applied to myself, I must say what you say about your situation. My 
answer, however, is not what Hare requires. And I (logically) cannot 
provide the required answer for the s imple reason that I cannot treat my 
representations of what it is like for you as representations of what it is 
or would be like for myself, i.e. as first-person representations within 
the reversed-role situation, since it makes no sense to say that I can 
imagine myself being you, with your universal features and other relevant 
characteristics. As I judge, Hare 's mistake is to make the knowledge 
requirement of rationality depend on a move he builds i nto the role-
reversal procedure. This is the move by which I am required to bracket or 
put aside all information about the particulars of my own actual case, 
which Hare interprets as demanding that I allow not on ly that the position 
I in fact occupy is mora lly irrelevant, but also that my ind ividual 
identity is irrelevant to the moral decision. The demand for 
universalization itself requires this interpretation . But in so far as this 
interpretation demands that we must abstract from the identities of the 
persons involved in order rationally to arrive at a moral decision,53 it is 
not possible to make coherent sense of what KR requires. 
I have maintained that the demand for correct factual information about 
your case can be satisfied only by appeal to the ro l e-reversal procedure. 
In reversing roles with you, I am committed to fulfilling a condition of 
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rational assent to your prescriptions. This is, as KR and ST imply, that I 
am not in possession of correct factual information about your case unless 
I myself want, were I to be in your precise situation with your desires, 
that these desires should be satisfied. I have also maintained that KR and 
ST require a strong reading of the sense in which I am expected to be 
concerned about the satisfaction of your desires. This sense is akin to the 
sense, appropriate in the sphere of prudence, in which a single person 
experiences concern for the satisfaction of his desires . The relevant point 
to stress is that to identify some other person as myself, and his desires 
as ' my own ' , is to desire what he in fa ct desires, as KR make s clear. As I 
understand, I have to treat your (prudent) desires as ' my own ' in the sense 
that I have regard - prudentially speaking - for their satisfaction. This 
is necessary if my initial assent to your prescriptions is to be a 
requirement of my rationality in the prudential sense of ' rational' which 
Hare's t heory requires . There i s i n th is a requirement to the effect that 
the things other people have good (prudential) reasons for wanting are, or 
must be construed as reason s for me to want the same things. 
Now, Hare ' s appeal to what I have r eason to want or to do in the case in 
which I am in your precise situation rests essentially on an appeal to my 
self-interest - albeit only hypothetical self-interest. I have argued that 
the argument for utilitarianism begins with this appeal, and that it 
translates to an appeal to hypothetical self-interest in reversed-role 
situations . Regarding the justification of the latter move, my suggestion 
has been that universalizability must be thought to constrain prudence to 
the demands which rational decision-making in morals impose on agents, as 
least as Hare conceives of these demands . The suggestion is that 
universalizability must be thought to constrain me to allow that any of the 
situations in which I occupy the position of affected party might be the 
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actual situation, and that I might actually be any of the persons whose 
positions I occupy ~ affected party . If we allow Hare this contention, we 
might also grant him the premiss that to the extent I identify the 
motivational states of another person as states of myself, to that extent I 
acquire the required concern for the satisfaction of his desires, and hence 
am willing to prescribe, at least initially, that these desires should be 
satisfied, as my rationality requires. The appeal to hypothetical self-
interest rests squarely on the contention mentioned above, for without it, 
it is difficult to see just how the appeal to self-interest may be extended 
to cover hypothetical situations in which I am expected to ascribe to 
myself motivational states other that those I might actually or in fact 
have for what should happen to myself in them. 
It is not difficult to see that the idea that universalizability constrains 
me to think of the person who has these experiences in the reversed-role 
situation as myself, supplies the key to understanding the motivational 
constraints of Hare's theory. The basic idea is that if I fully represent 
to myself my own (unpleasant) experiences, were I to be in your precise 
situation with your desires, I must acquire a mot i vational state which is 
just like yours in all relevant respects. If I do not, I have not fulfilled 
these conditions, and so have not become fully rational. Add to this the 
premiss that to have a desire is to accept a prescription that it be 
satisfied, and it seems that Hare is in a position to clinch the 
motivational issue simply by making it a requirement of my rationality that 
I must assent to your (prudent) prescriptions. 
Now, the strength of this position derives ultimately from the contention 
that to become fully rational, I have to fulfil conditions which arise from 
the demand for universalization. As I judge, there is in this one clear 
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point : I have to treat you as deserving of equal treatment, which means 
that I have to grant equal cons ide ration to your desires, the same as I 
grant my own. But, and this is the difficulty with this pOint, I am 
compelled by the demand for universalization to think of the person in the 
reversed-role situation as myself. This is to say, in order to become fully 
rational, the demand for universalization requires that I abstract from my 
own individual identity and assume the universal features of your person 
and situation. This is necessary if I am to fulfil KR. KR requires that I 
know how much you desire x, in the ' felt' sense of ' how much', and from the 
perspective of the first-person in the reversed-role situation. This means 
that KR cannot stand independent of universalizability, and hence that in 
fulfilling KR I have no reasons which satisfy the constraints of 
universalizability to treat your desires differently from my own. 
I argued above that it makes no sense to say that I can imagine myself to 
be the person in your precise situation. KR fails on these grounds . It is 
not difficult to see that the appeal to self-interest in reversed-ro le 
situations fails on the same grounds. If I am right, I have to construe the 
person I imagine to be having certain unp leasant experiences to be you, and 
this leaves no room for an appeal to self-interest, albeit only 
hypothetical self-interest. So, it may be asked on what grounds my feel of 
your unpleasant experiences is a reason for me to assent to your 
prescriptions, i.e. why I have reason to assent. 
If we abandon role-reversal, as I th in k we should, it is worth asking how 
far it is possible to push the fact that I can know the feel of what it is 
like for you as a motivational constrain t to which I am subject, ~ moral 
agent. 
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It is not difficult to see that we would have to allow substantive moral 
intuitions to intrude at a critical stage in Hare's theory. I might argue 
thus: I might say that if I am to suffer, and desire not to, I ought to be 
offered relief from my suffering, and offer as reason 'Anyone who suffers, 
and desires not to, ought to be offered relief'. This would commit me to 
conceding that, if you were suffering, and desire not to, you ought to be 
offered relief. It is not necessary to appeal to role-reversal to establish 
this point. I merely have to assent to the moral principle I have appealed 
to in this simple argument, and the singular prescription it entails. And 
if I assent to these, I would be appropriately motivated, though not 
strictly in the way Hare's theory requires. 
If we drop the role-reversal procedure, as I think we must, critical 
thinking, as Hare conceives of it, cannot proceed. I wish to advance three 
pOints. I maintained that two applications of prudence, at different 
levels, are needed to bring me to a decision concerning what I morally 
ought to do, first to determine your criticized desires and then to 
determine what, in the end, all things considered, I ought rationally to 
prescribe. Regarding this final decision, I am expected to choose ~ 
rationally self-interested person, i.e. as one who wants to satisfy my own 
interests to the greatest extent possible. If my final decision is 
ultimately determined by an application of universalizability to prudential 
reasoning, I have to prescribe - on the basis of the supposition that it is 
equally probable that I might myself actually be any of the persons whose 
positions I occupy - that the rational desires I associate with being in 
these positions, should be satisfied strictly in proportion to their 
strengths. I am then, ~ rational decision-maker, in a position which is 
structurally similar to a single-person's treatment of his rational 
desires, i.e. I am, in a way which parallels his treatment of these 
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desires, in the two-person or mUlti-person case, committed to t he principle 
which bids that desires of equal strength count equally . 
Now, one point is that Hare's strategy to bring me to a final decision runs 
on the logical impossibility that an action can, without inconsistency, 
have different and opposite values for me, at least not at the same time. 54 
This strategy will run only if the moves Hare employs to give the desires 
and other relevant characteristics of distinct individuals a place in my 
deliberation, works in the way suggested, viz., that one and the same 
person must be thought to be making a decision, which affects another 
person, on the assumption that I am identical with myself in each role I 
perform. But, as I have argued, I am not identical with myself in all of 
these roles. So the strategy Hare employs to resolve inter-personal cases 
of conflict, which is to reduce them to intra-personal ones, cannot come 
into play. 
A second point is the assumption that the reduction of inter-personal cases 
of conflict to intra-personal ones provides a basis for inter-personal 
comparisons. The assumption is, in effect, that by construing all relevant 
rational desires as 'my own', in the sense that I have regard 
prudentially speaking - for their satisfaction, I bring these desires on to 
the same scale of comparison. 55 I am supposed to be able, along lines 
analogous to intra-personal comparisons, to compare the values different 
persons assign to various expected outcomes, from the perspective of first-
personal rat i onality. But, if I am right, the intra-personal response to 
the comparison problem i s no solution at all because no intra-personal 
reduction is possible. 
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The third point follows from the ones just made. The major significance of 
the impossibility of intra-personal reduction as a solution to inter-
personal comparisons is simply that it undermines the idea underlying 
Hare's argument for summing and balancing. I expressed this idea as an 
assumption about my rationality in a two-person or mUlti-person case of 
conflict. This is that just as it is rational, in the prudential sense of 
'rational', for me to act on what I most desire should be done in my own 
actual case, so it is rational for me to act on what I most desire should 
be done in the case in which, in addition to my own desires, I have other 
desires which I treat 'as if they were my own' through an act of t he 
imagination. If we reject this assumption, as I think we should, we in 
effect reject the idea that a single principle of rational choice can 
govern two different kinds of conflict situation, viz. , conflicts between 
distinct individuals and conflicts within the lives of particular 
indi viduals. 
It is difficult to see how Hare might retain the motivationa l constraints 
of his theory without appeal to the formal res triction s of the role-
reversal procedure. It may be granted that the reason I have to be 
concerned about the satisfaction of (rational) desires I currently have and 
would have in future states of myself, which is simply that these states 
are and will be states of myself, is sufficient ground for me to allow that 
you have the same reason to be concerned about the satisfaction of your 
(rational) current and future desires. It is, however, le ss easy to grant 
that I have reason to be concerned about the satisfac tion of your 
(rational) desires simply on grounds of what it means for me to be in your 
precise situation. I have suggested appeal to moral intuitions of substance 
as a motivating constraint. Hare, however, cannot avail himself of this 
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suggestion, at least not without abandoning th e project he is at tempting to 
defend. 
Conclusion 
I conclude this ch apter with some brief remarks concerning the di rection in 
which Hare's thinking develops in Moral thinking (MT). There are two 
significant developments in MT. Hare attempts to defend the knowledge 
requirement of his theory, not as a requirement of rationality, but rather 
as a conceptua l truth which is independent of un iversal i zabili t y. He 
combines this requirement with a newly developed theory of prudence in a 
renewed argument for act-utilitarianism. These developments represen t a 
clear departure from a claim which Hare advances i n FR and ETU, which is 
that all the moves he need make to argue for ut i litarianism derive from the 
logic of the moral concepts , universali zability and prescriptivity, alone . 
I shall ex amine these developments in Chapter 4 in order to establish 
whether Hare succeeds in defending this new project. 
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CHAPTER 4 
An analysis and critigue of 'Moral Thinking' (MT) 
In MT Hare dev elops a new thesis which stands independent of 
universalizability. This is the thesis that my knowledge of your 
preferences entails my having the same preferences for a similar 
hypothetical situat ion in which I am in your precise situation, and which 
universalizability compels me to treat as actual and ' my own '. Hare defends 
t his thesis with reference to another thesis, vi z, the thesis of the 
prescriptivity of ' I ' and various conceptual clai ms he makes regarding my 
knowledge of other people's preferences. These things work with a concept 
of prudence and various rationality cons traints in a new argument for 
utilitarianism. 
I shall argue that t he argument for utilitarianism fails on grounds that 
these theses do not commit me to the moves Hare needs to make to compel me 
to accept act-utilitarian conclusions. These moves require that we construe 
t he decision -procedure he offers for a bi-lateral cas~ of preference 
conflict as if it were a single-person case of preference conflict. I shall 
attempt to show that this move may be rejected, and that the argument for 
the maximization of preference -s atisfaction fails. 
Section 1: An outline of the argument for utilitarianism 
In this section my object is to show how Hare thinks that a moral judgement 
consistent with act-utilitarianism may be derived from his premises. These 
are 
(1) the logical principle of universalizability; 
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(2) the logical principle of prescriptivity and its relation to 
preferences; 
(3) an analytic principle of knowledge, which claims that my knowledge of 
someone's preferences entails my having those preferences, and which 
specifies the conditions governing what shall count as knowledge of 
what it is like for someone to be having a certain experience; 
(4) a set of rationality constraints, in particular the requirement of 
prudence . 
Acco rding to the version of act-utilitarianism which Hare defends, an act 
is morally right if and only if no alternative is likely to yield a greater 
net-sum of preference-satisfaction. The central claim, on which his defence 
of act-utilitarianism rests, might be expressed thus: if we were apprised 
of all the relevant and available facts of a situation, and made no logical 
errors in our reasoning, we would not endo rse · any moral judgement which 
runs contrary to that required by the preferred form of utilitarianism. 
I begin by stating the relevant versions of the universalizability and 
prescriptivity theses as employed in MT, as well as other premisses which 
relate to them. Hare formulates the universalizability thesis as a property 
of moral 'ought'-judgements. Moral judgements entail identical judgements 
about all situations which are identical in what universal descriptive 
features they exhibit.l I formulate the thesis as follows: 
U: If I accept the moral judgement that x ought to be done in a certain 
situation, this implies that I am willing to prescribe x in each 
position I occupy in this situation, indifferently of the fact that I 
prefer to be in one position rather than another, and indifferently of 
the fact that in that position I prefer that x be done, which is to say 
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that my preference that x be done must be independent of which position 
I in fact occupy, and of the fact that in this position I am the person 
who prefers that x be done. 
This thesis commits me to the view that, should I wish to do x to you, and 
think I ought to, I have to be willing to accept that x ought to be done to 
me in the case in which I am in your precise situation. This premiss works 
with the knowledge requirements of Hare's theory, which I must fulfil if I 
am to make a rational decision about how I would like to be treated in the 
case in which I stand in your shoes .2 
Hare formulates the prescriptivity of moral judgements as the property of 
entailing at least one prescription for action. If I accept the singular 
moral judgement that I ought to do x, I am thereby committed to accepting 
the prescription 'Let x be done,. 3 Since accepting the singular moral 
judgement commits me to accepti ng the universal principle which supports 
it, I am committed to this prescription in all cases that fall under the 
principle . This is to say that prescriptivity, combined with 
universalizability, commits me to the following view : 
P: If I accept the singular moral judgement that I ought to do x to you, I 
am thereby committed to the prescription 'Let x be done to me', were I 
to be in your precise situation. 
Hare argues that prescriptions are the proper expression, in linguistic 
form, of preferences. 4 To have a preference that x be done is to accept the 
prescription that it be done, which we express by saying 'Let it be the 
case that x be done'. This relation between prescriptivity and preferences 
implies that, if I accept a prescription, then it must be the case that I 
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prefer to do what it enjoins me to do. s I formulate the premiss Hare has in 
mind as follows: 
PI: I accept the prescription 'Let it be the case that x be done ' only if I 
prefer that x be done. 
Hare maintains that the knowledge conditions which I have to fulfil, if I 
am to make a rational decision about how I would like to be treated in the 
case in which I am in your precise situation, rest on conceptual truths 
which concern the relation between knowing that someone is suffering and 
actually experiencing this suffering .6 The main condition is that I have to 
know what it would be like for myself to be suffering as that person is 
suffering, and this condition can be satisfied only by appeal to the demand 
for role-reversal and imaginative identification with his preferences. The 
crucial claim Hare makes regarding my knowledge of his situation is that my 
present (full) knowledge of his preferences entails my now having the same 
preferences as he has for what shou ld happen to himself in that situation.? 
I do not fully know these hypothesized preferences unless I accept not only 
that I would have them, but also 'what it would be like' for myself to have 
them. As I understand this notion of 'what it would be like', I am expected 
to want for myself, in the case in which I am in his preCise situation, 
what he wants should happen to himself. 8 And, since in this situation, I 
have to allow, as counting among the relevant facts of his situation, the 
relevance of facts about experiences I would have, particularly facts about 
how much I would dislike having his experiences, knowing 'what it would be 
like' involves my having his concern for the satisfaction of his 
preferences. I understand this concern in a strong sense, akin to the 
sense, appropriate in the sphere of prudence, in which a single person 
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experiences concern for the satisfaction of his preferences . I formulate 
the knowledge requirement which Hare defends as follows: 
KR: If I know that you prefer x, this entai ls that I now prefer x in the 
hypothetical case in which I am in your precise situation. 9 
It is clearly possible to defend KR as a requirement which rationality 
imposes on me. 10 But in MT Hare goes beyond this to claim that KR is a 
'conceptual truth' and that it is distinct from universalizability.ll Hare 's 
case rests on the truth of a conceptual link which he sees between the 
following two propositions : 
(a) ' I now prefer with strength S that if I were in that situation x should 
happen rather than not. ' 
(b) ' If I were in that situat ion, I would prefer with strength S that x 
should happen rather than not.,11 
According to Hare I cannot know that (b), and what that would be l ike, 
without (a) being true, and this is a conceptual truth. 13 As I understand, 
it is a conceptual truth that I cannot know what it would be like for 
myself to be treated as I am treating you, unless I know what it is like 
for you to be treated like that . It is clear that a certain sort of 
knowledge is required, which is knowledge of how much I would dislike to be 
suffering like that, in the 'felt' -sense of 'h ow much' .14 This is knowledge 
appropriate to the first-person perspective, i.e . knowledge I have of the 
feel of my experiences in the reversed-role situation, which I cannot have 
unless I not only know what you prefer, but also (actually) prefer the same 
thing . Hare's answer to the question concerning how it is possible that I 
can form a preference concerning how I would like to be treated in the case 
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in which I am in your precise situation, involves his thesis of the 
prescriptivity of 'I'. Hare says: 
by calling some person 'I', I express at least a considerably 
greater concern for the satisfaction of his preferences than for those 
of people I do not so designate.,IS 
The thesis is that I use the word 'I' of myself in the reversed-role 
situation, which I cannot do without preferring for myself what you prefer 
should happen to yourself in the actual situation. This, Hare thinks, 
follows from the prescriptive element in the meaning of the word 'I', when 
combined with the requirement that hypothetical situations must be 
identical to actual ones, which identity must extend to the preferences of 
the persons in them. 16 
Now , this thesis is extremely contentious. The account Hare offers of it 
runs on the truth of the following considerations, which concern a relation 
Hare sees between knowing that I am suffering, and (actually) experiencing 
this suffering. 
(a) 'If I am suffering, I know that I am suffering 
(b) 'If I am suffering, I have a motive for ending the suffering.' 
(c) ' It would be self-contradictory to report suffering but claim that one 
did not mind it, and had no motive for ending or avoiding it ... ,17 
The significant point about these considerations is that they are held to 
be true for actual and hypothetical reversed-role situations. 1S They have a 
peculiar relation to the knowledge requirement and, indeed, make clear that 
this requirement includes certain motivational constraints as a component 
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of knowledge. They therefore have relevance to the motivational assumptions 
of KR, and represent one step towards an account of how it is possible that 
my present reasons for action can be influenced by an adequate knowledge of 
the relevant facts of your situation. They can be rephrased to include a 
reference to my knowledge of the degree or intensity of my suffering, were 
I to be in your precise situation. As I read Hare, it is a condition of 
satisfying KR that I must now have an equal aversion to myself suffering as 
you are suffering. I formulate this as Hare's suffering thesis (5T).19 
5T: Unless I now have equal aversion to suffering as you are suffering, in 
the case in which I am in your precise situation, it cannot be said 
that I really know the relevant facts of your case (i .e. I would be in 
factual error about what it is like for you) .20 
It is important to guard against a possible misinterpretation of KR. Does 
KR imply that if I have your preference that x, I can have no other 
preference which could outweigh this?21 Hare's view is that I will form £ 
preference for what should happen to myself, if I were now in your precise 
situation, which is identical in content and strength to your actual 
preference. 22 We might illustrate this by means of the following example. 23 
B, the patient, prefers that the drilling into his decaying tooth be 
stopped immediately. By KR, A, the dentist, prefers that, if he were in B's 
position suffering that degree of pain, the drilling be stopped 
immediately. But though A must form this preference, he can have the 
possibly stronger preference that, if he were in B's position, his dentist 
should go on drilling, for otherwise he will not be able to avoid toothache 
in the future. 24 If A's own preference is really stronger than his acquired 
preference, and assuming that no other preferences are involved, there can 
on Hare's view be no bar to allowing it to override the weaker one. The 
174 
point is that KR does not assume that a recipient's preferences will always 
have a veto, irrespective of its strength. 2s 
I have indicated that ST defines the bottom line of what co nstitutes an 
adequate knowledge of the relevant facts of your situation. The important 
point is that I am not in possession of correct factual information about 
your situation unless I now have equal aversion to myself suffering as you 
are suffering. 26 This, as Hare sees it, is a condition of rational assent to 
your prescriptions. It is, if Hare is right, a tautology to say that, if I 
really know the fac ts of your s ituation, in the sense of 'know' made clear 
above, I shal l prescribe that the preferences I would have in the case in 
which I am in your precise situation, be satisfied, and strictly in 
proportion to their strength. 27 I am, however, required to prescribe this 
only initially, as a step towards finally endorsing a universal 
prescription. I formulate this initial requirement of my rationality as 
follows: 
R: Rationality requires that I prescribe - initially - that the 
preferences I would have, were I now in your precise situat ion, be 
satisfied strictly in proportion to their strength. 
However, Hare requires that the preference I form in the reversed-role 
si tuation must be the one you would retain, if you were perfectly prudent 
as far as your own interest goes. 2S This is part of what Hare understands by 
knowing the relevant facts of your situation, and part of the necessity, as 
he sees it, of rationally endorsing the prescription which I accept as 
applying to myself in the reversed-role situation. Hare expresses his 
notion of prudence as a current preference which I should have, and which 
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should always have overriding strength relative to other current 
preferences. The requirement of prudence is formulated as follows: 
we should always have a dominant or overriding preference now that 
the satisfaction of our now-for-now and then-for-then preferences 
should be maximized. ,29 
As I understand, prudence consists in satisfying my now-for-now and then-
for-then preferences as far as possible, in proportion to their strength. 
Now-for-now preferences are preferences I currently have for what should 
happen at present, and then-for-then preferences are preferences I 
currently believe I will have at some time in the future, i.e. they are 
preferences I will have at that time for what should happen then. These 
future preferences may be represented in the present to generate what Hare 
calls resultant or surrogate now-for-then preferences, i . e. preferences I 
currently have for what should happen at the appropriate time in the 
future. Ideally now-for-now and surrogate now-for-then preferences should 
be compatible. But, they may conflict with other current preferences, 
particularly strong antecedent now-for-then preferences, i.e. preferences 
which bear little or no relation to other current and future preferences, 
and which, if satisfied, may lead to the non-satisfaction of my expected 
future preferences. 3D An example may help to make this clear. It is, for 
instance, conceivable that someone may now strongly prefer that x should 
then (in the immediate future) happen, though then he shall prefer that x 
not happen. The heroin addict knows that, should the pusher call again in a 
day or two, he will then want a shot. He now prefers that, should he then 
be in the grip of a craving for the drug, he be allowed a shot. But, he 
also knows that then he will prefer not to have succumbed, for then his 
fight for recovery will have taken a step backwards. As I understand Hare, 
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satisfying the antecedent current preference to be allowed a shot at the 
expense of the future preference that the shot be withheld, is a sign of 
imprudence, even if the former preference is the stronger one. 3l 
It seems that we should understand prudence as requiring that strong 
antecedent current preferences be adjusted or modified in such a way that 
they no longer conflict with expected future preferences. 32 This works on 
the idea of putting oneself imaginatively in one's own future shoes. Thus, 
because the heroin addict now fully represents to himself the state of 
affairs he wants to realize in the future, he generates a surrogate current 
preference that the shot be withheld, which will be of the same strength as 
the corresponding future preference . The generat ion of these surrogate 
preferences helps to block imprudent actions, because the representation in 
the present of preferences for future states and events prevents us from 
discounting them simply on grounds that they are for the future, which Hare 
believes is irrational. (This is distinct from discounting because of 
unpredictability, which Hare thinks is rational.)33 
One cr itical point Hare is trying to drive home regarding prudential 
ca l culations i s that what is current ly most strongly preferred may not 
yield maximal preference-satisfaction, in sum, over time, and hence that 
the requirement of prudence may demand that current preferences be adjusted 
or modified in the light of future preferences. 34 If Hare is right, recourse 
to the requirement of prudence is properly called for when strong 
preliminary or antecedent current preferences conflict with future ones. 35 A 
rational course of action is then determined by the balance of one's 
current preferences once all preferences in one's preference set have been 
exposed to all relevant facts and logic. 
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I shall attempt to exp 1 a in what full exposure to all relevant facts and 
logic involves by constructing a case of preference conflict over time. I 
hope to illustrate Hare's view that where more than one rational 
alternative is available, prudence may point in different directions. 36 
Consider the following case. A, the aspirant medical student, now prefers 
then (once matriculated) not to go to the army, since that will delay 
starting his university career. But this means that he will have to go as 
soon as he has graduated, which will then be particularly unwelcome, 
because then he will prefer to start hi s professional career. 
The first preference is a preliminary present preference; he now prefers 
then (once matriculated) to be pursuing his university career, rather than 
being in the army. The second is a then-for-then preference; he wi ll then 
prefer (once graduated) to be pursuing his professional career, rather than 
going to the army. His question is: what will overall be the best course of 
action to adopt, given that he believes he ought to do his military 
service? 
Suppose that, of the two preferences, the latter is marginally weaker. 
Fol l ow ing Hare, one way of proceeding would bi for A· ·to ask what his 
present preferences would be i f he exposed them to all relevant facts and 
10gic. 37 If he fully represents to himself his then-for-then preference, 
without discounting, he will have two current preferences, the preference 
that x (going to the army) should then - in the immediate future - not 
happen, and the preference that x should then - some years later - not 
happen. Since the latter is weaker, the rational choice will be that he 
shou ld delay going to the army. 
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But, as Hare observes, there is a different way of proceeding which does 
not yield to the same result. 38 A might consider that when the time comes 
for x to happen, his present preference that x then not happen will then be 
something of the past. Accordingly, he might decide to ignore this 
preference, and seek instead to maximize the satisfaction of other present 
and future preferences. This means that the balance of his present 
preferences will come down in favour of not delaying going to the army. 
Hare suggests that what will be for A the rational course of action depends 
strongly on what he is real ly after. 39 Thus, if A thinks that, once 
matriculated, a delay in making a start to his university career will be 
the greater evil overall, the first option will prevail. On the other hand, 
if he thinks that, once graduated, a delay in making a start to his 
professional career will be the greater evil overall, the second option 
will prevail. 
Now, as I understand Hare, if the relative strengths of A's preferences are 
as assumed, he should select the first option in order to secure maximal 
preference-satisfaction, in sum, over ti me. It is worth noting that Hare 
(following Brandt) favours the first option, for he holds that 
we shall in any case do what the balance of our present 
preferences requires ,40 
after exposure to facts and logic, and there may be cases in which 
preliminary now-for-then preferences may survive this exposure, which means 
that they need not be imprudent. 41 Accordingly, I take Hare to be saying 
that a charge of imprudence will stick to A if and only if, on either 
option, what A currently mos t strongly prefers (as determined by the 
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balance of the relative strengths of the preferences in his preference 
set), will not yield maximal preference-satisfaction, in sum, over time. 
Two final observations are here in order. First, it need not always be the 
case that current preferences should be changed or adjusted. Hare does not 
mean to say that future preferences should never be overridden. 42 Let us 
grant that it is in order, at the time one decides which preferences are in 
one's own best interest to satisfy, to make allowance for possible changes 
in one's future preferences. A may, for instance, envisage the possibility 
that, once graduated, his aversion to x then happening will have become 
very weak relative to his current preference. We might suppose that, as 
graduate, he will receive an army post and the sort of experience much to 
his liking (e.g. as medical officer), which has the effect of boosting the 
strength of his current preference . If, then, his future preference is 
likely to be as weak as I am now supposing , choosing to frustrate it need 
not be imprudent . For, though satisfying the strong now-for-then preference 
first to comple t e his university career will have results which he will 
then prefer not to obtain, he will then not be faced with a case of serious 
preference-frustration, because the non-satisfaction of his weak future 
preference counts for less in the overall preference pattern. 
Second, the request for prudence is best understood as making a demand on 
an agent's choice of preferences at the time he chooses. 43 This involves a 
demand on his motivation at this time, which may involve making adjustments 
to his future preferences. 
Here I wish to note that the request for prudence extends to reversed-role 
situations. On the motivational interpretation of the request for prudence, 
I am required, before I am allowed to universalize my prescriptions, to 
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criticize my own and other people's preferences by asking whether they have 
a claim to what is best for myself and others. The significance of 
criticism from the perspective of first-personal rationality is, as 
mentioned above, that I am expected to identify only with the prudent 
preferences of others, and to admit only my own and other people's prudent 
preferences for consideration at the time I choose the prescription I think 
I can universally endorse. Hare presents this view as a simplifying 
assumption . He says: 
'We are to assume, when we come to universalize our prescriptions, as 
morality demands, t ha t we have to consider only those prescriptions and 
preferences of others which they would retain if they were always 
prudent in the sense ... defined. ,44 
Though this is Hare 's preferred position, he allows that giving weight to 
imprudent (and evil or malevolent) preferences strictly in proportion to 
their strength is permissible because it is unlikely to have an effect on 
my final decision. 45 
Before proceeding to show how Hare's argument for act-utilitarianism works, 
it is necessary to take note of some methodological pOints which concern 
the fulfilment of the knowledge conditions on which the rational ity 
requirements depend. Hare advises that we follow a direct route 
from knowledge of, and preferences regarding, my own present 
experiences, to knowledge of, and preferences regarding, what should 
happen to me in the hypothetical case in which I am to be, forthwith, 
put into the position of somebody else. ,46 
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It is worth noting that this route is structurally similar to the procedure 
we follow in order to fulfil the knowledge conditions in the single-person 
case . As I judge, the crucial point is the contention, which is implicit in 
KR and ST, that an adequate representation of ' what it would be like' to be 
in your precise situation, consists not in my having an aversion to you 
suffering as you are, but rather in having an aversion to myself suffering 
1 i ke t hat. 47 
As I understand Hare, the direct route runs as follows: 48 
I must first 
(1) determine all relevant preferences, my own and yours, all of which 
receive equal, initial consideration, and then 
(2) determine, after criticism by fact s and logic, in the context of the 
overall preference pattern, what I rationally ought to prescribe. This 
works on an application of the requirement of prudence which determines 
the final outcome on the basis of preference-strength alone, and on the 
assumption that imprudent (and evil) preferences will be outbalanced by 
other preferences. 
Hare contrasts this with an indirect route. 49 On this alternative route , I 
must first 
(3) determine your criticized preferences, which become the preferences I 
identify with and grant equal, initial consideration, along with my own 
prudent preferences, and then 
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(4) determine, on the basis of only our criticized preferences, what I 
rationally ought to prescribe. This, too, works on an application of 
the requirement of prudence to the set of criticized preferences. 
The direct route requires that all relevant preferences must be criticized 
in the same context, as the preferences of a single person. This, unlike 
the indirect route, calls for only one application of the requirement of 
prudence to determine the final outcome on the basis of preference-strength 
alone. If Hare is right, no harm is done by including imprudent preferences 
in my deliberation, and granting them positive weight in proportion to 
their strength, for Hare thinks there never will be a case in which the sum 
of preference-satisfaction will be maximized by allowing this. Here I 
merely note that Hare's view is consistent with his rejection of an anti-
utilitarian stance, i.e. the stance that imprudent (and evil or malevolent) 
preferences should receive no consideration, not even initial 
consideration. 5o 
I shall illustrate an interesting point I wish to make abou t the direct 
route by means of a bi-lateral case of preference conflict. Suppose that A 
and B (the newly -weds) are considering starting a family. A prefers j to 
start a family now, but he knows that when they have a child he would 
prefer2 not to have a child. Assume that preference2 is stronger than 
preference j • B prefers x to start a family now, but she knows that when they 
have a child she would prefer not to have a child. Assume that preference y x 
is stronger than preference, and that preference is stronger than y x 
preference2 • Should they start a family now? Let A be the decision-maker . 
Now, following Hare, A must adopt the following procedure . He must first 
identify all relevant preferences and then determine, after criticism by 
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facts and logic, what he rationally ought to prescribe on the basis of 
preference-strength alone. If Hare is right in his view that the inclusion 
of imprudent preferences is unlikely to affect the final outcome, then it 
should not matter whether A 
(1) first sums like preferences, and then decides what the prudent course 
of act i on wi 11 be, or 
(2) first sets aside imprudent preferences, and then sums like preferences 
in the subset of criticized preferences. 
I said that recourse to t he requirement of prudence is properly called for 
when strong preliminary or antecedent current preferences conflict with 
expected future preferences . Now, following (1), A will be led to the 
conclusion that starting a family now i s the rational course of action. But 
it is obvious enough that the preference to start a family now is an 
imprudent preference for A. (2) yields the same result. When considered on 
their own as the preferences of two different persons , preference l and 
preferencey should be eliminated as imprudent . This leaves A with 
preference2 and preferencex ' and since preferencex is stronger than 
preference2, he must rationally endorse preferencex ' But for A, preferencex 
is an imprudent preference. I return to this point again .in Section 2. 
It is now time to show how Hare's argument for utilitarianism works. I 
shall present an outline of this argument, leaving my discussion of the 
justification of the various moves in it for the next section. The argument 
proceeds via an attempt to establish the principle of equal interests 
(PEl), which Hare regards as a crucial premiss in his argument. Hare says: 
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'It is in accordance with our method to assign equal weight, strength 
for strength, to all preferences alike, provided that they survive 
exposure to logic and the facts.,sl 
I begin by noting two things. First, as I understand the argument, we 
proceed by first satisfying KR and the knowledge conditions on which the 
rationality requirements depend. As I read Hare, the satisfaction of these 
things is independent of the constraints of universalizability. 
Universalizability enters the argument only once the relevant facts of the 
situation we are judging have been ascertained. s2 Second, the argument for 
act-utilitarianism then proceeds via appeal to the PEl and Hare's argument 
for summing and balancing in bi-lateral and multi-lateral cases of 
preference conflict. 
I shall use the 'dent i st'-example to illustrate my points . Given that A 
(the dentist) knows that B (the patient) prefers that x (i.e. that the 
drilling into his decaying tooth be stopped immediately), A acquires, by 
KR, the following preference. 
(a) A prefers that x in the case in which he imagines that he is in B's 
precise situation. 53 
Now, it is a condition of fulfilling KR that A must have equal aversion to 
suffering as B is suffering, were he to be in B's precise situation. I have 
said that ST defines the bottom line of what shall count as knowing the 
relevant facts of another person's situation . If he really knows the facts 
of B's situation, he must, by ST (and the view that to have .a preference is 
to prescribe that it be satisfied) prescribe that the preference for x be 
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satisfied, albeit only initiall y, and in proportion to its strength. A 
would then, by these things, be committed to the following move. 
(b) A prescribes that the preference for x be satisfied in the case in 
which he imagines that he is in 8's precise situation. 
Regarding (b), it is important to recall that for Hare KR and ST are 
conceptual truths, deriving from the thesis of the prescriptivity of 'I' 
and the conceptual claims Hare makes regarding our knowledge of other 
people ' s preferences. It is conceptual truth that if he knows 8 prescribes 
x, he must be prescribing the same thing, and with the same intensity, in 
the case in which he imagines that he is in 8's precise situation.~ (b), of 
course, may be viewed as a requirement of A's rationality (R above). 
Rationality requires that he must assent to 8's prescription 'Let it be the 
case that x', for his assent is the te st of whether he really knows the 
facts of 8' s situation . Now, as I judge, Hare makes R depend on KR and ST, 
and in particular on the truth of the conceptual claims he makes regarding 
the relation between knowing that someone is suffering and (actually) 
experiencing this suffering. 55 It is al so worth noting that the move to (b) 
does not depend on universalizability. For Hare maintains that a knowl edge 
of the re l evant facts of 8's situation is a condition of rational assent to 
his prescriptions, and indeed, to all prescriptions, whether singular or 
universal. 56 If this view be accepted, there is no need to appeal to 
universalizability to justify the move from (a) to (b) . I return to this 
point again in Section 2. 
Now, given the relation Hare sees between prescriptivity and preferences, A 
can be said to accept a prescription only if he prefers to do what the 
prescription enjoins him to do. Hence it can be said that 
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(c) A accepts the prescription 'Let it be the case that x' only if he 
prefers that x in the case in which he imagines that he is in 8's 
precise situation. 
I said that universalizability enters the argument only once the request 
for correct factual information about 8's situation has been met. Here I 
wish to note two pOints. First, for Hare it follows from universalizability 
that if A now thinks that he ought to keep on drilling into 8's decaying 
too th, he is committed to the view that the same thing ought to be done to 
him, were he in 8's precise situation. 57 And since 'ought' is prescriptive, 
he would be committed to the following move. 
(d) A prescribes that the preference for y (the preference, i.e. that his 
dentist keep on drilling into his decaying tooth), be satisfied in the 
case in which he imagines that he is in 8's precise situation. 
Given again the relation between prescriptivity and preferences, it can be 
said that 
(e) A accepts the prescription 'Let it be the case that y' only if he 
prefers that y in the case in which he imagines that he is in 8's 
precise situation. 
Second, the key to understanding the force of universalizability in Hare's 
argument is that it requires that we treat other people's preferences 'as 
if they were our own'. This is essen tial to the basic strategy Hare employs 
for the resolution of bi-lateral and multi-lateral cases of preference 
conflict, which is the strategy of committing his decision maker to 
incompatible preferences. 58 Universalizability must then be thought to 
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constrain A to accept that the preference he has ~ dentist, viz, the 
preference for y, and the preference he has ~ patient, viz, the 
preference for x, are for him incompatible preferences. There is, if Hare 
is right, nothing logically amiss with A having incompatible preferences, 
but he cannot without logical inconsistency (i.e. self-contradiction) 
prescribe that both be satisfied. 59 Now, it is obvious that the prescription 
A must be accepting in (c) is inconsistent with the one universalizability 
constrains him to accept in (e). So, how might A proceed? Neither of A's 
preferences has a veto. Either may qualify as moral subject to a certain 
condition. This is that the qualifying preference has to be a universal 
preference, and it qualifies as such if and only if A prefers, on balance, 
that it be satisfied in each position he occupies ~ dentist and ~ 
patient. 6o The question then becomes: What constrains A to balance one 
preference against the other? 
Two major constraints must here be noted. A must (1) grant equal weight, 
strength for strength, to all relevant rational preferences, and then, (2) 
assuming that the decision-procedure in the two-person case parallels a 
prudential decision in the single-person case, balance his preference for x 
against his preference for y. The argument for (1) has three legs . First, 
given that Hare is correct in maintaining that KR is a conceptual truth 
which rests on the thesis of the prescriptivity of 'I' and the truth of the 
conceptual claims Hare makes regarding our knowledge of other people's 
preferences, it follows that in using the word 'I' of himself in the 
reversed-role situation, he cannot without self-contradiction claim that he 
knows he is suffering, yet deny that he has no motive for ending this 
suffering. For, as I have understood Hare, he has to use the word 'I' of 
himself in the reversed-role situation, which means that he has to concede 
that some state of another person, B, might actually be a state of himself, 
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and that in conceding this he must concede that he is concerned about the 
satisfaction of the preferences he will have in that different state of 
himself. The point is simply that since to be in this state is to be in a 
state of suffering, he must know that he is suffering, and if he knows 
this, he must have a motive for ending his suffering. And, if he does not 
want the suffering to stop, or claim that he does not mind it, he cannot 
really be suffering. 6! 
Second, I said that KR requires a strong reading of the sense in which A is 
expected to be concerned about the satisfaction of B's preference not to be 
made to suffer, one akin to the sense, appropriate in the sphere of 
prudence, in which a single person experiences concern for the satisfaction 
of his preferences. Now, I maintain that the motivat ional assumptions of KR 
run on an appeal to hypothetical self-interest in reversed-role 
situations. 62 I shall have more to say about this point in Section 2. Here I 
merely note that, if correct, we may say that as one who is rationally 
self-interested, A is expected to grant positive weight to his preference 
for x, and strictly in proportion to its strength, just as B would, if B 
were perfectly prudent. 
Third, A must now prescribe, as his rational i ty requires (R above), that 
the preference for x be satisfied, albeit only initially, and strictly in 
proportion to its strength. But this he must do as if the preference for x 
were 'his own', as universalizability requires. The point is that since he 
has to make a decision concerning which prescription to universalize in 
ignorance of the fact that he plays the role which he in fact plays, and in 
ignorance of who is actually who in each of the positions he occupies -
i.e . in ignorance of any information about particulars which enable him to 
identify a particular case as his own, there is an equal chance that any of 
189 
the cases which have been put up for consideration might actually be his 
own case, and therefore that all cases are deserving of the same 
consideration, the same consideration he grants to his own actual case.~ If 
this is how universalizability constrains, and provided that he knows the 
relevant facts of B's situation - in the required sense of 'know', which 
includes knowing the strength or intensity of B's preference for x in that 
sense - he would be committed to the PEl. 
Now, following Hare's direct method, A merely has to balance his preference 
for x against his preference for y in order to arrive at a final decision. 
As I judge, this move is justified by the requirement of prudence. If 
prudent, he will opt for that course of action which yields the greatest 
net sum of preference-satisfaction. And if his preference for y is his 
strongest considered preference, he must allow it to override the weaker 
preference for x. The indirect method yields the same result. It is obvious 
that we cannot read the preference A forms in the case in which he imagines 
that he is in B's precise situation, viz, the preference for x, as B's on 
balance or considered preference. This is clearly not what B would prefer, 
if he were fully informed and perfectly prudent. A must from this 
preference for x, for KR requires it. But KR is distinct from the 
requirement of prudence,64 and so, ~ prudent, he need not include this 
preference in his final set, which means that his preference, were he the 
patient, that his dentist should go on drilling into his decaying tooth in 
order that he may avoid toothache in the future, must win. 
The resolution of multi-lateral cases of preference-conflict runs along the 
same lines. Hare says: 
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in them too the interpersonal conflicts, however complex and 
however many persons involved, will reduce themselves, given full 
knowledge of the preferences of others, to intra-personal ones.,65 
But the matter is not quite so straightforward. I shall use a modified 
version of Hare's 'car-bicycle' example to illustrate my pOints. 66 Suppose 
A, the dentist, wants to park his car in a convenient spot directly 
opposite the main entrance to his practice, but discovers that this spot 
(the only available one) is occupied by two bicycles belonging to two of 
his patients, Band C. They prefer to leave their bicycles exactly where 
they are and will mind if he moves them some distance to a vacant lot. 
Suppose also that A knows this, in the required sense of 'know', and assume 
that his preference to park his car in the occupied lot is stronger than 
their preferences to leave their bicyc l es where they are, taken separately, 
though not in sum . So, why should he sum t heir preferences before he 
balances in order to establish what he rationally ought to do? 
How does Hare's argument for summing run? The demand for universalization 
requires that he accept a universal prescription for all relevantly similar 
situations. The relevant poin t to take is that being universal, the 
prescription has to apply in one logically possible world in which the 
individual identities of the person concerned, and the particular positions 
they in fact occupy, are irrelevant to the moral decision. So, let us 
accept that there is an equal chance that any of the three situations at 
issue might be the actual situation in which he is either the car-owner or 
one of the two cyclists,67 and that he is constrained to allow that, 
whatever line of action he chooses to prescribe, the same thing should be 
done to himself £Qi car -owner and £Qi anyone of the two cyclists. If we 
allow further that the things the two cyclists have good (prudential) 
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reasons for wanting, are also for him reasons to want the same things, as 
Hare requires, he can then, from the perspective of first-personal 
rationality, affirm that a particular line of action ought to be pursued 
if and only if its performance is likely to yield the greatest net sum of 
preference satisfaction overall. This presupposes a constraint to sum the 
preferences of the two cyclists. So, what might this constraint be? 
We have to assume that we may weight the probability of anyone of the 
three situations actually occurring in the world as it is in terms of the 
number of instances that they actual l y occur. 58 To this has to be added the 
strengths of the preferences which accompany the occurrence. Let us accept 
that to be fully informed involves knowing the probability of the 
situations occurring and the strengths of the preferences. Now, since there 
is but one situation in which A prefers to park his car, the probability of 
the other situations occurring is much higher. 59 This is to say, in effect, 
that A' s preferences to leave the bicyc l es where they are, are in sum 
greater that his preference to park his car. And, if to be fully informed 
involves knowing how strongly he prefers to leave the bicycles where they 
are, he must sum the two preferences not to move them. The idea underlying 
the move to sum might be expressed as an assumption about his rationality. 
This is that just as it is rational, in the prudential sense of 'rational', 
for him to act on what he most prefers to do in his own actual case, so it 
is rational for him to act on what he most prefers in the case in which, in 
addition to his own preferences, he has other preferences which he treats 
'as if they were his own ' through an act of the imagination. 
Section 2. A critique of the argument for utilitarianism 
I have maintained that the argument for act-ut ilitarianism runs mainly on 
three things: KR, the request for prudence and universalizability. KR rests 
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on the thesis of the prescriptivity of 'I' and the conceptual claims Hare 
makes regarding our knowledge of our own future preferences, and our 
knowledge of other people's preferences. KR is independent of both 
universalizability and the requirement of prudence,7o and is, as Hare 
maintains, an analytic or conceptual truth. It is a conceptual truth to say 
that I cannot use the word 'I' of myself in the hypothetical case in which 
I reverse roles with you or with my own future self, without currently 
preferring what I will prefer in these hypothetical cases. And it is a 
conceptual truth to say that , if I know I will prefer x in these cases, 
this entails that I now prefer x. For, if Hare is right, my knowledge of my 
own future states is not merely a cognitive matter. 7l KR includes a 
motivational constraint as a component of knowledge. This thesis, then, as 
Hare says, is 
analytic of the word "I" and of the word "knowledge" when applied 
to knowledge of preferences of other people or at other times.,72 
Now, KR is the thesis Hare must be able to defend, for it plays a crucial 
role in establishing the general claim that I have to maximize the sum of 
preference - satisfaction, if I am to be rational . The important claims 
underlying KR are 
(1) that some state of some person might actually be a state of myself, and 
(2) that I am, in identifying this state as a state of myself, concerned 
about the satisfaction of the preferences I associate with being in 
this state of myself . 73 
In postulating the possibility of KR, Hare draws on the general point that 
any person who judges some person to be continuous with himself , will 
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presently desire that the preferences of that person be satisfied in 
proportion to their strength. 1 quote the passage in MT in which Hare 
offers this view. He says: 
it is probable that the word '1' is attached to all identifying 
properties ... [bodily continuity, continuity of personal 
characteristics and linked memories] in varying degrees. 1 wish merely 
to suggest that to these we should add, not another identifying 
property, but another feature of the word '1', namely that, by calling 
some person '1', 1 express at least considerably greater concern for 
the satisfaction of his preferences than for those of people 1 do not 
so designate.,14 
The thesis Hare is defending says simply that in identifying some person as 
myself, 1 do not merely affirm the (supposed) fact that continuity obtains, 
but also that I am concerned about the satisfaction of his preferences. ls As 
1 understand Hare's concept of personal identity, to suppose that all 
continuity requirements are satisfied, albeit only hypothetically through 
an act of the imagination, in volves having this concern. IS 
Now, this thesis underlies KR and its subsidiary claims, as well as the 
role Hare assigns to the universalizability thesis. 1 have two main 
concerns: (I) to examine the defence of KR, and particularly the 
motivational assumptions which it implies . I shall accordingly have 
something to say about Hare's concept of personal identity. 1 begin with an 
analysis of how KR works in the single -pers on case, and follow this up with 
an analysis in a bi-lateral case. I shall then (2) att empt to assess 
whether there is a case for maintaining that a prudential rule may be 
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applied in the two-person case, and whether this move can constrain Hare's 
agent to maximize the sum of preference-satisfaction. 
Let us return to the 'army'-case. I said that, QQi rational, A, our 
aspirant medical student, should consider what it is he would be doing, if 
he chose one or other of the alternatives open to him. If he thinks that he 
should first go to university, he will not be able to start his 
professional career at the time he will want that to happen. If he rejects 
this course of action , this must be because of what delaying the start 
would be like for himself, i.e. some (supposed) fact about the anticipated 
experience, e.g., the fact that then he will not like it, supplies the 
reason for his rejection. Considering what it is he would be doing, then, 
involves taking cognizance of how that will affe ct what he will then want. 77 
Hare maintains that he should do what he rationally most prefers at 
present, i.e. what will maximize the satisfaction of his present rational 
preferences, which are the ones he retains after criticism by facts and 
10gic. 78 For Hare present actions must be compatible with what will maximize 
preference-satisfaction at other times, for otherwise his present 
preferences will not be rational in the pruden t ial sense which Hare 's 
theory requires. 
Now, the thesis of the prescriptivity of 'I' plays a role in accounting for 
the possibility that a reason A will have to do something in the future can 
be a reason which presently constrains him to act in ways compatible with 
his own maximal welfare. According to th is thesis, he uses the word ' I' of 
himsel f in the hypotheti cal situation in which he stands in his own future 
shoes, which he cannot do without currently preferring what he now believes 
he will then prefer and now prescribing that this preference be satisfied. 79 
If he knows that there is somet hing about an anticipated experience he will 
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then not like - say, because having the experience will cause him to suffer 
- he will now desire, i.e. have a motive that that experience be avoided. 
Hare's thesis is that there is a logically necessary connection between 
fully representing the anticipated experience to himself and presently 
desiring that that experience be avoided. The connection is, as he says, 
'conceptual'. This is, as Hare puts it, 
because the experience that is being represented is a desire. If 
we try to represent to ourselves what it is like to have a certain 
desire, we have not succeeded unless there is something in our present 
experience to correspond to what we are trying to represent; and this 
has to be a desire toO.,80 
Hare's account of the rationality of present actions requires that he must 
satisfy KR as a step towards satisfying the principle which requires that 
he grant equal weight to all (considered) preferences of equal strength. KR 
itself, however, does not say which ones of the anticipated experiences it 
would be best for him to have, in a sense of ' best' compatible with what is 
likely to secure his own maximal welfare. This is strictly a matter for the 
requirement of prudence. It seems that a preference may .be compatible with 
KR, but not be a preference that should be satisfied, all things told, i.e. 
it may not be one's considered preference for a particular contingency. So 
it seems that Hare is right in maintaining that KR is distinct from the 
requirement of prudence .81 
But, we may ask: what constrains A to satisfy KR? Suppose Hare is right 
about personal identity. It then follows that if he has a reason at present 
to be concerned about the satisfaction of the preferences he envisages 
having in the future, this reason must be that the person who will have 
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those preferences will be himself.~ We may, however, still ask: what reason 
do we have to believe that satisfying all continuity requirements involves 
having the suggested concern for the welfare of that future person?83 Does 
Hare mean to say that the (supposed) fact of continuity itself has at 
present motivating force? If Hare is right, it follows on the assumption 
that all the continuity requirements of personal identity are satisfied, 
albeit only through an act of the imagination, that he has at present the 
required concern for the welfare of that person. As I understand Hare, we 
require as a condition of saying that he has the reason for the concern 
which this concept of personal identity demands, that all these 
requirements be satisfied. So, we have to assume, if the (supposed) fact of 
continuity has motivating force , that this must be operative at present. 
How might we account for this? 
We need to suppose (1) that a distinguishing feature of A's present self, 
or of his present motivational set, supplies the reason for the required 
concern. 84 I think this works with another thesis which is closely linked to 
the thesis of the prescriptivity of 'I'. This is (2) Hare's concept of 
prudence. Hare says: 
'To be prudent is to think of the future states of a certain person 
(normally the person whose body one's present body will be) as oneself, 
and thus to acquire a concern for the satisfaction of the future 
preferences of that person . ,8S 
As I understand Hare, the point is that rational persons possess a strong 
degree of self-concern, and this we might express by saying that they want 
to satisfy their own preferences to the greatest extent possible. If this 
is correct, we might then say that anyone who uses the word 'I' to identify 
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some person as himself, and subject to the condition of its use with 
reference to that person, exhibits rationality in the required sense 
(though this is itself no guide to what he had best at present do to secure 
his own maximal welfare). If this be granted, we make room for the 
conceptual link Hare sees between fully representing to himself anticipated 
future experiences, and presently desiring what he will then want, to come 
into play. 
Now, if I am right, allowing t ha t continuity obtains does itself not 
constrain him to form a current preference compatible with what he will 
have reason to do or to avoid in the future. If, as we are assuming, that 
(1) and (2) serve as the main motivating factors, he has a reason, all 
other things being equal, to satisfy KR. Now, might we say that if he has a 
reason to satisfy KR, he also has a reason to satisfy the principle which 
demands that he grant equal weight to all (considered) preferences of equal 
strength? 
Consider the following case. Suppose that A is strongly anti-conformist. At 
present, t 1 , he prefers to serve time in prison rather than in the army. 
But he knows that at some time in the foreseeable future, t 2, he will not 
prefer to serve time in prison, i.e. that then he will have a preference he. 
now regards as contemptible, rather to do his military service .86 Let the 
preference to serve time in prison be x and the preference to do his 
military service be y. At t l he prefers that the preference for y be 
frustrated, even though he now believes that, should he prefer y at t z' he 
will not then have the preference that y be frustrated, because then the 
preference for y will be very strong. 
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Suppose further that he thinks of the person who will have the preference 
for y at t2 as himself. Now, what reason do we have to believe that 
regarding that person as himself involves having the required concern for 
his welfare? It seems plausible to say that if he knows he will want to do 
things in the future which he at present regards as contemptible, he will 
not now form preferences for those things. B7 And, if this be granted, we may ' 
ask what reason we have to believe that the (supposed) fact of continuity 
supplies a compelling reason why he should now form a preference that the 
preference for y be satisfied. B8 
Now, the obvious objection is that unless he satisfies KR, he does not 
exhibit rationality in the sense which Hare requires. If Hare is right, he 
cannot be said to know the facts of his own case, in a sense of 'know' 
which requires that he understands the circumstances in which he would have 
the preference for y, unless he now forms a preference that the preference 
for y be satisfied. B9 To be fully rational, he must know how strongly he 
would prefer that y, and how much he would then suffer if the preference 
for y were to be frustrated, and this he cannot know unless he represents 
these things to himself in the way KR requires . This means that he must now 
. be equally averse to suffering as he would then be. As I pointed out above, 
Hare maintains that the experience he imagines to be having in the 
circumstances in which he would prefer that y, is a desire which has to be 
present in his current experience, if he is fully to understand those 
circumstances. So, now forming a preference that the preference for y be 
satisfied is rationally required . 
Suppose, then, that he puts himself in his own future shoes, and suppose he 
understands the circumstances in which he would then prefer that y as 
follows. At t2 he will be tempted, gQ£ self-interested agent , to prescribe 
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that his preference for y be satisfied because then the preference to 
conform will be very strong . But I see no reason to accept the view that 
representing certain experiences to himself is simply a matter of desiring 
that certain actions be performed or not be performed. It is not 
implausible to suggest that if the person he envisages becoming does not 
resemble him in those respects he most values at present, he has a reason 
at present to disallow that the preferences of that person are worthy of 
satisfaction .9o And, if (I) above is correct, it is not implausible to 
suggest that at present he lacks the motivation to des ire that the 
preference for y be satisfied. Moreover, what reason does he have to accept 
that the strength of the preferences which will obtain at t 2, and not their 
content, should be decisive in deciding which preferences to allow to have 
an influence on present actions?91 We may ask: are there sufficient grounds 
for allowing that he is rationally required presently to desire that the 
preference for y be satisfied? We may ask again: why should he now care 
whether at t2 he will strongly prefer that the preference for y be 
satisfied, even though he now imagines and fully understands the 
circumstances in which he would prefer that y, just as the person he may 
become will then prefer that y will care and understand? 
We may note that his current preference that the preference for y be 
satisfied is an antecedent now-for-then preference which the requirement of 
prudence might disallow. 92 It is also a preference corresponding to an 
ideal. We may, following Hare, call it an autofanatical preference. If Hare 
is right, anyone who is willing to allow strong antecedent now-for-then 
preferences to override strong and fully represented then-for-then 
preferences manifests a form of imprudence. Hare says: 
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'We might call him an autofanatic, because of his similarity in the 
sphere of prudence, to the fanatic in the sphere of morality.,93 
The mark of the autofanatic is this. His current preferences are so strong 
that, though he thinks of the person he may become as himself, he is still 
prepared to prescribe that that person's preferences be frustrated. It is 
obvious that this runs counter to the requirements of KR, and this is 
perhaps the reason why Hare favours the exclusion of autofanatical 
preferences. 94 Hare does not say that these preferences are irrational. His 
point is rather that they are not rational.1Y required in that they are not 
compatible with KR . We may ask whether they are also incompatible with the 
requirement of prudence . Appeal to the overriding strength of the current 
preference we should have that the satisfaction of our now-for-now and 
then-for-then preferences be maximized, is properly called for when strong 
antecedent now-for-thens conflict with strong and fully represented then-
for-thens . But, it seems that in the case under consideration it does not 
help to appeal to this requirement, for the appeal will work only for 
antecedent now-for-thens which are not so strong that they become 
incompatible with the requirements of KR. 
Now, I wish to draw attention to a point well worth considering. As I have 
understood Hare's theory of prudence, a charge of imprudence will stick to 
A if and only if what is currently most strongly preferred - as determined 
by the balance of all (considered) preferences in his preference set - is 
not likely to yield maximal preference-satisfaction, in sum, over time. The 
question then is how this might be established if KR is not satisfied. 
Hare's account of the rationality of present actions requires that KR be 
satisfied as a step towards satisfying the principle which demands that he 
must grant equal weight to all (considered) preferences of equal strength, 
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irrespective of their content. The reason Hare thinks ~ available to 
satisfy KR is not independent of the supposition that continuity obtains, 
and this supposition is necessary to account for the rationality of present 
actions . Now, we may ask: what theory of prudence requires that present 
aversions, of the kind I have been considering, should count for nothing in 
making prudential decisions? A could retain his current preference that the 
preference for y be frustrated, and still be rational. 
I shall now attempt to show how KR works in a bi-lateral case of 
preference-conflict. I use the 'newly-weds ' case to illustrate my points. 
Suppose again that A and B now prefer to have a child (A with strength 1 
and B with strength x) . But they realize that once they had started a 
family, they would prefer not to have done so (A with strength 2 and B with 
strength y). Let the preference to start a family be F and the preference 
not to be F-. Suppose that F-2 is stronger than Fl and that Fx is stronger 
than F-y ' Suppose also that Fx is st ronger than F- 2• We might now reconstruct 
the critical steps in the initial stage of Hare 's argument thus : A cannot 
defend denying B the satisfaction of starting a family now unless he knows 
what it is he is doing. Knowing what he ·is doing necessarily involves 
knowing what B is experiencing, i.e. what it is like for B to be denied 
this satisfaction. Suppose that this is causing B to suffer . Hence, knowing 
what it is he is doing involves knowing what it is like for B to be 
suffering. He cannot know this without knowing that it involves wanting the 
suffering to stop . The linguistic expression of this is 'Let it be the case 
that B not be denied the satisfaction of having a family.' If A uses the 
word 'I' of himself in the reversed-role situation, which he cannot do 
without now having the preference that, were he to be in B's precise 
situation, he should not be denied the satisfaction of having a family, he 
must prescribe that this preference be satisfied, at least initially, and 
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strictly in proportion to its strength. This involves accepting the 
prescription 'Let it be the case that I not be denied the satisfaction of 
having a family'. Accepting or assenting to this prescription is a 
requirement of his rationality (R above). If he does not assent, so Hare 
claims, he does not know the relevant facts of B's situation, which means 
that his final decision would be irrational, i.e. it would be faulted for 
lack of information . 
We may note that F is what B would prefer , if she were prudent and fully 
x 
informed about the facts of her own case . As I understand Hare, the 
preference A forms in the case in which he imagines himself to be in her 
precise situation must conform to her considered preference. A must then 
form the current preference (which is surrogate or resultant now-for-then 
preference), that were he forthwith to be in her precise situation, F be 
x 
satisfied. However, if wOe consider A' s preferences on their own, the 
current preference that Fx be satisfied, is for him, an imprudent 
preference. As I pointed out in section 1, rationality requires, all things 
told, that he prescribe that it be satisfied . We may ask: Should he not, 
ill@. prudent, reject it on grounds that he has-'nb reason which he can square 
with rational self-interest to prescribe i ts satisfaction? This obviously 
runs contrary to R. 
But , there is an assumption in this requirement of rationality which is 
well worth considering. This is that A has no other preferences which may 
serve as reasons presently to desire that Fx be frustrated . Suppose A 
believes that wives ought to obey their husbands because they are wives. 
Let the preference that his wife obey him be z. Suppose further that z 
corresponds to a long cherished personal moral ideal, and that A is so 
strongly attached to z that he is wil l ing to prescribe its satisfaction, 
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even in the hypothetical situation in which he would be the person who 
would be adversely affected . Should z be allowed to count? 
Now, Hare maintains that external preferences , i . e . preferences for states 
of affairs which are not currently within the experience of the preferrer, 
should be excluded. 95 The reason is that they are not compatible with the 
requirements of KR .96 External preferences include personal moral ideals of 
the kind which is here being considered. 97 Hare could simply rule z and all 
other kinds of external preferences out of court for the reason given, and 
accept that there are limitations to what kinds of preferences his theory 
can accommodate. 98 But this move would leave Hare without a way of dealing 
with 'fanatical' preferences, which he wishes to avoid. Z must be allowed 
to count and be treated as just one preference among those which enter into 
moral thinking. 99 There are two points worth noting here. A has to treat his 
ideal as just one preference among others, IOO and he has to form the current 
preference that Fx be satisfied in ignorance of the facts of his own actual 
case. IOI The latter is a condition of full representation, and is 
independent of universalizability. 
Now, if the moves which commit A to KR are all conceptual moves, he cannot 
refuse them. If he is committed to KR, he must prescribe, albeit only 
initially, that Fx be satisfied. He cannot then legitimately evade forming 
this preference. Indeed, he is expected to form this preference, not gQ£ 
the person with his individual identity and name, but rather gQ£ 'I', as 
one who identifies the person in the reversed-role situation as himself. 
We may note the following : First, the crucial point about KR is that it is 
a conceptual truth which can be defended independent of universalizability. 
Hare says: 
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'I claimed that it is a conceptual truth that if I know that I would be 
prescribing something were I in exactly someone else's position with 
his preferences, I must now be prescribing the same thing with the same 
intensity. ,102 
Hare notes that in establishing the possibility of KR, we may appeal to 
universalizability, to a ' limited extent', to show that rational decisions 
in moral thinking depend on our knowledge of the relevant facts of a 
situation . 103 However, and this is the crucial point, we may dispense with 
this appeal if we ac ce pt the view 
that all prescriptions, universal and singular, have to be made in 
cognizance of the facts if they are to be rational. ,104 
Fulfilling the requirement of correct factual information about B's case is 
clearly a condition of rational assent to her prescr i ptions. I indicated 
above that ST defines the bottom-line of what is involved in this request 
for information: A is not in possession of this information unless he 
himself has a preference, were he in her prec~se situation with her 
preferences, that these preferences should be satisfied. This is to say, 
the bottom-line consists in himself being averse to suffering as B is 
suffering, and be i ng concerned, just as B is, about the satisfaction of the 
preference to start a family now. 
Second, I indicated above that Hare's concept of personal identity 
underlies KR. A cannot use the word 'I' of himself in the reversed-role 
situation without currently preferring what he would then prefer, given 
that he would then be situated just as B is in all relevant universal 
respects . And, in using the word ' I ' of himself in that situation, he 
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acquires a concern - albeit only a hypothetical concern - for the 
satisfaction of the preferences he would then have. As I understand, the 
sense of his concern must be akin to the sense - appropriate in the sphere 
of prudence - in which a single person experiences concern for the 
satisfaction of his (future) preferences . However, we may ask: what 
constrains A to use the word 'I' of himself in the reversed-role situation? 
We may also ask, on the assumption that continuity obtains, what reason we 
have to believe that this (supposed) fa ct supplies the required motivating 
force at present? For, as I under stand Hare, in the reversed-role s i tuation 
the satisfaction of Fx must be, for him, a matter of self-interest, albeit 
only hypothetical self-interest. If this can be shown, he would be 
committed, ill@. rational in the prudential sense which Hare requ ires, to 
prescribing that, were he in her precise situation, his suffering should 
stop. 
It is a crucial assumpt io n of Hare 's argument that the same person must be 
thought to occupy different positions, ill@. author of a prescription and ill@. 
recipient of it, albeit only at different times. The identity-requirements 
of Hare's theory demand that the similarity between actual and hypothetical 
situations be extended not only to the persons in these situations, but 
also to the preferences they actually have in these situations, and this 
means that the requ ired identity does not obtain unless A has equal 
aversion to suffering as B is suffering. If Hare is right, A need -
initially - form only a conditional preference in the case in which he 
imagines himself to be in B's precise situation. And he need - initially -
only acquire a hypothetical concern for the satisfaction of this 
preference, as KR requires. He must then, because of universalizability, 
turn this hypothetical concern into an actual concern for the satisfaction 
of that preference. 105 
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So, on the assumption that treating an ideal as just another preference 
presents no obstacle to satisfying KR, R will constrain A presently to 
desire that Fx be satisfied, albeit only initially, and strictly in 
proportion to its strength. But, allowing Z to count is unfair to B. How 
might Hare remove the counter-intuitiveness of allowing this external 
preference to count? The obvious answer is that B's ideals must also count 
as preferences. Should A then, in the case in which he imagines himself to 
be in B's precise situation, form the current preference that Fx be 
satisfied, or the current preference that wives be treated as their 
husbands' equals, or both? The development of Hare 's position if he were to 
admit external preferences would seem to require both. But doing so could 
generate significant unfairness to B. So perhaps Hare ought to exclude all 
external preferences and find some other way of dealing with 'fanatical' 
preferences . 1 have raised the probl em of external preferences because they 
present an obstacle to satisfying KR. There are, however, more serious 
obstacles. 1 shall have something to say about these towards the end of 
this section. 
Now, Hare 's case that KR is a conceptual trut h which may be defended 
independent of universalizability rests on the presumed truth of his 
concept of personal identity. The thesis that 'I' is not wholly a 
descriptive word but in part prescriptive, says Hare, 
is the thesis to the extent that 1 know what it is like for a 
certain person to be prescribing or preferring something in his 
situation, and identify hypothetically with him (i . e. think that 1 
might be he, which involves prescribing that if 1 were, his 
prescriptions, which would in that hypothetical case have become mine, 
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should be satisfied), I shall prescribe that those prescriptions should 
in that hypothetical case be satisfied.,lo6 
This, says Hare, is a tautology. This thesis follows from the prescriptive 
element in the meaning of the word 'I', when combined with the requirement 
that hypothetical situations must be identical to actual ones, which 
identity must extend to the persons and the preferences they have in them. 
Does this mean that Hare defends the role-reversal procedure as a 
requirement of rationality and not as a requirement of 
universalizability?I07 But, though the thesis of the prescriptivity of 'I' 
is a tautology, it is not, thinks Hare, a trivial one. For it - combined 
with universalizability - explains how we advance from prudence to 
morality.10B We advance from prudence to morality in virtue of being 
constrained to balance all considered competing preferences against each 
other on the basis of strength alone. The strategy Hare employs to achieve 
this requires that all these preferences be regarded as the preferences of 
a single person . However, it seems to me that in postulating this thesis, 
Hare assumes 
(a) that the decision-procedure for the two-person case parallels the 
decision-procedure he advocates for the single-person case, i.e. that 
appeal to a form of rational prudence is the appropriate response in 
the two-person case. 
In assuming (a), Hare also assumes a theory of personal identity which 
yields the judgements 
(b) that A may have two sets of universal features, albeit in different 
positions and at different times, and 
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(c) that A has, in virtue of the (supposed) fact of continuity, a reason to 
be concerned about the welfare of the person he envisages becoming. 
(b) and (c) are closely 1 inked through Hare's concept of personal identity . 
I begin my discussion of these assumptions by asking: what constrains A to 
balance all considered preferences on the basis of preference-strength 
alone? The answer is that he is expected to think of the person in the 
reversed-role situation as himself, and that this involves, in virtue of 
the (supposed) fact of continuity, having the required concern for the 
welfare of that person. If I am right in this, Hare appeals to self-
interest, albeit only hypothetical self-interest. Hare maintains that 
unless A accords equal weight, strength for strength, to B's considered 
preferences, he is either failing fully to represent what it would be like 
for himself to be suffering as B is suffering, or he is not really thinking 
of the person in the reversed -role situation as himself, i . e . he has not 
become fQlly knowledgeable and rational in the prudential sense which Hare 
requi res. 109 
I shall now argue that applying a prudential rule in the two -person case 
demands more than what the supposedly parallel requirements of applying a 
prudential rule in the single-person case demand, and that the conceptual 
claims Hare makes regarding our knowledge of other people's preferences are 
false. I begin by noting two requirements of A's rationality. 
1. Rationality requires that he presently prefer and prescribe, albeit 
only initially, that the preferences he will have, if his position were 
to change, be satisfied in proportion to their strength. 
2. Rationality requires that he act on what he most prefers, all things 
told, in the case in which he has, in addition to his own preferences, 
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other preferences which he treats as 'his own' through an act of the 
imagination. IIO 
I have mentioned Hare's view that universalizability enters his argument 
only once KR has been satisfied to constrain A to turn a merely 
hypothetical concern into an actual concern for the satisfaction of a 
preference he is expected to deem 'his own'. In this second stage of the 
argument, Hare's position rests on the possibility of A being able to see 
himself as one who has a set of incompatible preferences, and as rationally 
required to maximize the sum of preference-satisfaction. This, of course , 
assumes that he will treat other people's preferences no differently from 
his own, if he has no reason which satisfies the constraints of 
universalizability to treat them differently. Hare says: 
'I t follows from universalizability that if I now say that I ought to 
do a certain thing to a certain person, I am committed to the view that 
the very same thing ought to be done for me, were I in exactly his 
situation, including having the same personal characteristics and in 
particular the same motivational states.,1ll 
I formulate two crucial requirements of universalizability as follows. 
Universalizability requires that A prescribe for the situation in hand 
3. irrespective of the fact that he is the person whom he in fact is, 
because morality demands that moral judgements be accepted 
indifferently as regards who he iS112, and 
4. irrespective of the fact that he prefers one thing for an actual 
situation and another thing for a hypothetical situation, because 
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morality demands that moral judgements be accepted indifferently as 
regards this fact.113 
There are two points worth noting here. First, there appears to be some 
overlap between the requirements of the thesis of the prescriptivity of 'I' 
and the requirements of universalizability. Hare makes it clear that the 
former does not, by itself, entail the latter. 114 Universalizability enters 
the argument to compel A to treat merely hypothetical concerns as actual 
and 'his own'. But, if this is correct, we may ask: what prevents A, in the 
initial stage of Hare's theory, from refusing to use the word 'I' of 
himself in the reversed-role situation, and hence to reject Fx on grounds 
that it is an imprudent preference for him? The constraint Hare has in mind 
cannot be due to universalizability, for KR is independent of this thesis. 
The answer is that A must be thought to be constrained by "his rationality, 
as I above formulates this. I, in effect, is the requirement of correct 
factual information about B's case. I, then, assumes that A can imagine 
himself to be B, and that the knowledge Hare thinks is available to him is 
knowledge he can have in propria persona , i.e. from the perspective of the 
first-person. 11 5 But I is not quite enough. For we may ask: what reason do 
we have to believe that the (supposed) fact of continuity has at present 
motivating force? It seems that we must here invoke the idea that a 
distinguishing feature of his present self, or of his present motivati onal 
set, supplies the reason for the concern he should have at present for the 
satisfaction of Fx. We have to suppose that Hare's argument for 
uitlitarianism begins with an appeal to rational prudence, and that this 
appeal translates to an appeal to hypothetical self-interest in the 
reversed-role situation. If this is right, KR and 5T must then be thought 
to follow from the thesis of the prescriptivity of 'I' and the appeal to 
rational prudence, when combined with the requirement that hypothetical 
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situations must count for as much as actual ones . It is worth noting again 
that all this assumes (a) above, i.e. that appeal to a form of rational 
prudence is the appropriate response in the two-person case. 
Second, if Hare is right, universalizability plays a role in constraining A 
to maximize preference-satisfaction. Universalizability constrains A, (a) 
to treat all (considered) preferences, irrespective of their content, as 
equally worthy of satisfaction, 116 and (b) to treat B's reasons for wanting 
to start a family now as 'his own' reasons . He cannot then fail to give 
positive weight to B's preferences in his final deliberation, for this 
constitutes a breach of universalizability. 117 But, we may ask: what is 
there in universalizability or in the thesis of the prescriptivity of 'I' 
to constrain A to accept (a)? The decision procedure for the two-person 
case is supposed to run paralle l to the decision-procedure for the single-
person case. But, we may ask: is there a rational requirement in the 
single-person case to the effect that all (considered) preferences be 
accepted indifferently as regards to their content? If Hare is right, A 
will be constrained, in virtue of universalizability, and ~ rationally 
self-interested agent, to sum preferences and to bal.ance the result on the 
basis of preference-strength alone, and the outcome of this,' Hare believes, 
will maximize preference-satisfaction for all concerned. 
Now, I have said that Hare's concept of personal identity underlies his 
defence of KR and its subsidiary claims, in particular ST, and that these 
claims underlie the role Hare assigns to the universalizability thesis. If 
this is correct, we may formulate the central claim Hare makes regarding 
the move to maximize preference-satisfaction as follows . The claim is 
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5. that A, by entertaining the thought that some person might be himself, 
which involves regarding some state of that person as his, acquires a 
concern for the satisfaction of that person's preferences, which then 
because of universalizability - he treats as on equal par with his own 
(present) concerns. llB 
Now, the application of universalizability generates the following claim 
which has a bearing on the move to sum and balance. This is 
6. that just as it is rational for A to act on what he, prudentially 
speaking, most prefers should be done in his own actual case, so it is 
rational for him to act on what he most prefers should be done in the 
case in which he has, in addition to his own preferences, other 
preferences which he treats 'as if they were his own' through an act of 
the imagination . 
It is worth noting here that 6 is problematic. We may ask: what is there in 
universalizability which requires that a form of rational prudence be 
adopted in a two-person case of conflict? 2 is not independent of 
universalizability. The question arises: what constrains A to sum and 
balance on the basis of preference-strength alone, as 2 requires? In what 
follows I shall attempt to establish whether we are committed to 5 and 6, 
i.e. whether there is a rational requirement to the effect that A must 
maximize preference-satisfaction if he is to be rational. 
Let us return to the 'army'-case. If Hare is right about personal identity, 
A cannot use the word 'I' to identify the person standing in his own future 
shoes without currently preferring that the preferences he will then have 
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be satisfied. Identifying that person as himself implies that he has at 
present the required concern . We might formulate this as follows: 
7. If A knows that some state of some person will be a future of himself, 
he has a reason at present to be concerned about the satisfaction of 
the preferences he will have in that future state strictly in 
proportion to their strength. 
7 may be read as a requirement of A's rationality, i.e. of the request for 
correct factual information about his own case. If Hare is right, there is 
a rational requirement to the effect that he must presently desire that 
future preferences be satisfied strictly in proportion to their strength. 
But, 7 does not follow from Hare's concept of personal identity alone. 7 
assumes that the (supposed) fact of continuity has at present motivating 
force. So, to establish 7, we have to suppose that the required concern for 
the welfare of the person he will become obtains at present, i.e . we have 
to suppose that there is nothing about A's present self or his present 
motivational set which may serve as a reason presently to desire that his 
future preferences be frustrated, and that A is rational in the prudential 
sense. We need not suppose that an identity-related problem arises to see 
that the (supposed) fact of continuity may at present lack motivating 
force. 
Now, 7 does not say which preference he should satisfy to secure his own 
maximal welfare. This is a matter for Hare's requirement of prudence. Hare 
thinks that if A acts prudently, he will do what he presently believes is 
likely to maximize the satisfaction over time of only his strongest 
rational preferences. Hare makes clear that whatever is rationally 
preferred at any time always depends on what the alternatives at that time 
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are, and that a prudent choice is always a choice between rational 
alternatives. 119 So, 7 should be reformulated to read thus: 
8. If A knows that some state of some person will be a future state of 
himself, he has a reason presently to desire the satisfaction of the 
rational preferences he will have in that future state strictly in 
proportion to their strength. 
But, 8 says nothing about the (psychological) causes or the moral 
legitimacy of the preferences he presently believes he will have in 
envisaged future states of himself. We may ask: is there a rational 
requirement to the effect that future preferences and prescriptions should 
be accepted indifferently as regards to what is preferred or prescribed? 
Hare's thesis of the prescriptivity of 'I' does not address this question. 
And, even if we allow that he is rational in the prudential se nse , we still 
have no reason to accept that the content of future preferences should play 
no role in deciding which preferences to admit for consideration. One 
crucial question is whether there is a requirement in the single-person 
case that all considered preferences should be accepted for consideration 
indifferently of their content. It seems to me that whether one will have 
reason currently to desire that preferences one will have at other times be 
satisfied or frustrated, is largely a contingent matter. It is plausible to 
suggest that such reasons arise from a distinguishing feature of ones 
present sel f, or from a distinguishing feature of one's present 
motivational state, which at present (or at any given time which is 
present) one singles out to i dent ify the person about whom one is 
concerned, and which is the reason for thi s concern. 120 Now, there seems 
reason to accept that one is committed to prescribing that one's future 
preference be satisfied indifferently of their content if at present one 
no 
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has reason not to be sympathetically concerned about the person one 
envisages becoming. But, I have assumed that he does not lack this concern. 
If then, A is seeking that course of action which is likely to maximize the 
satisfaction, in sum, of his rational preferences over time, he has a 
reason to weigh all considered preferences against each other on the basis 
of strength alone, i.e. he has a rea son to satisfy the principle which 
requires that equal preferences should count equally, irrespective of their 
content. I am suggesting that in seeking to maximize the satisfaction, in 
sum, of his rational preferences overtime, A follows the following 
prudential rule. 
9. Prudential rule: If A at present believes that he will have preferences 
in some future state of himself which promote or serve the 
distinguishing feature of his present motivational state, he has a 
reason presently to desire that they be satisfied strictly in 
proportion to their strength. 
Now, matters are less straightforward in the 'contemptible-desire' case. We 
may ask: what reason does A, the non-conformist, have to accept 7 and B? If 
I am right, there is nothing in 7 or 8 to compel him to accept that all his 
preferences are equally worthy of satisfaction. It is not implausible to 
suggest, as I have done, that if the person he envisages becoming does not 
resemble him in those respects he most values at present, he has a reason 
at present to disallow that the preferences of that person are worthy of 
satisfaction. If this is in order, the following rule serves to qualify 7 
and 8. 
10 . If A at present believes that he will have preferences in some future 
state of himself which will generate reasons for action he cannot at 
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present accept, he has a reason presently to desire that those 
preferences be frustrated. 
If I am right in claiming that Hare supplies no good reason to suppose that 
present aversions of the kind we are consi dering should count for nothing 
in making prudential decisions, then the following rule serves to qualify 
9. 
11. If A at present believes that he will have preferences in some future 
state of himself which promote or serve the distinguishing feature of 
his present motivational state, he has a reason presently to desire 
that they be satisfied in proportion to the ir strength and 
indifferently of their content - otherwise not. 
The point is not that it would be irrational for him presently to desire 
that those preferences be satisf ied, but rather that they do not at presen t 
generate reasons for action (i.e. at present they lack motivating force). 
It is worth noting again that 11 does not ·imply that A has no reason to 
satisfy the principle which demands that he grant equal w~ight to all 
(considered) preferences of equal strength. I suggested above that he 
satisfies this principle whatever he decides to do. 
Let us now return to the two-person case. What reasons do we have to 
believe that A, the newly-wed, is committed to 7 and 8? I noted above that 
Hare's argument for act-utilitarianism begins with the appeal to rational 
prudence. This appeal works with the thesis of the prescriptivity of ' I ' to 
constrain A to satisfy KR. According to Hare, A satisfies the continuity 
requirements of personal identity by imagining that he is the person in B's 
precise situation, with B's set of universal features. So let us suppose 
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that the actual and hypothetical situations (51 and 52 respectively) are 
identical in all relevant universal respects, with this one irrelevant 
difference that in 52 A performs the role of recipient. If this be granted, 
and supposing that all other things are equal, A cannot evade 7. If this is 
correct, he will have acquired a hypothetical concern for the satisfaction 
of preferences he will have in 52. This is for the satisfaction of the 
preference that Fx. If appeal to the requirement of prudence is in order 
here, A can also not evade 8 . This, however, assumes that the decision-
procedure for the two-person case parallels the decision-procedure for the 
single-person case, i.e. putting himself in B's shoes is supposed to run 
parallel to putting himself in his own future shoes. 
If Hare is right, it is a condition of full representation that he must 
form the current preference that Fx be satisfied in ignorance of any 
information about the facts of his own actual case. It is part of what Hare 
means by becoming fully knowl edgeable and rational that he has to identify 
the person in the reversed -role situation as himself. But it is difficult 
to see how the requirement that he must form the preference that Fx be 
satisfied in ignorance of all other information aboul himself , counts as a 
requirement of rationality in the required sense in which a preference 
counts as rational if it is formed in full knowledge of all relevant 
i nformation. 12l Hare holds that it is possible to form a fully informed 
preference without appealing to a set of current preferences . 122 Yet a 
problem arises here concerning the reason A has to satisfy 9. If it is 
possible to say that he can use the word 'I' to refer to the person in the 
reversed-role situation as himself, this cannot be because of some 
distinguishing feature of his present self, or of his present motivational 
state, which he singles out to identify the person about whom he is 
concerned, and which is the reason for t his concern . It seems that we must 
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suppose that the word 'I' attaches to the person in the reversed-role 
situation indifferently of these things. But, if this is so, what reason do 
we have to believe that, in form i ng the preference for Fx' he has a 
motivating reason presently to desire that it be satisfied strictly in 
proportion to its strength? 
Now, the notion that a distinguishing feature of A's present self, or of 
his present motivational state, supplies a reason for th e required concern 
seems indispensable. If I am right, this supplies the motivational content 
of a reason for action. But it is creating problems. It blocks the view 
that there can be some overriding reason, like the (supposed) fact of 
continuity itself, for satisfyi ng preferences if there is at present no 
motivating reason to satisfy them, and in particular the view that 
rationality requires that A accept that pre fe rences be satisfied strictly 
in proportion to their strength and indifferently of their content. 
It seems that the sort of rule Hare requires must be one that allows the 
motivational conten t of present re asons for action to be derived from 
motivational states which do not at present obtain. So, the following rule 
would seem to be in order: 
12. If A at present believes that in some state of hi mself he will have 
preferences which promote or serve a distinguishing feature of himself, 
or a motivational state he will then have, he has a reason presently to 
desire that those preferences be satisfied strictly in proportion to 
their strength. 
12 requires that preferences be accepted indifferently as regards to what 
is preferred and as regards to who is doing the preferring . If 12 were in 
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order, A has a reason presently to desire that all preferences be satisfied 
strictly in proportion to their strength, albeit only initially . But 12 
gives rise to a problem of a different kind. We may ask: why should A 
accept that all relevant preferences are unproblematically his preferences? 
The constraints of Hare's method require a very strong interpretation of 
his concept of personal identity . If Hare i s right, he satisfies the 
con tinuity requirements of personal identity by imagining that he is the 
person in the reversed-role situat ion, though in that situation he will 
have a different set of identifying features . But, what reason do we have 
to beli eve that the person he imagines becoming and the person he presently 
identifies as himself are one and the same person?123 
It is worth noting that universalizability rules ou t as it 'relevant any 
information A may have regarding which motivational state i s actually his 
own. But a reference to himself is indispensable for our understanding of 
what constrains him to maximize the satisfaction of his rational 
preferences over time. This reason provides the basis for the application 
of a prudential rule in t he single-person case. But will it do as a reason 
in the two -person case? We may ask: what criteria of personal identity 
yield the judgement that he may have two sets of identifying features, 
albeit in different positions and at different times? If this is in order, 
he has as yet no compelling reason to accept some set of preferences as the 
rational set, nor a reason to maximize the satisfaction of this set. 
Now, how might A decide what the 'prudent' course of action will be? 
Preference-strength is obviously one relevant crite rion for coming to a 
decision. But it is not the only criterion . I have argued above, in 
connection with the single-person case, that a prudential rule which works 
on the assumption that all preferences be admitted as equally worthy of 
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satisfaction, would be unsatisfactory if taken to rule out as irrational 
reasons one may have at present to desire that one or other member of one's 
preference-set be frustrated. There has to be a reason for A presently to 
desire that one or other member of his preference-set be frustrated. 2 
above suggests that preference-strength is the final criterion. If I am 
right, Hare cannot defend at least one requirement of rationality - 2 above 
- without reference to universalizability. 2 is essential for Hare's 
argument as a whole, for it is the premiss which commits A to 6. But 6 is 
problematic. We may ask: what is there in universalizability which requires 
that a form of rational prudence be adopted in the two-person case of 
preference-conflict? 
I think the only reason for A presently to desire that some of his 
preferences be frustrated, turns on a belief about which member of his 
present motivational set is or wil l be the distinguishing feature of 
himself. We might then say that there is a reason for A to maximize the 
satisfaction of his rational preferences over time, only if these 
preferences serve or promote that member of his present motivational set 
which he at present identifies as the distinguishing feature of himself. 
But this is a move which universalizability blocks. If Hare is right, he 
has to accept that all members of his present motivational set are ' his 
own', and then to make a final decision on the basis of preference-strength 
alone . But, this is to assume that in compe lling A to think of the person 
in the reversed-role situation as himself, he has at present reasons not to 
discount preferences which serve or promote motivational states he cannot 
at present accept, not even initially . I think this suggests that the 
rational requirements of decision-making on the basis of a prudential rule 
in the two-person case demand more than the parallel requirements of the 
single-person case demand. 
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Is appeal to a form of rational prudence the appropriate response in the 
two-person case? Can a single principle of rational choice govern decision-
making in two different kinds of conflict situation, viz, conflicts between 
distinct individuals and conflicts within particular individuals?124 
I argued above in connection with the single-person case that a 
distinguishing feature of one's present self, or of one ' s present 
motivational set, is indispensable for our understanding of why one may 
have reasons presently to desire that fully represented future preferences 
be satisfied or frustrated. If I am right, there is always something about 
one's present self, or one's present motivational set, which supplies the 
reasons for a preference ordering or ranking, and the motivation presently 
to act in ways compatible with what one will have reason to do or to avoid 
at other times . We may grant Hare the claim that my knowledge of my own 
envisaged future suffering neces saril y involves having present motivations 
that the suffering stop. Hare claims that this link is 'conceptual' . But, 
if I am right, it does not follow from this that I will necessarily have no 
reasons at present to reject some preferences as unworthy of satisfaction. 
I suggested that a prudential rule which rules out such reasons as 
irrational would be unsatisfactory in that it would fail to take account of 
what is distinctive about oneself . 
Now, in the two-person case the conceptual link just referred to holds 
between my knowing what it is like for you to be suffering, and my having 
at present equal aversion to suffering for a similar hypothetical situation 
in which I am the sufferer, which universalizability then compels me to 
treat as actual and ' my own ' . The strategy Ha re employs to compel me to 
grant all considered preferences the same consideration as I grant my own 
considered preferences, which is to reduce the inter-personal case of 
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conflict to an intra-personal one, does not deny the simple fact that the 
preferences I treat 'as if they were my own' are the preferences of a 
different person . I shall grant Hare the claim that to the extent I am 
compelled to think of the person in the reversed role situation as myself, 
to that extent different persons are treated equally. This is Hare's way of 
ensuring that we will not refuse the principle of granting equal weight to 
the equal preferences of all parties concerned, and to balance all 
considered interests on the basis of preference -strength alone . 
But, even if we grant Hare the reduction i st move, it does not follow that 
it serves as a co nstraint to maxim ize. I argued above in connection with 
the single-person case, that the mere fact of continuity itself does not 
provide a blanket reason to accept that all one's preferences are equally 
worthy of satisfaction, for such a reason ignores what is distinctive about 
one's present self, or one's present motivational set. I also said that we 
need to assume in addition a strong degree of self-concern as a component 
of one's present motivational set. This, taken together with one's present 
concerns, yields a reason presently to desire the maximal satisfaction, in 
sum, of all considered preferences, for these preferences will serve or 
promote one or other motivational state one at present accepts. Regarding 
the two-person case, I suggested that one needs to treat one or other 
member of one's present motivational set as if it were or will be the 
distinguishing feature of one's present self. But universalizability blocks 
thi s move. So the question arises what grounds we have to believe that he 
has a reason to maximize? It is worth noting that the preferences he is 
seeking maximally to satisfy must serve one or other member of his present 
motivational set, for otherwise they cannot at present generate reasons for 
action. As I judge, Hare's theory lacks the required motivational 
structure. It is indeed difficult to see what there is in 
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universalizability which requires that a form of rational prudence be 
adopted. If there is a (motivating) reason to maximize, this must come from 
elsewhere, from outside Hare ' s theory itself. 125 
Earlier on I asked whether a single principle of rational choice can govern 
decision-making in two different kinds of conflict situation. I think 
Hare's attempt to do so i s methodologically inappropriate. 126 The objection 
is that a prudential rule does not work in the two-person case, and this is 
largely due to universalizability. The idea of an 'I' or a 'me' with a set 
of concerns and a motivational set, which serves as the distinguishing 
feature of myself, loses all force in the reductionist move, and creates 
the motivational gap to which I have drawn attention. 12 l This suggests that 
the analogy between the prudent individual and the prudent universalizer is 
a false analogy. 
There is, however, no compelling reason why we should grant Hare the 
reductionist move. We should recognize that the reductionist move, which 
demands that all relevant preferences be viewed as the preferences of a 
single person, is a methodological move. But the constraints of this move 
require a very st ringent interpretation of Hare's notion of what 
constitutes a person. 128 1 satisfy the continuity requirements of personal 
identity by imagining that 1 am the person in the reversed-role situation, 
though in that situation 1 will have a different set of identifying 
features . But, the person 1 imagine becoming and the person 1 presently 
identify as myself are different persons, for it is obvious that we do not 
share the same set of identifying features. In Chapters 2 and 3 1 have 
argued that it is logically impossible to suppose that 1 can imag ine what 
it would be like for myself to be you, though not that I can imagine what 
it is like for you, if we assume that I have access to your experiences in 
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just the way I have access to my own. So, if the person I represent as 
having certain experiences is not myself, I cannot treat my representations 
of what it is like for him as representations of what it would be like for 
myself. If this is correct, the knowledge Hare supposes is available to me, 
is not knowledge I can have . If the 'felt'-disposition account of my 
knowledge of your preferences is the appropriate account, I cannot construe 
the feel of what it is like for you as knowledge of what it would be like 
for myself, because it makes no sense to say that I can imagine myself to 
be you. If knowledge of your experiences is not available to me in the 
sense in which this is required, then the crucial claim that my knowledge 
of your experiences entails that I prefer what you in·fact prefer, may be 
rejected as false. 
I said that the knowledge requirement and its subsidiary claims underlie 
the role Hare assigns to the universalizability thesis. If I am right, the 
points just raised remove all necessary grounds for the universalizability 
thesis to come into play. It is therefore difficult to see what constrains 
Hare 's fanatic to set aside the view that his ideal matters simply because 
it is his. It is possible, in the intial stages of the argument advanced in 
MT, to evade satisfying the knowledge requirement, and to refuse the 
subsequent steps. If I am right, it is difficult to see how the role-
reversal procedure can come into play, and hence what force the thesis of 
the prescriptivity of 'I' can have. In view of this I am inclined to think 
that the new thesis advanced in MT, which Hare attempts to defend 
independent of universalizability, does not place the argument of MT in a 
better position than the arguments advanced in FR and ETU. 
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